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1. introDuction
The existence and survival of life in the world, including the incipi-
ence and development of humanity, has been accompanied by emer-
gencies, disasters and catastrophes. Humans have always been exposed 
to different hazards (Tammepuu et al., 2009). Emergencies have oc-
curred in the past, occur at present and will occur in the future, and, 
in hazardous environments, as Flynn and Theodore (2001, 80) argue, 
accidents will happen again – it is only a question of time. Major 
accidents and hazards are results of destabilising factors, which can 
cause serious setbacks and breakdowns in the continuous develop-
mental process (Tammepuu et al., 2008). Currently, the outbreaks of 
unwanted accidental events are mostly uncertain and are thus usually 
handled in relation to risk concept. Risks, hazards and threats can be 
hidden and kept out of the public eye until something serious hap-
pens (Tammepuu et al., 2008, 2009). Therefore, it is important for 
communities to be aware of these risks (Tammepuu et al., 2008). For 
this purpose, risk assessment is an essential part of civil protection 
(Tammepuu et al., 2007). Currently, the requirements concerning 
emergency preparedness, which include accident risk identification 
and assessment, can be found in several international/national legal 
documents and also in various standards.
The emergency risk assessment in Estonia began in the early 1990s, 
and since then, it has continued to produce remarkable achievements 
in methodological developments and practical applications. Although 
risk assessment is currently an essential component of Estonian crisis 
management, many gaps, contradictions and ambiguities concerning the 
legal and methodological requirements, classifications of emergencies, 
indicators, etc. have remained. 
The scope of this dissertation embraces the development and current state 
of emergency risk assessment in Estonia as one of the ‘new’ members of 
the EU. This dissertation is composed of the national, regional-local and 
organisational levels. The comparison with the UK as an ‘old’ member 
of the EU has an important place in the entire thesis. The objective and 
aims are expressed more precisely in Chapter 3. The overview of the 
studies for finding solutions to the proposed aims is combined in seven 
papers. The following is a brief review of these papers:
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Paper i generically summarises the problems of emergency risk assess-
ment in Estonia. The development of the emergency risk assessment is 
discussed in retrospective, current and comparative contexts. The survey 
shifts its attention to the impact of national and international acts on 
this development of the emergency risk assessment and discusses the ap-
plication of emergency risk assessment outcomes. 
Paper ii is composed of the problems that are connected with the risk 
assessment of emergency situations in Estonia and their relations with 
land use planning, in view of the risk assessment of the city of Tartu. 
The scenarios of the development of emergency situations are grouped 
into five groups in relation to land use and spatial planning, which are 
described and analysed separately.
Paper iii is composed of the Estonian and the British national risk as-
sessments. The selected indicators include a comparison of legislative 
requirements, provisions and performance, methodologies, types of an-
alysed risks, large-scale risk assessment outcomes, and risk assessment 
results, as well as the usage of risk. 
Paper iv presents a comparative study of city risk assessment in Esto-
nia, which is a so-called ‘new member’, and in the UK, which is an ‘old 
member’ of the EU. The comparison of the outcomes used four strate-
gically selected risk assessments of Estonian cities and the same number 
of British cities. 
Paper v concerns the integration of Safety Management Systems of the 
Estonian Seveso II establishments into ISO-based Integrated Manage-
ment Systems (IMS). The results demonstrated that, in spite of different 
approaches, many common factors exist, which enabled general recom-
mendations to be determined. 
Paper vi discusses the problem of the integration of emergency pre-
paredness and safety management into the ISO-based integrated man-
agement system (IMS). The problem was observed in the context of a 
case study of the Port of Tallinn, which has implemented the integrated 
quality and environmental management system. 
Paper vii observes the application of emergency preparedness and re-
sponse in environmental management systems. In this context of ambi-
12
guity, we studied Estonian enterprises to analyse a variety of approaches 
to emergency preparedness and response. A comprehensive study en-
gaged the identification and assessment of accidents and emergency sit-
uations, as well as the response to these situations by organisations that 
had implemented the requirements of the ISO 14001.
13
2. rEviEW of tHE litEraturE
2.1. Meaning of emergency risk
The term ‘risk’ is widely used both in the scientific world and in everyday 
life (Christou, 1998). Risk is an integral part of life (Smith, 2001) that 
has become one of the most powerful concepts in modern society (Leiss 
and Chociolko, 1994), to the extent that today’s world has even been 
called a ‘risk society’ (Beck, 2000). Wlodarczyk and Tennyson (2003) 
contend that risk is both the product of the harmful consequence of an 
activity or event and the probability of its occurrence. Safety literature 
most commonly defines risk as the probability of an adverse future event 
multiplied by its magnitude (Adams, 2001). Although contemporary 
society is greatly concerned with many aspects of risk, the concept of 
risk and its assessment and management have not yet been sufficiently 
developed to provide a holistic approach (Aven and Kristensen, 2005). 
The EU Civil Protection Financial Instrument (EC, 2007a) defines an 
emergency as any situation that has or may have an adverse impact on 
people, and preparedness is defined as a state of readiness in which the 
capacity of human and material means enables protection against such 
emergencies (EC, 2007a, 2007b, Article 3). The UN ISDR terminology 
considers the terms ‘crisis’ and ‘emergency’ as effectively the same, with 
both being ‘a threatening condition that requires urgent action’ (UN 
ISDR, 2009, 12). The glossary of the European Environment Agency 
(EEA, 2010) defines collocations containing ‘emergency’, such as ‘emer-
gency law’ and ‘emergency plan’, but unfortunately not the word ‘emer-
gency’ itself. 
The Estonian Emergency Preparedness Act (Parliament of Estonia, 
2000), which was valid until 23 July 2009, designated an emergency as 
‘an event or a chain of events, which endangers national security, the life 
and health of persons, causes significant damages to the environment 
or extensive economic damage’ (Parliament of Estonia, 2000: Section 2 
of General Provisions). Responding to any of these events requires ‘the 
co-ordinated action of the Government of the Republic, government 
agencies and local governments’ (Parliament of Estonia, 2000: Section 
2 of General Provisions). This definition is comparable to Smith’s defi-
nition of disaster as: ‘an event, concentrated in time and space, in which 
a community experiences severe danger and disruption of its essential 
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functions, accompanied by widespread human, material or environmen-
tal losses, which often exceed the ability of the community to cope with-
out external assistance (Smith, 2001, 7).
2.2. Emergency risk assessment in the context of civil protection
Today a wide range of professions and academic subjects use the technique 
of risk assessment (Fairman et al., 1998). Risk assessment is an essential 
component of the overall management of risks within society, and specifi-
cally risks to human health and/or the environment (OECD, 1997). It is 
the first step in explaining the problems and evaluating the significance of 
risk either quantitatively or qualitatively (Smith, 2001). Although today’s 
society is greatly concerned with many aspects of risk, the concept of risk 
and its assessment and management have not yet been sufficiently devel-
oped to meet many challenges (Aven and Kristensen, 2005). 
Lonka (1999) conducted a comparative study of risk assessment in the 
field of civil protection in Europe and concluded that in many European 
countries the usefulness of the further development of risk assessment 
in the field of civil protection and emergency preparedness was clearly 
recognized. The European research project QUARTER concentrated on 
the development of a territorial management system for territorial risk 
reduction and environmental quality improvement (Treu et al., 2004). 
In the frames of the previously mentioned research project, a methodo-
logical framework for territorial vulnerability analysis and assessment was 
worked out (Treu et al., 2005). In the context of territorial vulnerability 
analysis the Environmental Risk Management System procedure was pro-
posed by the research group (Baldi et al., 2004). 
Risk assessments on a national level are recognized to be a determinant 
for improving disaster prevention and preparedness activities (EC, 
2010a). Recently the European Commission issued risk assessment 
guidelines with the main goals being to improve coherence among 
the national risk assessments and to make these risk assessments more 
comparable between member states (EC, 2010a). Nowadays many 
countries are undertaking national risk assessments (EC, 2010a), in-
cluding the UK (Cabinet Office, 2010a) and Estonia (Ministry of the 
Interior, 2011). 
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2.3. Emergency risks regulated by Eu directives
2.3.1. Major chemical accident risks and safety
The essential principles and requirements concerning the EU risk as-
sessment of industrial institutions designated as major accident hazards 
are formulated in the Seveso II Directive (EC, 1997). This document 
belongs to the most remarkable EU Directives, supporting the protec-
tion of people and the environment from major accidental hazards (Salvi 
and Gaston, 2004). The requirements for risk assessment are specified 
in the accompanying guidance on the preparation of a safety report (see 
MAHB, 2005) and in land use planning guidelines (see MAHB, 2006). 
The accidental risk assessment methodology for industries (ARAMIS) 
developed by the ARAMIS project had as one objective the creation of 
a harmonised EU-wide methodology based on the specific requirements 
of the Seveso II directive, combining the strengths of both deterministic 
and probabilistic approaches (Salvi and Debray, 2006).
The Seveso II Directive requires the compilation of a “Major Accident Pre-
vention Policy” (MAPP) and “Safety Management System” (SMS) from 
all establishments with a major accident hazard (EC, 1997; Duijm and 
Goossens, 2006) on the basis of a summarized qualifying quantity by An-
nex I of the Directive. In accordance with Annex III of the Directive the 
SMS must embrace the following issues (EC, 1997; Basso et al., 2004):
1. Organisation and personnel
2. Identification and evaluation of major hazards
3. Operational control
4. Management of change
5. Planning for emergencies
6. Monitoring performance
7. Audit and review
The Safety Management System can be briefly defined as the system for 
implementing safety management (Mitchison and Papadakis, 1999). SMS 
substantially means multiple activities, initiatives, programs, etc., consoli-
dated by organisational, human and technical aspects (Harms-Ringdahl, 
2004). SMS in a formal sense is a framework, holding a large package 
of documents, containing different procedures, manuals, charts, reports, 
records, emergency plans, etc. (Bragatto et al., 2010). The safety manage-
ment system is considered to be a basic component of the organisations’ 
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safety culture (Fernandez-Muniz et al., 2007; Sales et al., 2007). The size 
and orientation of SMS procedures are deeply dependent on identifica-
tion and evaluation of major accident hazards and selection of risk analy-
sis method(s) (Demichela et al., 2004). The integration of the principles 
of inherent safety and land use planning into the plant safety manage-
ment system permits the reduction of possible consequences (Vierendeels 
et al., 2011). The SMS of neighbouring Seveso establishments may be 
organized in clusters, which enables observing common risks and possible 
counteractions as well as knowledge exchange and coordinated planning 
of pro-active and re-active measures (Reniers et al., 2009). 
2.3.2. flood risks
The main requirements for the risk assessments of floods are present-
ed in the EU’s new Flood Directive (EC, 2007b), which includes the 
preparation of flood hazard maps and flood risk maps. De Moel et al. 
(2009) suggest that the Directive refers to the mapping of flood hazards 
and risks as essential components of flood risk assessment and are conse-
quently the basis of flood risk management plans. 
2.3.3. critical infrastructure risks
The requirements for the identification and designation of European 
critical infrastructures (ECIs) and the assessment of the need to improve 
their protection were enacted in the Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 
December 2008 (EC, 2008).Vrijling et al. (2004) characterise critical in-
frastructures as complex societal systems, and Pursiainen, Lindblom and 
Franke (2007) argue that they play an essential role in the maintenance 
of vital societal functions such as the supply chain, health, safety, security 
and the economic and social well-being of the population. Although the 
Directive (EC, 2008) focuses on ECIs, the disruption or destruction of 
which would have a significant impact on at least two Member States, 
the Directive’s main principles have broader applicability. 
2.4. application of emergency risk assessment outcomes
2.4.1. Environmental assessment and management
The term ‘risk’ is not defined in the main texts of the Environmental Im-
pact Assessment (EIA) Directive (EC, 1985), the Strategic Environmental 
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Assessment (SEA) Directive (EC, 2001), Estonia’s Environmental Impact 
Assessment and Environmental Management System Act (Parliament of 
Estonia, 2005), ISO 14001 (2004) or the EU’s Eco-Management and 
Audit Scheme regulation (EC, 2009). Although risk is not defined and 
is strictly exteriorised in the above documents, the practical requirement 
to consider the probability of its consequences creates an unavoidable 
necessity for the practical usage of risk assessment as a tool for explaining 
environmental aspects and impacts (Tammepuu and Sepp, 2013). 
2.4.2. Mapping and spatial planning
The ESPON Hazards Project 1.3.1 has worked out spatial patterns of 
natural and technological hazards in Europe in the shape of an overview 
on all NUTS3 areas (Schmidt-Thome et al., 2006). The European re-
search project QUARTER concentrated on the development of a territo-
rial management system for territorial risk reduction and environmental 
quality improvement (Treu et al., 2004). The report of the project EU-
ROBALTIC I presents different examples of methodologies of risk as-
sessment, management and mapping in the Baltic Sea Region, developed 
and applied in the countries of the region (Hedin et al., 2006). 
2.5. Emergency risk in the context of iso 14001 and iMs
Today several organisations over the world have implemented and cer-
tified integrated management systems (IMS), based on corresponding 
ISO standards, relying on the universal management cycle of plan-do-
check-act (PDCA) and containing quality (ISO 9001, 2008), environ-
ment (ISO 14001, 2004) and often also occupational health and safety 
requirements (BS OHSAS 18001, 2007). The latter is not based on ISO 
standards, but on a document of the British Standard Institute, which 
has generically adopted the structure of ISO 14001 and has been rec-
ognized in many countries. The ISO 14001 and OHSAS 18001 both 
contain requirements concerning emergency and safety management.
The International Organization for Standardization’s (ISO) standard for 
Environmental Management Systems (EMS), ISO 14001, is a globally 
recognized standard containing direct requirements for emergency pre-
paredness and response (ISO 14001, 2004). The global context is reflect-
ed in the 129,199 organizations in 140 countries that were certified, in 
2006, as observing the ISO 14001 EMS standard (ISO/Survey, 2006; 
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Balzarova and Castka, 2008). Emergency preparedness and response is 
one of the key elements of ISO 14001, for which all certified organisa-
tions have taken responsibility (ISO 14001, 2004).
The ISO 14001 standard provides a practical and workable framework for 
controlling environmental risk to prevent accidents and environmental 
regulation violations (Kwon et al., 2002). The avoidance of environmen-
tal risks arising from the activities of the organisation and mitigation of 
the impact deriving from accidents and emergencies is one of the goals of 
implementing the environmental management system (EMS) (Belmane 
et al., 2002). At the same time the meanings of emergency or emergency 
preparedness are not defined in the ISO 14001 (ISO 14001, 2004). Mar-
tin (1998) for instance brings out that emergencies include releases of all 
types to the environment, including natural disasters that might lead to 
releases, and process hazards that might become emergencies. 
Risk in the different issues of ISO 14001 (Jones and Mason, 2002; Mar-
tin and Edgley, 1998; Voorhees and Woellner, 1998) is observed in a 
broader context than that of merely emergencies and accidents, cover-
ing additional uncertain and undesirable environmental impacts. The 
ISO 14001 sets that environmental aspects should not be limited only 
to normal operational conditions; abnormal and emergency situations 
must also be considered (ISO 14001, 2004; Põder, 2006). Voorhees And 
Woellner (1998) point out, that for understanding the degree of risk, 
ISO 14001 requires that the following environmental concerns need to 
be addressed: the scale of the impact, the severity of the impact, the 
probability of occurrence, and the duration of impact. Organizations, in 
addition to first-string ones, often engage risk management specialists to 
assist in the identification of potential emergency or accident situations 
that could lead to human injury, environmental damage, or economic 
loss (Schaarsmith, 2005).
The ISO 14001 (2004) does not specify that the accidents and emer-
gency situations, covered by the procedure(s), descend only from the 
elements of an organisation’s activities, products and services, (e.g. envi-
ronmental aspects – on-site hazards). Conversely, the responding guid-
ance of ISO 14004 (ISO 14004, 2004) mentions that in establishing its 
procedure(s), the organization should include consideration of the po-
tential for (an) emergency situation(s) or accident(s) at a nearby facility 
(e.g. plant, road, railway line). 
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A number of studies have been carried out, concerning emergency pre-
paredness in ISO 14001 certified enterprises, some of which focus on 
major chemical hazards and relationships with ISO 14001 (Rosenthal 
and Theiler, 1998; Gerbec and Kontic, 2009). Rosenthal and Theiler 
(1998) discuss, for example, the ISO 14000 option of implementing 
the United States Environmental Protection Agency’s rule on Risk Man-
agement Programs for Chemical Accidental Release Prevention. Gerbec 
and Kontic (2009) conducted a survey of the implementation of the 
Seveso II Directive enterprises in Slovenia, in which they found the ma-
jority of the ‘Seveso enterprises’ were combining the Safety Management 
System, as required by the directive, with voluntary management sys-
tems, including the ISO 14001. Other studies, while focusing on any 
of a broad range of ISO 14001 topics will include emergency prepared-
ness and response (Savely et al., 2007; Sambasivan and Yun Fei, 2008; 
Marazza et al., 2010; Saengsupavanich et al., 2009). Savely and others 
(2007) in a survey of the implementation status of EMS in U.S. colleges 
and universities demonstrate that environmental emergency prepared-
ness and response procedures were present in 88% of the studied cases. 
Sambasivan and Yun Fei (2008) argued organizational preparedness to 
emergency situations is a component and a key factor of organisation-
al change. Marazza et al. (2010) studied the environmental aspects of 
local authorities, bringing out that direct environmental aspects could 
also include the risks of environmental accidents. Saengsupavanich et al. 
(2009), during an environmental performance evaluation of a Thai port 
and adjoining industrial estate, included a study of emergency prepar-
edness and plans. They determined emergency plan availability as one 
of the environmental performance indicators (Saengsupavanich et al., 
2009).
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3. oBJEctivE anD aiMs of tHis stuDy
The objective of this dissertation was a survey of the development of 
Estonian emergency risk assessment since the restitution of Estonia as an 
independent state, which examined the impact of legislation and guide-
lines from other states and international institutions. 
The particular aims of the present doctoral thesis were as follows:
1. To identify and determine the key events and agents of the develop-
ment of emergency risk assessment of Estonia.
2. To observe the development and application of the emergency risk 
assessment and its outcomes in Estonia on national, regional-local 
and organisational levels.
3. To compare the national and local level emergency risk assessments 
of Estonia and the UK. 
4. To study the emergency risk assessment in the context of Estonian 
case organisations with certified ISO 14001 environmental manage-
ment systems. 
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4. MatErials anD MEtHoDs
4.1. study area and sites
This dissertation consists of a series of relatively independent studies, 
whose essential intersection is the theme of emergency risk assessment in 
Estonia and, partly, in the UK in a comparative context. Thus, the mate-
rials and methods are observed separately by concrete survey directions.
The generalised study area predominantly embraces the entire territory 
and concrete sites of Estonia and part of the UK. 
4.2. Development and organisation of Emra in Estonia
4.2.1. The Estonian approach to emergency risk assessment
The emergency risk assessment generic study (i) in Estonia, which em-
braced both the development and current arrangement, was, to a large 
extent, of a reference quality, in that there was no direct disparity be-
tween the reference sources and research documents. The main research 
documents, in addition to literary resources, were legislative acts and 
regulations, methodologies and different reports of risk assessments, en-
vironmental assessments, etc. The prevailing methodological approach 
was a textual analysis, which was based on the selection of key topics and 
determining limiting features for the systematic determination and de-
scription of the developmental process of emergency risk assessment on 
Estonian state, regional, local and organisational levels, while revealing 
the impacts of legal documents and methodologies of other countries 
and international organisations. Some descriptive statistics were applied 
only in a subsequently described case study. 
The case study, which performed risk assessments of the hazardous enter-
prises of the South-Estonian region, was performed using a correspond-
ing questionnaire. There were 147 hazardous enterprises, which included 
enterprises with major chemical accident hazards, in the six counties of 
the South-Estonian region. The results of the questionnaire were pro-
cessed in the Microsoft Excel program. 
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4.2.2. case study of tartu
The risk assessment of the city of Tartu (ii) was based on the document 
“Methodology of Risk Assessment of County, City and Community”, 
which was enacted by a regulation of the Minister of the Interior (2001). 
The risks were assessed by a risk matrix approach, which uses a 5-step 
ranking system for the assessment of probability (1-5, where 1 was the 
lowest and 5 was the highest) and the consequences (A-E, where A was 
the least serious and E was the most serious) were united into the matrix, 
which was based on principles that were analogous to the APELL/UNEP 
methodology (UNEP IE/PAC, 1992). 
The probabilities of the accidents occurring were assessed indirectly, con-
sidering the existing statistics of accidental events, as well as the possible 
internal and external causes and initial events that could activate acci-
dent scenarios. The consequences of each selected accident scenario were 
first assessed separately using the following four tasks: human life and 
health, essential sectors, environment and property, with each task given 
a five-point ranking. Then, a general appraisal was given. 
The methodology of complementary analysis consisted of determining 
appropriate criteria for a systematic approach to hazard zoning and to 
the application of risk assessment results for land use planning. This 
analysis embraced the attempt to find and describe characteristic features 
by which the accident types and concrete emergency scenarios could be 
distinguished and analytically described concerning their relation to the 
rural and urban environment and to group these events using these char-
acteristic features for further practical application. The benchmarks in 
this approach were the type and distribution of the risk sources, as well 
as impacts of these sources.
4.3. comparative studies of Estonia and the uk
Comparative studies of the national (iii) and local (iv) risk assessments 
of Estonia and the UK were performed as textual analyses of certain cas-
es: the public outcome documents of the national risk assessments and 
the selected cities or conurbations of the two countries.
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4.3.1. comparative study of the national risk assessments
The main research materials of study iii were the most recent publicly 
available output documents of the national risk assessments of the two 
countries: the 2008 National Summary of Risk Assessments for Emer-
gencies (Ministry of the Interior, 2009) of Estonia and the National Risk 
Register of Civil Emergencies (2010 edition, Cabinet Office, 2010a) of 
the United Kingdom. The observed and compared subjects were the re-
quirements, methodologies, output document compositions, risk assess-
ment processes, risk assessment performers, risk types, risk categories, 
and risk assessment outcomes. 
4.3.2. comparative study of the Estonian and the uk city  
risk assessments
Comparative study iv of the emergency risk assessments in Estonia and the 
UK was drafted using the comparison of the selected documents by specific 
criteria. The research materials were legislative acts and regulations, guides, 
risk assessment reports of Estonian cities and community risk registers with 
supplementary materials from British cities (including the boroughs in 
London) and conurbations. The Estonian sample risk assessment reports 
were of the largest cities of Estonia’s four rescue regions: Tallinn (North-Es-
tonia), Tartu (South-Estonia), Narva (together with the Vaivara municipal-
ity, East-Estonia) and Pärnu (West-Estonia). The British analogues were the 
community risk registers of the boroughs of London, Greater Manchester, 
West Midlands conurbation (Birmingham with surrounding urban areas), 
and Belfast. The last community was chosen because differences exist in the 
requirements and methodologies for Scotland and Northern Ireland. The 
compared and discussed criteria were the following: steps of risk assessment; 
risk types and categories; assessment of likelihood and consequences; risk 
assessment performance; public availability; outcomes and outputs.
4.4. Emergency risk assessment in  
iso 14001 certified organisations
4.4.1. Emra in iMs: case studies of three Estonian establishments 
with major chemical accident hazards
At present, as previously stated, approximately 1/3 of Seveso II establish-
ments in Estonia have implemented the integrated management system. 
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Three of these establishments, which each belong to different economic 
activities, were selected for case studies in the scope of study v. One 
principle of the selection was finding organisations that were not com-
petitors with each other. This principle allowed for pleasant conditions 
for possible further cooperation between the specialists of the organisa-
tions in IMS and SMS development.
The common characteristics of the selected case organisations were the 
following: first, all three organisations belonged to international corpo-
rations; second, all the establishments had implemented and certified at 
least the ISO 9001 and ISO 14001 as IMS; and third, all three had the 
additional duty to follow the internal standards of their international 
corporations. One of the three case study establishments belonged to the 
upper tier and the two others belonged to the lower tier, according to 
the threshold quantity of dangerous substances, which was presented in 
Annex I of the Seveso II Directive (EC, 1997).
The dominating method was the textual analysis of the following: safety 
reports or descriptions of SMS-s, handbooks of IMS-s, procedures and 
guides of IMS-s and also emergency plans. During the case studies, rel-
atively more attention was focused on SMS-specific components: the 
identification and evaluation of major hazards (risk assessments), as well 
as planning for emergencies.
4.4.2. case study of the Port of tallinn
The methodology of case study vi of the emergency preparedness in the 
IMS of the Port of Tallinn was principally textual analysis, which was 
in the form of an audit of the safety system of the ports. This method-
ology essentially embraced the revision of sample documents. The sam-
ple documents were primarily the components of the integrated quality 
(ISO 9001, 2008) and environmental (ISO 14001, 2004) management 
systems of the port. These sample documents included the handbook, 
the procedures, the additional documents derived from the procedures 
as guidance, plans, filled forms and reports. The assessment criteria were 
legal requirements and the requirements of the standard ISO 14001. 
The document analysis was complemented by interviews with key per-
sons and by observations of the sites. The interviews with selected re-
sponsible persons of the ports embraced the practical operations for 
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espousing the requirements. The aim of observations on the sites was 
primarily the comparison of the contents of the documents with real 
situations and finding possible nonconformities. 
4.4.3. Emra in Estonian organisations: a multiple case study
Study vii was conducted by sending a survey questionnaire to selected 
Estonian ISO 14001 certified organisations. The questionnaire consisted 
of 16 questions, including 7 open questions, 6 questions with select-
ed answers and 3 closed questions, which were designed to elicit data 
and information concerning the enterprises’ structures, and their com-
pliance, aspirations and problems with ISO 14001 certification in the 
specific context of emergency preparedness and response. The questions 
embraced the following topics:
•	 Identification of possible emergencies and accidents
•	 Types of identified accidents and emergencies
•	 Emergency preparedness, response procedures and emergency 
plans;
•	 Training and testing
•	 Proposals for continual improvement
•	 Information sources.
Initially, 84 companies with the longest experience in having certified en-
vironmental management systems were selected. This selection indicates 
that only organisations that had certified environmental management 
systems before the publication of the new version of the ISO 14001 
standard in 2004, were chosen. The questionnaire was sent to these 84 
companies. In total, 45 of these organisations returned completed or 
partially completed questionnaires. The data regarding these 45 organ-
isations are displayed in Table 1, which were adapted from paper vii. 
The sizes of the workforces were rounded to complete ‘tens’ and ranged 
from 40–4600, which, for the 44 enterprises that supplied this data, 
meant an average workforce of 350 and a median of 150. In the context 
of chemical hazards, almost 23% (10 of 44) were enterprises with ‘ma-
jor chemical accident hazards’ according to the criteria of the Seveso II 
Directive (1997) or ‘hazardous enterprises’ according to the criteria of 
Estonia’s Chemicals Act 1998 (Parliament of Estonia, 1998). 
The descriptive statistics were based on either or both the percentages 
and number of responses. The percentages were rounded into integers, 
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and when the number of responses, due to incomplete questionnaires, 
fell short of the total (45), the shortened total is indicated, e.g., 30% 
of 43. In addition to simple descriptive statistics, factor analysis using 
the SAS software (SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC, USA) to uncover the 
main patterns and structures in emergency preparedness and response 
was used.




Business Activity Category Size of Workforce and 
Chemical Accident 
Hazard (+)
6 Electronics and electrical equipment 70,110,110,130,490,520
5 Construction 90,220,270,290,330
4 Chemical industry 60+,60+,110+,210+
4 Energy Production and distribution 140,160+,300,990
3 Petroleum products 50+,110+,150+
3 Printing 40,50,180
2 Building materials 80,130
2 Design 70,100 
2 Furniture industry 130,200
2 Metalworking 70,650
2 Waste management 210,350+
1 Animal husbandry 180
1 Aviation Data Not Available
1 Automobile components production 800+
1 Forestry 1300
1 Medical equipment production 90
1 Oil shale production 4600
1 Port services 740
1 Textile industry 150
1 Transport and logistics 60
1 Wood industry 250
27
5. rEsults anD Discussion
5.1. Development of Emra legislation and methodologies in Estonia
Similar to Sweden, Finland and Norway (Lonka, 1999), emergency risks 
are also assessed nationwide in Estonia. The development of EmRA has 
been essentially dependent on the formation and adoption of pertinent 
legislation, which was initially independent of EU legislation. 
5.1.1. Period i: transition from the soviet republic to a  
re-established independent state
The emergency risk assessment topic in Estonia was recognised in 1992, 
when the Civil Protection Act (Parliament of Estonia, 1992) was adopt-
ed, which initially defined and established the goals of civil protection 
in a national context. This Act did not contain the word ‘risk’ or define 
its meaning; however, risk was the principal catalyst for conducting Em-
RAs. The primary aim of civil protection of those times was to identify 
the possible extraordinary situations, their possible causes, locations and 
consequences. Simultaneously, concrete requirements and legally ac-
knowledged methodologies for risk assessments were absent at that time. 
The translation of the UNEP/APELL guidebook Hazard Identification 
and Evaluation in a Local Community (UNEP IE/PAC, 1992) into Es-
tonian was an important developmental factor. The guidebook was based 
on the handbook of the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (1989). The 
translated text, which was prepared through the cooperation of the Es-
tonian and Swedish Rescue Boards, led to the adoption of an approach 
known in Estonia as the ‘Swedish methodology’. During the years from 
1993 to 1999, only occasional pilot risk assessments were conducted 
using modifications of the Swedish methodology, most of which con-
cerned chemically hazardous enterprises. A more intensive application 
of practical EmRAs was undertaken when the government passed the 
Estonian Chemicals Act (1998) and the corresponding regulations of 
the Minister of the Interior (1999) into law. These documents already 
considered the principles and selected criteria of EU legislation. 
5.1.2. Period ii: Eu acceptance through 2008
An important feature of this period was the adoption the Estonian Emer-
gency Preparedness Act (Parliament of Estonia, 2000), which clearly at-
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tempted to conform to the EU legislative framework. The Act defined 
risk assessment as an important task of crisis management from which 
all following measures of crisis management should be organised. This 
Act also specified two types of risk assessment, territorial risk assessment 
(TRA) and functional risk assessment (FRA). The TRA concerned the 
counties, the largest cities and communities, whereas the FRA involved 
the Ministries and their areas of government. Pertinent risk assessment 
methodologies were integral to the Act. Both the TRA and the FRA 
methodologies are essentially variants of the aforementioned Swedish 
methodology (UNEP/APELL), and they were developed and adjusted 
to Estonian conditions by work groups, with the organisational and/
or financial support of the Ministry of the Interior. The risk assessment 
that is conducted by these two methodologies is basically a risk matrix 
approach, which uses a 5-step ranking system for both the assessment 
of probability (1–5, with 1 as the lowest and 5 as the highest) and the 
assessment of consequences (A–E, with A as the least serious and E as 
the most serious).
The methodology of TRA was established by a special regulation in ‘Meth-
odology of risk assessment of the county, the community and the city’ 
(Minister of the Interior, 2001). The objective of risk assessment in the 
context of this regulation was to determine and to assess certain types of 
possible accidents in the territory of counties, communities or cities, as well 
as the probabilities of their occurrences. The methodology required the as-
sessment of multi-hazard risks of 16 main types of possible accidents or 
hazards. These types, in alphabetical order, were as follows: building col-
lapses, communal systems, communication systems, dangerous chemicals, 
drinking water pollution, electricity supply, epidemics, epizootics, explo-
sions, extreme environmental conditions, forest fires, floods, gas, social haz-
ards, transport and water bodies. The Emergency Preparedness Act of 2000 
included the requirement that the outcomes of risk assessments formed the 
basis for composing crisis management plans and spatial (or land use) plan-
ning in the contexts of county plans, comprehensive plans, detailed plans 
and specific building projects. This important requirement expressed the 
requirement for further research and the development of a more effective 
link between risk assessment and land use planning. 
The methodology of FRA was presented in the guidance document ‘The 
Schedule and Methodology of Ministerial Risk Assessment’ (Ministry of 
the Interior, 2003), which conformed to the decisions of the Crisis Com-
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mission of the Government of the Republic of Estonia and was amended 
until 2007. The aims of FRA were to assess possible emergencies and their 
corresponding hazards in the fields and relevant institutions for which 
each Government Ministry was responsible. The FRAs were performed 
by work groups of the Ministries. The methodology of FRA did not re-
quire the Ministries to detail these emergencies because the risks that were 
classified as being highly probable and/or of the most serious consequence 
could be analysed at a later date. All Ministries (except for the Ministry of 
Defence, which was exempted from the requirement) conducted FRAs, 
and the counties and most of the largest cities in Estonia conducted TRAs 
in the frames of the requirements of those times.
The Estonian risk matrices, which were recommended in the TRA and 
FRA methodologies, did not originally contain the risk ranking divi-
sions, which enabled a creative approach to the problem on the one hand 
but complicated the comparison of risk assessments on the other. The 
following examples of the risk matrices from the risk assessments of the 
cities of Estonia (Figure 1 to Figure 4, adopted from paper iv) demon-
strate the variability of the approaches of that period.
The risk matrix form for the methodology is displayed in Figure 1, using 






A B C D E






A B C D E
figure 4. Risk matrix of Tartu.
1 II III IV V VI
2 II III IV V VI
3 I III IV V VI
4 I I I V VI
5 I I I I I
A B C D E
figure 2. Risk matrix of Tallinn.
1 II V V VII VII
2 II V V VII VII
3 II IV IV VI VI
4 I IV IV VI VI
5 I I III III III
A B C D E
figure 5. Risk matrix of Pärnu.
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the matrix. The blank risk matrix of Narva represents the original “pure” 
one from the TRA methodology, without determined risk ranking zones. 
The blank risk matrix of Tallinn (Figure 2) is divided into 6 (I-VI) risk 
ranking zones. Analogous with the British risk matrix, the relative im-
portance of the consequences is accentuated, but, most likely, with too 
high a degree of contrast. For example, in the case of catastrophic conse-
quences, the events with a small likelihood belong to the VI zone, which 
is the highest, and the events with an extremely small likelihood to zone 
I, which is the lowest. The blank risk matrix of Tartu (Figure 3) uses the 
three risk ranking zones on the matrix (originally red, yellow and green), 
where likelihood and consequences have proportional weights. The blank 
risk matrix (Figure 4) of Pärnu uses seven (I-VII) risk-ranking zones. The 
last two zones had noticeable aberrances from the general logics of a risk 
matrix, where the risk increases “diagonally” towards the matrix, following 
the increasing values of likelihood and consequences (or impacts). 
5.1.3. Period iii: current development as a member of the Eu
The adoption of the Emergency Act (Parliament of Estonia, 2009) into 
law designated the onset of Period III. The Act defines risk assessment as 
a document that identifies the risk coupled with a report of the risk as-
sessment outcomes. The risk assessment should include all relevant data 
pertaining to the emergency: a description, hazards causing the event, 
the probability and the consequences of the event, related information, 
references to applied models and to the sources and other relevant infor-
mation on which the risk assessment is based. With this Act, risk assess-
ment becomes more emergency-based; delineated distinction between 
the FRA and the TRA disappears. This substantial difference means 
that work groups, which consist of representatives of various National 
Boards, now assess the risks of concrete emergencies. These work groups 
can be amended with additional competence from civil service, research 
and development institutions, as well as from the private sector. This 
new approach enables Estonia the versatile opportunity to follow the 
contemporary principles of risk governance: communication, inclusion, 
integration and reflection, as determined by van Asselt and Renn (2011). 
According to the Emergency Act of 2009, the Government had to estab-
lish a list of emergencies, which define 26 types of events, all of which 
must be assessed for risk at the national level (Government of the Re-
public, 2010). The Act also requires the compilation of interdisciplinary 
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work groups for each type of emergency, which are formed by an author-
ised competent agency that is responsible for conducting the particular 
risk assessment. The quantity of emergency risks, which the Act requires 
at the regional level, is slightly smaller, consisting of 19 different types of 
events. The Emergency Act of 2009, with a fundamental difference from 
the previous Acts, assumes risk assessments for the continuous opera-
tion and provision of vital services. The arrangement of the continuous 
operation of vital services is delegated to particular Ministries, the Bank 
of Estonia and the municipalities. Simultaneously, the obligation of pre-
paring the risk assessments for the continuous operation of vital services 
is placed on the direct providers of these services. The guidelines for the 
risk assessment of the continuous operation of vital services were estab-
lished by the regulation of the Minister of the Interior, which principally 
means that a separate methodology was compiled for this specific sector. 
The noticeable change in the methodological development of EmRA is 
the new orientation to the example of the British methodology in addi-
tion to the Swedish methodology (UNEP IE/PAC, 1992). The example 
methodology was developed in the UK and published as a chapter of 
the Emergency Preparedness Guidance (HM Government, 2005), which 
was, in turn, based on Australian methodology (Emergency Management 
Australia, 2004). The transition was blended because of the relative simi-
larity between Estonia’s thus far Swedish-based methodology and the UK’s 
methodology for local communities (iv). The causes for this change of 
orientation in methodology were mostly practical, and an explanation is 
subsequently outlined. First, the British methodology was more recently 
developed and was novel. Second, the entire methodological concept and 
its particular steps of risk assessment were presented in a systematic and 
straightforward manner; these steps were also widely accepted and proven 
in solid practical applications (Ministry of the Interior, 2008a). Third, 
the system enabled the design of better solutions for several problematic 
characteristics of the previous methodology, e.g., risk rating (or ranking) 
into certain categories on the risk matrix. Fourth, as a purely practical 
advantage, the public version of the British methodology was easily avail-
able via the Internet and was composed in English. Before the Minister of 
the Interior (2010a) enacted the current Estonian EmRA methodology 
as a legal document, the Government’s Crisis Management Committee 
(Ministry of the Interior, 2008a) compiled and made public a guide to 
the EmRA, which was available in both Estonian and English. This guide 
can be considered the Estonian version of the UK’s methodology. 
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The new perspectives that were espoused from the UK’s methodology 
were the principle of likelihood scoring and the risk rating (or ranking) 
on the risk matrix. Formerly, distinct and occasionally paradoxical scales 
for risk rating had been suggested by risk assessors, but a uniform meth-
odological approach was missing. The likelihood scale of previous Esto-
nian risk assessment methodologies (TRA and FRA) employed 5 steps, 
which were defined by the probability of a particular event occurring in 
n years; for example, probability (3) defined an event as occurring at least 
once in five years. The currently valid EmRA methodology also presents 
the likelihood scoring scales in 5 steps, which are defined periods of five 
years in percentages, and simultaneously, in the number of emergencies 
per certain background events. The last is observed more precisely in 
subdivision 5.4.3 of the current dissertation. 
5.2. Performing Emergency risk assessments in Estonia
The following subjects in study i embrace three categories of emergency 
risk assessment: national risk assessment summaries on the state level, 
flood risk assessments and chemical accident risks assessments in estab-
lishment with fixed sites. The last two categories are covered with the 
requirements of corresponding EU directives.
5.2.1. national emergency risk assessment summaries
The publicly available issues of Estonian national risk assessment reports 
are attainable via the Internet for the period 2005-2011 (Ministry of the 
Interior, 2006, 2007a, 2008b, 2009, 2011). The annual national level 
risk assessments of 2005–2007 were compiled using the ‘old’ method-
ology (Ministry of the Interior, 2003), which was amended until 2007 
(Ministry of the Interior, 2007b). By 2008, the first version of the cur-
rent methodology was applied (Ministry of the Interior, 2008a), which 
was then amended to become the currently valid methodology (Minister 
of the Interior, 2010a). The summary of the emergency risk assessments 
of 2011 was completely based on the most recent methodology.
The summary reports of the national risk assessments from the four-year 
period from 2005–2008 exhibited a lack of continuity in the identifi-
cation, definition and classification of emergencies. The comparison of 
assessed risks over this brief period was complicated because the quantity 
and the formulations of identified emergencies varied from year to year. 
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The main disparities concerned the number of identified emergencies, 
which ranged from 10 in 2005 to 26 in 2008, and the number of groups 
of emergencies, which ranged from 2 in 2005 to 5 in 2007. The key 
difference that occurred in 2008 was the application of Roman numeral 
codes I–XXVI to each of the 26 identified types of emergencies. This 
same technique was also applied to the summary of 2011. Subsequent-
ly the last two Estonian national risk assessment summary reports of 
2008 (Ministry of the Interior, 2009) and 2011 (Ministry of the Interior, 
2011) are observed in particular detail. 
The summary report of 2008 was composed of 26 types of emergencies, 
as was required by the current EmRA methodology (Ministry of the In-
terior, 2008a). This system finally determined certain obligations for the 
assessment of emergency types. The emergencies were coded with Ro-
man numerals from I to XXVI, and the evaluated risks were marked on 
the corresponding division of the risk matrix. The list of the emergencies 
was composed of several definitions, which included quantitative pre-as-
sessment components concerned the estimated consequences, such as an 
aircraft accident or its dissipation with many victims or extensive marine 
pollution. We still hold that the definition of an emergency should not 
initially consist of the determined criteria of its consequences, which are 
essentially the components evaluated during the risk assessment. Emer-
gency risks were assigned into 4 risk rating groups, which are described 
below, with reference to the previously described risk rating principles.
•	 Very high risk – extensive marine pollution (IV) 
•	 High risk – extensive forest and brush fire (I)
•	 Medium risk – road accident with many casualties (VIII) 
•	 Low risk – extraordinarily cold (XIV) or hot (XV) weather
The summary report of 2011 observed the same principles in dividing 
the emergencies (or emergency risks) into 26 types (or more precisely 
into 25 types, as the risk assessment of one of the new categories, the 
hostage crisis, was confidential and not contained in the publicly avail-
able summary). Simultaneously, the typology and the numbers of the 
emergencies were changed. This conversion denotes that, in most cases, 
the same Roman numerals have different meanings in the matrices of 
2008 and 2011, which complicates any simple one-to-one comparisons. 
A more circumstantial comparative analysis demonstrated that most 
of the assessed emergency risk types were fundamentally the same or 
similar. However, the formulations of many emergency definitions were 
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changed, and two new types of emergencies were included and the same 
number removed. This change generally led to better continuity in ty-
pology than that observed in the years from 2005 to 2008.
5.2.2. chemical accident risk assessment
In Estonian legislation, the requirements for the assessment of chem-
ical accident risks in dangerous enterprises and in enterprises that are 
likely to be affected by a major accident are based on the Chemicals 
Act (1998). Estonian legislation determines which establishments are 
dangerous and divides them into three categories, depending on the in-
herent hazardous characteristics of the substances these establishments 
process and the quantities stored. The threshold quantities of Estonia’s 
two most stringent categories are outlined in the Seveso II Directive’s 
Annex 1, by which enterprises (hereafter ‘Seveso establishments’) are 
deemed to be likely to be affected by a major accident. The number of 
Estonian Seveso establishments has increased from 53 in 2011 (Estoni-
an Rescue Board, 2011) to 58 in 2013 (Estonian Rescue Board, 2013). 
The threshold quantities for the third category, which comprises ‘dan-
gerous enterprises’, are substantially lower than those threshold quanti-
ties that were prescribed in the Seveso criteria. For instance, the thresh-
old quantity for petrol (petroleum spirits) was previously 10 tonnes; 
consequently, the majority of Estonia’s petrol stations belonged to this 
category. Since the 1st of October 2011, however, the threshold quan-
tities for the ‘dangerous enterprises’ were increased, and the threshold 
for petrol (petroleum spirits) was raised to 100 tonnes. Due to this 
increase, the number of designated ‘dangerous enterprises’ dramatically 
decreased after that date. Originating from the corresponding regula-
tion of the Estonian Government (Government of the Republic, 2011), 
‘dangerous enterprises’ have a duty to perform risk assessments and to 
compose emergency plans.
The previous (Minister of the Interior, 1999; Minister of the Interior, 
2003) and the current (Government of the Republic, 2011) regulations 
provided only generic requirements for risk assessments, which gave risk 
assessors a broad scope to select their methodologies and approaches. For 
example, researchers at the Tallinn University of Technology, acting as 
risk assessors (Paas et al., 2009), have used the risk matrix-based meth-
odology of the University of Melbourne (2003). 
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Two mini-studies were performed in the frames of study i to observe 
the conformity of selected cases of chemical accident risk assessments 
with the current legislation for the time at which these assessments were 
conducted. Subsequently, the results of two mini-studies are presented. 
First, in 2005, the 147 category three ‘dangerous enterprises’ of the South 
Estonian region were studied, which found that only 66% of the risk as-
sessments complied with the generic requirements of ‘The Procedures’ 
regulations (Minister of the Interior 2003), which were valid during the 
period of the study. 
Later, in 2010, the publicly available safety documents of five Estonian 
category one and two ‘Seveso establishments’ (Ministry of the Environ-
ment, 2010) were observed. These establishments utilised the following 
dangerous chemicals or groups of chemicals: Establishment 1 (oil prod-
ucts); Establishment 2 (ammonium nitrate); Establishment 3 (oil shale 
products); Establishment 4 (liquefied petroleum gas); and Establishment 
5 (chlorine). Establishments (1), (4) and (5) based their risk assessments 
on a risk matrix. Establishment (1) used an elementary risk matrix with 
3-step probability and consequence scales, similar to the risk matrix that 
was used in occupational risk assessment. Establishments (4) and (5) used 
risk matrices with 5-step scales, which were contingently compatible with 
those risk matrices used in TRAs. Establishments (4) and (5) also used 
simplified combinations of fault and event trees (bow-ties) for accident 
scenario identification and layer of protection analysis (EN 61511-3, 
2005) in a qualitative form, without the probabilities of the safety barrier 
operations. Establishments (2) and (3) only emphasised the qualitative 
descriptions of risks. Establishments (2) and (5) calculated the conse-
quences, based on safety distances according to certain criteria, whereas 
Establishments (1) and (4) used generic safety distances. 
In compliance with the valid emergency risk assessment methodology 
(Minister of the Interior, 2010a) and the Emergency Act (Parliament 
of Estonia, 2009), major chemical accidents are also the responsibility 
of regional and national risk assessments. In spite of the absence of a 
‘major chemical accident’ in the classifications of emergencies, which are 
required for regional or the national risk assessments, this type of event 
is linked to other types of classified emergencies. The following examples 
are selected from the 2011 National Summary of Risk Assessments for 
Emergencies (Ministry of the Interior, 2011):
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•	 Extensive and/or complicated fire/explosion in industrial or 
warehouse buildings (production enterprises and warehouses with a 
risk of major accident, including explosive depots)
•	 Extensive pollution on coast/shore
•	 Mass poisoning
•	 Extensive contamination of ground, body of water or groundwater 
Chemical accident risk assessments of dangerous establishments are an 
important source of data for regional and national risk assessments, and 
therefore, methodological compatibility is presumed by default. Because 
of this presumption, the assessors of dangerous enterprises have to con-
sider that their results should be easily formatted to meet the input re-
quirements of regional and national risk assessments. Problems may arise 
from the usage of quantitative and probabilistic methods, in which the 
probable consequences (fatalities) usually reflect individual and societal 
risks in concrete conditions. Quantitative methods are certainly more 
precise and informative; however, their outcomes are not directly adopt-
able as inputs to regional or national risk assessments. This issue could 
be solved by the development of a method that enables the comparison 
of risk assessment outcomes, with the aim of interpreting and converting 
their results into a suitable format. A similar solution already exists in 
the UK, where compatible criteria for risk-based and consequence-based 
approaches have been established for the definition of zones around a 
dangerous enterprise (Christou et al., 1999). 
5.2.3. flood risk assessments
Flood risk assessments, in the Estonian conditions, have two conclusive 
moments, which were observed and discussed in study i. First, the risk 
assessments must obey the special requirements of the EU’s Flood Di-
rective, particularly the compilation of flood risk or hazard maps; and 
second, the flood risk assessment must be performed by regional and 
national assessors.
The Estonian Ministry of the Environment is coordinating the perfor-
mance of the directive requirements. Therefore, the ministry has commis-
sioned research studies for the specification of the application conditions 
of the Flood Directive. Mugra and Sults (2006) studied flood mapping 
and concluded that the majority of existing maps were hazard maps. De 
Moel et al. (2009) found that the existing flood maps, which covered 
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the entire Estonian territory, were produced by the central government 
and were inherently historical. Kupits and Osjamets (2010) conducted a 
preliminary assessment of flood risks, using a framework in which they 
detailed the actual types of floods, their probability of occurrence and 
potential significant flood risk areas (PSFRA). In the same study, Kupits 
and Osjamets (2010) also observed many longstanding trends of water 
flow, which can affect the occurrence of floods. The Estonian Land Board 
recently created the flood hazard map layer on the digital map of Estonia 
for four cities: Tallinn, Pärnu, Haapaslu and Tartu (Estonian Land Board, 
2012). The mapping was based on the water level rise height. The Kro-
nstadt zero was taken as the initial height for Tallinn, Pärnu and Haapsalu, 
which are situated on the coasts of the Baltic Sea, and a compromise zero 
height was established for Tartu, which is situated inland on the banks of 
the River Emajõgi. The contour lines were counted with a range of 0.25 
meters, starting from 0.5 meters above the zero levels.
Flood types are determined as either coastal or river floods in the pub-
lic versions of the last two national EmRA summaries (Ministry of the 
Interior, 2009, 2011). Irrespective of the location and mechanism, the 
summaries infer that there is one unified emergency for flooding, which 
is defined as a flood in a high-density population area. The flood risk was 
assessed as high in both summary reports; however, the flood hazard or 
flood risk maps were not amended. Achieving a better conformance with 
the EU’s Flood Directive assumes the disclosing of both types of maps to 
future versions of the national and regional EmRA summaries. 
5.3. applicability of emergency risk assessment outcomes
5.3.1. Environmental assessment and Management
According to the Estonian experience thus far, risk assessment has been 
a part of many EIAs and SEAs, where the consideration of the proba-
bility of adverse outcomes was important, including engineered objects, 
in which abnormal and emergency situations were expected, such as 
(chemically) dangerous enterprises. While observing selected reports of 
EIAs and SEAs during study i, which were connected with the planning 
and projecting of new sites for ‘Seveso establishments’, preliminary evi-
dence was found that the elements of qualitative, semi-quantitative and 
quantitative risk assessment approaches were used in different combina-
tions. Simultaneously, the requirements for concrete methodological ap-
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proaches were absent. Therefore, this subject may be a worthy direction 
for future studies. 
The implementation of voluntary EMSs from ISO 14001 and from 
EMAS (EC, 2009) requires the applying organisations to prepare meas-
ures for emergency preparedness and response. These requirements in-
clude the identification of potential emergency situations, as well as po-
tential accidents, which is equivalent to an assessment of the risks of 
these accidental events. Simultaneously, the risk sources can be identified 
with significant environmental aspects. Risk assessment, in the context 
of ISO 14001 and, more generically, in ISO-certified integrated man-
agement systems, is more thoroughly observed in subdivision 5.5 of the 
current dissertation, which is based on studies v, vi and vii.
5.3.2. spatial planning and mapping
The currently valid version of the Estonian Planning Act (Parliament of 
Estonia, 2002) compels the consideration of the results of EmRAs at all 
determined levels of planning: national, county, comprehensive and de-
tailed. The pertinent maps were previously, and are currently, required as 
appendices to both regional and national EmRAs. Simultaneously, there 
is much doubtfulness concerning the criteria of hazard or risk mapping, 
which are applicable in Estonian conditions. This ambiguity has caused 
assessors to employ a broad variety of approaches. To provide a solution 
to the problem of multiple approaches, we established the simple prin-
ciples that are necessary for evaluating and mapping the hazards of local 
conditions during the study ii from emergency risk assessment risk as-
sessment outcomes of the Tartu municipality (Tammepuu et al., 2007). 
The circumstantial objective of the study was to select, group and analyse 
the scenarios of the rise of emergency situations in relation with land use 
and spatial planning in Tartu and to develop measures to mitigate en-
vironmental risk. The applied approach divided the emergencies, which 
originated from the characteristic of connectivity of the risk source or 
hazard with the surrounding space, into five clusters:
(1) Events that are characterised by the existence of a specific and 
localised risk source, for example, accidents at hazardous installations 
handling dangerous goods;
(2) Events with mobile sources of risk and logistics chains, for example, 
accidents with dangerous goods on traffic routes, rail routes and 
pipelines;
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(3) Events where the risk source does not have a specific localisation 
but could be found in a limited area, for example, wildfires and fires 
in districts with a high proportion of old timber houses, where the 
level of fire protection is low;
(4) Events in which the main problem is not a surplus but a shortage 
of material or energy, mainly the coverage areas of certain 
supply networks, for example, electricity, water, gas supplies and 
communication system;
(5) Events that are ‘hardly localisable,’ where the exact or even indirect 
identification of a particular hazard area during risk assessment and 
its consideration in spatial planning procedures at the urban level 
is almost impossible, for example, natural disasters: thunder, snow 
and hailstorms, extreme snow conditions, unusually high and low 
temperatures, etc., but also some technological emergencies, such as 
nuclear accidents in a neighbouring country, also fall into this category.
Although the proposal dividing emergencies into these clusters can be 
only a preliminary solution, this proposal does enable a simple form of 
coverage for the problem of multi-hazard mapping for land use planning 
needs. Therefore, a good solution at the EU level requires the devel-
opment of unified risk mapping tools that are suitable for multi-haz-
ard or multi-risk mapping at the local level. Currently, the generic or 
consequence–based hazard zones of most of the ‘Seveso enterprises’ and 
‘hazardous enterprises’ have been mapped by, and are available from, the 
Estonian Land Board (2012).
5.4. comparative study of emergency risk assessments  
in Estonia and the uk
5.4.1. Generic remarks
The current dissertation embraces two comparative studies of emergency 
risk assessments of Estonia and the UK. Study iii compares the public 
outcomes of the national risk assessments, whereas study iv discusses 
the risk assessment of selected cities of the two countries. The results of 
the mentioned studies are also partly summarised in study i. The main 
attention in the current dissertation focuses on national risk assessments 
and relies on publicly accessible information for both countries. Estonia 
and the UK began to arrange and undertake local, regional and nation-
al risk assessments in the middle of the last decade. The development 
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and implementation of Estonian emergency risk assessments has been 
reviewed and discussed in subdivisions 5.1.1 and 5.2.1 of the current 
dissertation. Subsequently, the organisation of the British risk assessment 
of public emergencies is briefly described below. 
5.4.2. arrangement of Emra in the uk
The Government of the UK has performed emergency risk assessments 
since 2005 (Cabinet Office, 2010a). The Civil Contingencies Act of 2004 
(Parliament of the UK, 2004) actuated the reorganisation of the emergen-
cy management system, which included risk assessment. The Act, as well 
as the Civil Contingencies Act of 2004 (Contingency Planning) and Reg-
ulations of 2005, puts the risk assessment duty on Category 1 responders 
and local resilience forums. The Category 1 responders are, briefly: emer-
gency services, local authorities, health bodies and environment agencies 
(HM Government, 2005b). From these documents, it is clear that the 
crucial responsibility for emergency risk assessment lies on a local level. 
The British risk assessment processes that are used at regional and na-
tional levels are not completely identical with the process on the local 
level, but have many characteristics in common and are generally con-
sistent (HM Government, 2005a). The brief summary of the British 
national risk assessment process can be recognised in the NRR edition 
of 2010. Allegedly, the methodology of the British National Risk As-
sessment (NRA) is described more thoroughly in some other document, 
which is not available for public use because the NRA-s are stated as 
secret, and the NRR-s are only the public outputs of these assessments 
(Cabinet Office, 2010b). 
The UK National Risk Register (NRR) is a public document from NRA 
National Risk Assessment, and the first NRR was published in August 
2008 (Cabinet Office, 2010a, 2010b). The NRR 2010 Edition (Cabinet 
Office, 2010a), which is at the centre of attention in the current paper, is 
the second updated version, which is based on the 2009 iteration of the 
NRA (Cabinet Office, 2010b). The main changes to the 2010 Edition 
and the original NRR embrace the update of risk types and risks on the 
risk matrix and in the text, as well as in expansions of the last chapters of 
advisory and informative characteristics (Cabinet Office, 2010b). At the 
time of the composition of the current dissertation, the latest version of 
NRR is the 2013 edition (Cabinet Office, 2013). 
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5.4.3. risk assessment processes in the two countries
The Estonian emergency risk assessment process, which is described in 
the methodologies (Ministry of the Interior, 2008a; Minister of the Inte-
rior, 2010a) is generically uniform for national, regional and local levels. 
The process consists of 6 steps, which are nearly one-to-one comparable 
with the steps of the British emergency risk assessment methodology 
for local responders because the latter has served as an example for the 
Estonian approach (HM Government, 2005a; Ministry of the Interior 
2008a). 
The Estonian national EmRAs were performed in working groups, 
which each included the representatives of different bureaus, and were 
conducted by a lead institution (Government of the Republic, 2010). 
Later, these initially independent assessments were collected into a sum-
mary by the Ministry of the Interior (2009, 2011). The British National 
Risk Assessment drew on expertise from a wide range of government 
departments and agencies (Cabinet Office, 2010a).
The consequences or impacts of the emergencies were presented with 
four categories in the national risk assessments outcomes of both coun-
tries. The categories were not completely one-to-one in conformance, 
but were postured in a comparative context, emanating from the defini-
tions of these attributes (Cabinet Office, 2010a; Ministry of the Interior, 
2009; Ministry of the Interior, 2008a) as follows in Table 2, which was 
adapted from paper iii. 
table 2. The consequence (impact) categories 
Estonia united kingdom
categories of consequences categories of impact
Human life and health The number of fatalitiesHuman illness or injury




The British approach takes a certain period of 5 years and sets the per-
centage and/or ratio of the accidental event. The Estonian EmRA meth-
odology, which is currently in force, also presents the likelihood scoring 
scales in 5 steps, as defined periods of five years in percentages, and con-
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currently, in the number of emergencies per certain background events. 
For instance, 1 chance in 20,000 that an emergency will take place dur-
ing 5 years equates to 0.005% per 5-year period. The meaning of the 
entirety (100%) allows for various interpretations in the frames of this 
system, such as many ordinary events, many near misses, etc. The likeli-
hood scoring criteria were not adopted like-for-like from the UK meth-
odology, as brought out in Table 3, which was adapted from paper i.
table 3. Probability criteria in Estonian and British risk assessment methodologies
Level Estonian British




1 Very small <0.005% up to 0.05% Negligible >0.005%
2 Small >0.05% up to 0.5% Rare >0.05%
3 Average >0.5% up to 5% Unlikely >0.5%
4 Large >5% up to 50% Possible >5%
5 Very large >50% Probable >50%
The Estonian risk matrix (Minister of the Interior, 2010a) has the fol-
lowing position of the scales: likelihood on the vertical axis and con-
sequences on the horizontal axis. In contrast, the scales on the British 
(local) risk matrix (HM Government, 2005a) are reversed. The Estonian 
risk matrix (see Figure 6) presents the likelihood levels by numbers (1-5) 
and the consequence levels by letters (A-E), whereas the UK risk matrix 
imposes numbers for both scales (see Figure 1), which is similar to the 
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figure 6. Estonian Risk Matrix 2008 (Ministry of the Interior, 2009)
The Roman numerals, which are displayed in the Estonian risk matrix of 
2008 are the codes of the 26 assessed emergencies that were previously 
observed in subdivision 5.2.1 of the current dissertation.
The British local level risk matrix includes categories of risk rating with 
explanatory keys, which the Estonian methodology has espoused on an 
almost like-for-like basis. The main difference is that, whereas the Esto-
nian risk matrix defines the level of likelihood of occurrence of 3B, 4B 
and 5B as ‘low risk’, the British risk matrix defines their equivalents, 2–3, 
2–4 and 2-5, as ‘medium risk’. The former Estonian risk matrix, which 
is analogous with the Swedish matrix (Swedish Rescue Services Agency, 
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1989; UNEP IE/PAC, 1992; Davidsson et al., 2003), did not initially 
contain the risk rating categories. This ambiguity caused the plural inter-
pretations of the risk-rating problem, which were previously mentioned 
in subdivision 5.1.2. The risk rating categories, in both Figures 1 and 2, 
flow from ‘very high’ in the right upper corner through ‘high’ and ‘medi-
um’ to ‘low’ in the left lower corner.
In spite of the widespread use of the risk matrix method, which also 
belongs to the European standardised risk assessment techniques (EN 
31010, 2010) and is recommended by the Risk Assessment and Map-
ping Guidelines for Disaster Management (EC, 2010a), this method is 
not free of substantial imperfections. For example, Cox (2008) demon-
strated that risk matrices have only a limited ability to reproduce the risk 
ratings correctly, and therefore, careful attention is necessary for using 
these ratings as risk assessment tools. Levine (2011), who considered 
previous critical studies, recommended that, in cases where quantitative 
methods are not available or a reasonable choice, the most defensible risk 
matrices are those matrices employing logarithmic scales and a logical 
progression of risk rating categories on the matrix horizontally, vertically 
and diagonally. 
The Swedish, British and Estonian risk matrices that are used for emer-
gency risk assessment have logarithmic scales in principle. This quality 
occurs more observably in the Probability (or Likelihood) scales and 
less detectably in the Consequence (Impact) scales, although the latter 
are defined by the combination of both quantitative and qualitative 
criteria. The division of risk rating categories in the British and Es-
tonian matrices is not proportional and tends more in the direction 
of Impact (Consequence). The British matrix has a more coherent 
succession of risk rating categories; however, this matrix still con-
tains paradoxical sections from 2–2 to 3–3 and 3–2 to 4–3, in which 
the risk rating is diagonally “jumping” from ‘low’ to ‘high’ and from 
‘medium’ to ‘very high’, respectively. The Estonian matrix contains 
more paradoxes of a similar nature and is additionally divided into 
two areas, depending on Consequences: ‘conventional accidents and 
operating problems’ covering from 1A to 5B (white area) and ‘emer-
gency situations’ including from 1C to 5E (grey areas). This division 
refers to the possible impact of the example of Irish emergency risk 
assessment methodology (A Framework for Major Emergency Man-
agement, 2006), where the division into the previously mentioned 
45
two areas and their positions on the risk matrix, although formulated 
slightly differently, were identical. 
The British NRR 2010 edition brings only relative scales for impact and 
likelihood assessment because these scales cannot be compared with the 
Estonian 5-point scales (basically similar with British local level). The 
last editions of NRR (Cabinet Office, 2012, 2013), which are not in-
cluded in studies i and iii of the current dissertation, have again distrib-
uted 5-point scales in use on the risk matrices.
5.4.4. risk types and assessment outcomes
The EU Vademecum of Civil Protection (EC, 2010b) generically rec-
ommends the division of the typology of emergencies into two broad 
categories: natural and man-made disasters.
The public output documents of the national risk assessments of both of 
the observed countries (Ministry of the Interior, 2009; Cabinet Office, 
2010a) presented the risks on risk matrixes.
The methodology, on which the 2008 Estonian national risk assessment 
was based, determined 26 emergency types in a one-step list, which in-
dicates that the emergencies (or emergency risks) were not grouped into 
broader categories by certain features (see also subdivisions 5.1.3 and 
5.2.1 of the current dissertation). 
The British NRR 2010 edition divides emergency types into three broad 
categories, the first of which essentially includes natural events, and the 
last two categories include man-made events. The main risk types, in 
turn, contained sub-categories, which were described in the text of the 
NRR 2010 edition. The number of non-divided risk types and subtypes 
of the divided main types altogether included 23 events. In contrast with 
the risk matrix, which was recommended for UK local communities (see 
Figure 5, adapted from paper iii), both scales of the British NRR 2010 
matrix reflected correspondingly relative likelihood and impact without 
distributions. The British NRR 2010 matrix, as shown on Figure 7, dis-
plays 14 high consequence risks (iii). 
The implicit comparison of the assessed risks of the two countries, from 
the public outputs of Estonian 2008 and the British 2010 national risk 
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assessments, demonstrated the following: The risks of pandemic human 
disease were indicated in both countries as very high. The Estonian ap-
proach also determined the risks of extensive oil spills as very high; how-
ever, the British viewpoint did not observe these risks as independent 
accidental events because these events can be taken, in principle, as the 
results of transportation or industrial accidents. Flood risks were also 
assessed as remarkably high in the both countries, although, in the UK, 
coastal and inland floods were handled separately, and, in Estonia, the 
limiting criteria for flood risk assessment was localised in high-density ar-
eas. The risks arising from severe weather conditions were acknowledged 
as remarkably high in the both countries. Major industrial accident risks 
were assessed as relatively high in the both countries, whereas the risks of 
major transport accidents were more emphasised in the Estonian output 
document. The risk of cyber attacks was observed as higher in Estonia. 
Simultaneously, the British NRR 2010 accentuated the risks of different 
types of malicious attacks, which was even included as one of the broad 
categories of risks. In the Estonian approach, the corresponding events 
were not qualified as separate risk types, but simultaneous, for instance 
the risk of mass unrest, which could result from malicious attacks, which 












Figure 1: An illustration of the high consequence risks facing the United Kingdom 
 
RISKS IN CONTEXT 
1.9. Catastrophes, on the scale of the recent 
earthquake in the Republic of Haiti, are 
thankfully rare in the UK. Over the past few 
years, however, we have seen various 
emergencies of one sort or another that still 
have a significant impact on our ability to go 
about our daily lives. In setting out th  risks, 
their likelihood, and their impact, the 
National Risk Register is not predicting that 
any particular type of emergency will 
happen in the next five years or that, if it 
were to do so, it would happen on a specific 
scale. Events have a habit of confounding 
predictions; prudent emergency planning is 
bas d on consideration o  a wide range of 
risks rather than on a forecast that any 
particular risk will occur.  
Further information: 
For civil protection practitioners 
www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience.aspx 
Links to Community Ri  Registers nd 




National Security Strategy 
www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/reports/national_s
e urity.aspx 




fig re 7. British National Risk Matrix 2010 (Cabinet Office, 2010a)
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5.4.5. Emra output documents
The plain comparison of the output documents (Ministry of the Interior, 
2009; Cabinet Office, 2010a) demonstrated remarkable differences in 
composition and points of view.
The 2008 National Summary of Risk Assessments for Emergencies (Min-
istry of the Interior, 2009) of Estonia consisted of 2 generic and 26 specific 
chapters, as well as 9 appendixes. The specific chapters were the short sum-
maries of risk assessments of concrete emergency types. Each specific chapter 
included the subdivisions as follows: a description of the emergency, histori-
cal facts and previous (similar) events, an overview of the hazards causing the 
emergency, assessment of risks, existing resources and actions for emergency 
prevention and consequences mitigation, as well as required additional re-
sources and actions for emergency prevention and consequences mitigation. 
Appendix 1 was a risk matrix (Figure 1), and the remaining 8 appendixes 
contained informational materials in the forms of tables, maps or texts. 
The British NRR 2010 edition (Cabinet Office, 2010a) consisted of five 
main chapters. The Chapter 1 introduction provided a summarising, 
which included, among other things, the national risk register matrix. 
Chapter 2 was a discussion of assessed risks according to the previously 
discussed three broad categories. For each category, features were ob-
served, such as risk, background, and planning measures by the Gov-
ernment, the Devoted Administrations and the emergency responders. 
Chapters 3 and 4 provided orientations to risk communication, which 
addressed businesses and civilians, respectively. Chapter 5 was a brief 
overview of the risk assessment process on the national level. Each chap-
ter contained many appropriate Internet references.
Generally, the British NRR 2010 edition was a more advising, guiding 
and directing document, whereas the Estonian national risk assessment 
output document of 2008 was primarily a summary of different emer-
gency risk assessments.
5.5. Emergency risk assessment in Estonian iso 14001 organisations
This chapter collocates the results of studies v, vi and vii, which all 
include different aspects of emergency preparedness and response in the 
ISO 14001, which certified organisations based on Estonian case studies.
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5.5.1. identification of possible emergencies and accidents in select-
ed Estonian iso 14001 certified organisations
The results indicated that 96% of the enterprises that were included in 
study vii identified any possible accidents and emergencies (the risks of 
these) in the frames of their assessments of environmental aspects. The 
causes of possible accidents, which were not environmental aspects of the 
organisations, were taken into account by 73% of these enterprises. Or-
ganisations exerted an occupational risk assessment in 82% of the cases 
for the identification of possible accidents, and 40% of the respondents, 
primarily those respondents with a chemical hazard, conducted addi-
tional environmental risk assessments. Other methodological approach-
es towards conducting assessments were additionally used by 13% of the 
organisations. The last method was composed of: qualitative assessment 
based on expert knowledge; methods originating from object-specific 
requirements; identification during environmental impact assessment; 
and specific methods of risk assessment, for example the risk assessments 
of raw materials and products. The personnel of each enterprises own 
personnel committed the identification of possible accidents and emer-
gencies in 45% of 44 of the cases, and the identification was conducted 
by external consultants in only 32% of 44 or by a combination of both 
in 23% of 44 cases.
 
The types of accidents and emergencies that were identified by the or-
ganisations covered a range from the traditional (fire and vandalism) to 
the modern (bomb threats and IT security). The enterprises ranked fire 
(100%) as the most common type of possible accident with a logical 
outcome. Four-fifths of the enterprises (80%) defined possible accidents 
with dangerous chemical substances as a serious hazard, although only 
23% of the enterprises were considered hazardous under the Estonian 
Chemicals Act or belonged to the establishments with major chemical 
accident hazard by the Seveso II Directive. The case organisations iden-
tified accidental pollution of soil and/or water (62%) as more probable 
than air pollution (31%). A remarkable hazard was explosions (58%); 
one reason for this result may be the identification of bomb threats as a 
potential cause of explosive events. Other accidents that were included 
were vandalism, technical break-downs, occupational accidents, natural 
gas accidents, slips, electrical accidents, animal epidemics, bomb threats, 
transportation accidents, security and IT risks and off-site events, such as 
major accidents at neighbouring enterprises, extreme natural conditions, 
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epidemics, disruptions to the power supply and other networks, as well 
as radioactive pollution of the surroundings. 
The factor analysis permitted the following conclusions concerning 
emergency risk assessment. The organisations with more hazard(s) more 
figure 8. Results of the factor analysis of selected questions. Abbreviations that 
were used in the figure: Id – identification of possible emergencies and accidents 
(Id1: assessment of environmental aspects, Id2: assessment of off-site hazards, Id3: 
occupational risk assessment, Id4: additional environmental risk assessments, Id5: 
other methodological approaches), Per – persons identifying possible accidents and 
emergencies (Per1: enterprises’ own personnel, Per2: external consultants), Type – 
types of identified accidents and emergencies (Type1: explosion, Type2: dangerous 
chemical substances, Type3: accidental air pollution, Type4: accidental pollution of 
soil and water), P – emergency preparedness and response procedures (P1: supple-
mentary documents of preventive measures, P2: collection of safety guidelines, P3: 
fire safety document, P4: operational control manual, P5: occupational health and 
safety document, P6: emergency plans, P7: chemical safety document), ERP – general 
emergency response procedures (ERP1: common plan, ERP2: specific procedures not 
originating from the common plan), Tr – route to deliver a training procedure (Tr1: 
in-house personnel required to manage on their own, Tr2: foreign consultants em-
ployed to manage the entire procedure, Tr3: foreign consultants employed to support 
their in-house personnel, Tr4: selected categories of workers dispatched to thematic 
external courses), Test – testing of the emergency preparedness and response proce-
dures (Test1: theoretical training with role-playing, Test2: practical training with se-
lected employees, Test3: practical exercises for most of the employees, Test4: training 
exercises supervised by external instructors, Test5: practical exercises in cooperation 
with neighbouring enterprises, Test6: practical exercises in cooperation with emergen-
cy services (police, fire, ambulance) and other local or governmental offices.
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often used the services of external consultants, as well as specific methods 
for the identification of possible emergencies and accidents. The organ-
isations with low levels of hazards, but with well-developed safety meas-
ures, primarily used foreign consultants to manage their entire emergen-
cy preparedness and response procedure, including the organisation and 
execution of training. The results of the factor analysis are presented in 
Figure 8.
5.5.2. Emergency risk assessment in the Port of tallinn
The safety audit in the frames of study vi enabled the observation of 
several paradoxical moments, which included the following: The iden-
tification of emergencies was conducted by groups of competent port 
employees. The lists of emergencies were composed independently of 
the assessment of environmental aspects and other similar procedures. 
The emergencies were primarily described qualitatively and relied on 
experiences and expert decisions. Despite the fact that the group mem-
bers were aware of the environmental aspect assessments, as well as the 
risk assessments of the operators of ‘Seveso enterprises’ on the port 
areas, municipalities, etc., the outcomes of these assessments were only 
indirectly considered. The assessed (indirect) environmental aspects (of 
the terminals) included the release of hazardous chemicals and fire; 
however, the assessment methodology in use classified these aspects as 
non-significant. Therefore, the relevant environmental objectives and 
targets were presumably missing in the programmes of IMS. The pro-
cedure of EMS for emergency preparedness and response enacted the 
duty of coordinating the risk assessments of the operators, utilising 
dangerous goods, to the safety personnel of the ports. Simultaneously, 
the safety personnel did not actually have copies of the risk assessment 
outcomes or safety reports. Further, it became evident that one security 
company, who was a partner of the Port of Tallinn, had performed the 
general emergency risk assessment; however, the outcomes were some-
how disremembered or shunned by the interested parties. Therefore, 
the composition of a systematic overview of the existing outcomes of 
different risk assessments and further application of additional assess-
ment methodologies for accident and emergency risks, as well as for 
risk-related environmental aspects and impacts, was suggested based 
on the study. 
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5.5.3. Emergency risk assessment in Estonian iso 14001 certified 
‘seveso establishments’: three case studies
The first case study in paper v was the process industry. The main risk 
sources were highly flammable gases that are analogous with LPG. The 
industry belongs to the lower tier according to the Seveso II Directive. 
The identification and evaluation of major hazards, and as well as plan-
ning for emergencies, were both enacted by the emergency preparedness 
procedure of the IMS, which had references to the procedures of envi-
ronmental aspect assessments and the assessment of occupational hazards 
and risks. The internal standards of the corporation were also considered. 
The identification of hazards was accomplished by the well-known HA-
ZOP (BS IEC 61882, 2001; EN 31010, 2010) methodology, in combi-
nation with the risk matrix for the assessment of risks. The establishment 
used a rather ordinary risk matrix: 5*5 – with five-point scales for both 
likelihood and consequences. The risk assessment outcome documents 
were compiled as appendixes of the IMS emergency preparedness pro-
cedure. The environmental aspects and occupational risks were assessed 
separately from emergency risks; however, the principles were quite sim-
ilar to the major hazard risk assessment. 
The second case study in paper v was an oil terminal. The limiting risk 
sources were crude oil and heavy and light naphtha products. The ter-
minal belongs to the upper tier by the Seveso II Directive. The terminal 
had a uniform management policy, which also contained the essential 
elements of MAPP. The special procedure of emergency preparedness 
in the IMS was absent. Instead of this procedure, the elements of SMS, 
such as a safety report, risk assessment and an emergency plan are inte-
grated into IMS to cover the provisions of subdivision 4.4.7 “Emergency 
preparedness and response” of the ISO 14001, i.e., replacing the missing 
special procedure. Until now, the risk identification of major hazards was 
primarily performed using a deterministic approach, which relied on the 
competences of attracted specialists, experts and consultants. The risks 
were assessed by a 5*5 risk matrix. The establishment has an orientation 
to apply HAZOP to improve of the identification of hazards. 
The third case study in paper v was a water treatment plant. The decisive 
risk source, which was chlorine, was only used in one of several sites, 
specifically, where the owner company operated. Therefore, the IMS, 
which covered the entire company, and the SMS, which was obligatory 
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only for a certain site, were developed quite independently until the final 
times. The water treatment plant belongs to the lower tier according to 
the Seveso II Directive. The application of SMS already occurred under 
the conditions of a previously implemented and certified IMS, which 
included the ISO 9001 and ISO 14001 management systems. The IMS 
of quality and environmental management included the procedure of 
crisis management, which covered the provisions of 4.4.7 “Emergency 
preparedness and response” of the ISO 14001. The procedure was aimed 
to arrange preparedness and response against various types of possible 
emergencies beyond the entire company, and one of the guides, which 
originated from the procedure, was specifically a chlorine accident. Con-
currently, for better compliance of SMS requirements, special docu-
ments, such as a chlorine accident risk assessment and emergency plan, 
were compiled for the water treatment plant, with the help of a consul-
tation company. The risks were assessed by a 5*5 risk matrix. Afterwards, 
in the frames of the implementation of OHSAS 18001 and its integra-
tion into the IMS, the entire subject of risk was thoroughly revised, and 
a special procedure of risk management was compiled. The objective was 
to design a uniform approach to different types of risks, as well as envi-
ronmental aspects. The company actuated the HAZOP methodology, 
covering all the production units, including the water treatment unit. 
The successive direction for a major accident risk from chlorine is the 
adjustment of the possible major accident scenarios, with the help of 
HAZOP, and bonding the risk assessment step-by-step with the meth-
odological approach, which was derived from the risk management pro-
cedure of the IMS. During study v, there were good opportunities for 
this adjustment because the outputs of general (of the entire company), 
and chlorine emergency-specific, risk assessment resulted in 5*5 risk ma-
trices, regardless of the diversely defined scales, levels and other criteria. 
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6. conclusions
1. The development of the Estonian emergency risk assessment can be 
distributed into three periods, with certain limiting features. These 
divisions are the periods after transition, while joining the EU and 
the current state in the EU (i).
2. The factors causing the most intensive impact on the development 
of emergency risk assessment have been the Swedish and British 
methodologies, as well as the legislation concerning emergencies and 
chemicals. Those factors with the lease impact have been substan-
tially influenced by the corresponding requirements of EU legisla-
tive acts. The main tools of emergency risk assessment were partially 
adopted from Swedish methodology, which were later improved by 
the example of the British methodology, with facilities for risk rating 
(or ranking) and a more flexible assessment of the likelihood (i).
3. The Estonian typology and classification of emergencies until now 
have demonstrated only slight continuity. During the period from 
2005 to 2011, the numbers, names and the identification codes were 
the serial numbers in the list that was enforced by the provision of 
the Government of the Republic. This classification complicates the 
comparison of emergency risks by the crosscut of the years (i).
4. The regulation emanating from the Chemicals Act enacts the ge-
neric requirements for establishments with major chemical accident 
hazards and hazardous establishments, but simultaneously enables 
the application of different methodologies and criteria. Therefore, it 
will be relevant that the outcomes of chemical accident risk assess-
ments were compatible with the validated requirements and criteria 
for emergency risk assessments (i).
5. In relation to the changeover to the emergency-centric and inter-
disciplinary emergency risk assessment, as well as the resignation of 
territorial risk assessment, less attention has been given to the con-
currence of multiple risks. Emanating from the needs of spatial plan-
ning, this situation requires a solution that includes, among other 
things, the mapping of the hazard zones of different emergencies. 
One opportunity for this mapping is an approach of five clusters, 
which depend on the type and localisation of the risk sources (i, ii).
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6. The risk ranking on the risk matrix of the British example enabled 
the substantial renovation and unification of the risk rating in com-
parison with the previous method. Simultaneously, both Estonian 
and British (local level) risk matrices have many paradoxical mo-
ments, with the generic logics of risk matrix, which counts on an 
equable increase of risk by the diagonal of the (logarithmic) matrix 
(i, iii, iv). 
7. The renovation of the likelihood assessment by the British example 
permitted a more flexible approach; however, it remains unclear how 
exactly to consider a case per event or a percent (e.g., 1/2000 or 
0.05%) in the five-year observation period (i, iv). 
8. During the comparison of the public outputs of Estonian and British 
national risk assessments, similar risks were assessed as high or very 
high, such as epidemics or pandemics and severe weather conditions 
or floods. Additionally, one particular disparity was that, in Estonia, 
the risk of cyber attack was assessed as very high, whereas in the UK, 
different types of malicious attacks were emphasised. In these cases, 
the assessment results may be influenced by the risk perception of 
the assessors, which, to a certain extent, depends on actual events in 
the recent past (iii).
 
9. The comparison of the public output documents of Estonian and 
British national risk assessments demonstrated that Estonian output 
documents were basically the compendiums of the summaries of the 
emergency risk assessments and that the British output documents 
provided broader objectives of risk communication, which contained 
specific guidelines for private and legal persons (i, iii).
10. The studies of selected Estonian case organisations, which had im-
plemented and certified the ISO 14001 standard, demonstrated that 
the identification of possible accidents and emergencies is performed 
in association with the identification of environmental aspects, also 
considering external factors, which are not environmental aspects of 
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suMMary in Estonian
Inimkond on kogu oma eksistentsi vältel olnud erinevate ohtude 
meelevallas, millest paljudega on kaasnenud tõsised õnnetused või 
katastroofid, mis on viinud hävinguliste sündmusteni. Suurõnnetused 
ja katastroofid on destabiliseerivateks teguriteks, mis võivad anda 
ühiskonna arengule tõsiseid tagasilööke, ohustades jätkusuutlikku 
arengut. Õnnetuste toimumine on enamasti etteaimamatu, olles seetõttu 
tihedalt seotud riski kontseptsiooniga. Ootamatute õnnetusjuhtumite ja 
hädaolukordade riskid ja ohud on sageli varjatud ning äratavad avalikkuse 
tähelepanu alles siis, kui midagi tõsist on juba juhtunud või juhtumas. 
Seetõttu on parema valmisoleku huvides oluline olla nendest riskidest 
ja ohtudest teadlik. Eeltoodu on ka põhjuseks, miks riskianalüüs on 
elanikkonnakaitse oluline komponent. Tänapäeval on hädaolukorraks 
valmisoleku ja sealhulgas ka riskide kindlaksmääramise ning nende 
hindamise nõuded leitavad paljudest rahvusvahelistest ja rahvuslikest 
õigusaktidest ning erinevatest standarditest.
Hädaolukorra riskianalüüsi valdkonnas Eesti Vabariigis tehti esimesed 
sammud eelmise sajandi viimasel kümnendil ja sellest ajast kuni tänaseni 
on riskianalüüsialane töö teinud läbi olulise arengu nii metodoloogilise 
lähenemise kui praktilise rakenduse osas. Vaatamata asjaolule, et 
riskianalüüs on praeguses Eestis kriisireguleerimise elulise tähtsusega 
koostisosa, esineb sellega seoses jätkuvalt mitmeid vastuolusid ja 
küsitavusi. Need hõlmavad nii õiguslikku käsitlust ja metodoloogilist 
lähenemist kui ka hädaolukordade klassifikatsiooni, määratlemist jm 
asjasse puutuvat.
Käesoleva dissertatsiooni käsitlusala hõlmab Eesti kui Euroopa Liidu n-ö 
uusliikme hädaolukorra riskianalüüsi arengu kulgu ja praegust olukorda. 
Dissertatsioonis käsitletakse riskianalüüsi korraldamise ja teostamisega 
seonduvat riiklikul, regionaalsel, kohalikul ja organisatsiooni tasandil. Olulist 
rolli dissertatsiooniga haaratud uuringutes etendab Eestis praktiseeritava 
riskianaüüsi võrdlus Suurbritannia ja Põhja-Iirimaa Ühendkuningriigi kui 
Euroopa Liidu n-ö vana liikmesmaa vastavasisulise tööga. 
Dissertatsiooni põhieesmärgiks oli uurida hädaolukorra riskianalüüsi 
arengut Eestis alates taasiseseisvumisest kuni tänaseni, selgitades ühtlasi 
teiste riikide ja rahvusvaheliste institutsioonide õigusaktide, standardite 
ja juhendmaterjalide mõju.
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Doktoritöö konkreetsemad eesmärgid olid järgmised:
1. Selgitada välja ja määrata kindlaks Eesti hädaolukorra riskianalüüsi 
arengu võtmesündmused ja mõjutegurid.
2. Uurida Eesti hädaolukorra riskianalüüsi ja selle tulemuste rakenda-
mist riiklikul, regionaalsel, lokaalsel ja organisatsiooni tasandil.
3. Võrrelda Eesti ja Ühendkuningriigi riikliku ja kohaliku tasandi häda-
olukorra riskianalüüse.
4. Uurida hädaolukorra riskianalüüsi ISO 14001 keskkonnajuhtimis-
süsteemi sertifikaati omavate valitud Eesti organisatsioonide kon-
tekstis. 
Uurimismaterjalideks olid Eesti ja teiste riikide ning rahvusvahelised õi-
gusaktid, juhendamterjalid ja standardid, kus olid sätestatud või kajastusid 
hädaolukorra riskianalüüsialased nõudmised, metodoloogiad ning muud 
asjakohased teabeallikad. Võrdlevuuringutes (i, iii, iv) kasutati Eesti ja 
Ühendkuningriigi riiklike riskianalüüside ning samuti valitud suuremate 
linnade ja linnastute riskianalüüside avalikke väljunddokumente. 
Valdavaks uurimismeetodiks oli kvalitatiivsete meetodite hulka kuuluv 
tekstianalüüs (i, ii, iii, iv, v, vi, vii). Kvantitatiivsetest uurimismeeto-
ditest kasutati kirjeldavat statistikat (i, vii) ja faktoranalüüsi (vii).
Uuringute tulemusete alusel tehti järgmised olulisemad järeldused:
1. Hädaolukorra riskianalüüsi arengut Eestis saab kindlate tegurite alu-
sel jaotada kolme perioodi. Nendeks on taasiseseisvumisjärgne pe-
riood, Euroopa Liiduga liitumisprotsessi-aegne periood ja Euroopa 
Liidus liikmesriigina tegutsemise aegne periood (i).
2. Hädaolukorra riskianalüüsi arengut enim mõjutavateks teguriteks 
on olnud Rootsi Kuningriigi ja Ühendkuningriigi hädaolukorra ris-
kianalüüside metoodikad ning hädaolukordi (sh üleujutusi) ja ke-
mikaalikäitlust sätestavad seadused. Viimastele on avaldanud olulist 
mõju Euroopa Liidu õigusaktide vastavad nõuded. Rootsi metoo-
dikast võeti üle põhilised riskianalüüsi töövahendid, mida täiendati 
hiljem Ühendkuningriigi metoodika alusel riskitaseme määramise ja 
tõenäosuse paindlikuma hindamise vahenditega (i). 
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3. Eestis on hädaolukordade tüpoloogia ja klassifikatsiooni määratle-
mise osas olnud seni järjekindlusetust. Aastate jooksul ajavahemikus 
2005 kuni 2011 on korduvalt muutunud nii analüüsitavate häda-
olukordade arv, nimetus kui ka kood, milleks on olnud järjekorra-
number Vabariigi Valitsuse korraldusega jõustatud nimekirjas. See 
komplitseerib hädaolukorra riskide võrdlust aastate lõikes (i). 
4. Kemikaaliseadusest tulenev määrus sätestab küll üldised nõuded 
suurõnnetuse ohuga ja ohtlikele objektidele, kuid samas võimaldab 
rakendada riskianalüüsi teostamisel erinevaid metoodikaid ja kritee-
riumeid. Sellest tulenevalt oleks otstarbekas, et kemikaaliõnnetuste 
riskianalüüside väljundid oleksid ühildatavad hädaolukorra riskiana-
lüüsi jaoks õiguslikult kehtestatud nõuete ja kriteeriumitega (i).
5. Seoses üleminekuga hädaolukorra riskide olukorrakesksele interdist-
siplinaarsele hindamisele ja territoriaalse riskianalüüsi kaotamisele 
on vähenenud tähelepanu erinevate riskide koosmõju arvestamisele. 
Ruumilise planeerimise vajadustest lähtuvalt on vajalik leida olukor-
rale lahendus, mis eeldab muuhulgas ka erinevate hädaolukordade 
ohualade koos kaardistamist. Ühe võimaliku metoodilise võttena on 
käesolevas dissertatsioonis pakutud viiest klastrist koosnevat rühmi-
tust sõltuvalt riskiallika iseloomust ja paiknemisest (i, ii).
6. Riskimaatriksi liigendamine riskitasemeteks Ühendkuningriigi ris-
kimaatriksi eeskujul võimaldas riskide tasemehindamise olulist kor-
rastamist ja ühtlustamist võrreldes varasemaga. Samas ilmnevad nii 
Eesti kui ka Ühendkuningriigi (lokaalse tasandi) hädaolukorra ris-
kimaatriksites vastuolud ristkimaatriksi üldise loogikaga, mis eeldab 
astmelist lähenemist, mis arvestab riski ühtlast suurenemist piki (lo-
garitmskaaladega) maatriksi diagonaali (i, iii, iv). 
7. Tõenäosuste hindamise ümberkujundamine Ühendkuningriigi me-
toodika eeskujul võimaldab paindlikumat lähenemist, kuid samas jä-
tab selgusetuks, mida konkreetselt peaks arvestama juhtumina sünd-
muste kohta või protsendina (näiteks 1/2000 ehk 0,05%) viieaastase 
vaatlusperioodi kohta (i, iv). 
8. Eesti ja Ühendkuningriigi riiklike hädaolukorra riskianalüüside 
avalike väljundite võrdlusel ilmnes, et mõlemas riigis hinnati väga 
kõrgeks või kõrgeks järgmisi riske: epideemiad või pandeemiad, tõsi-
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sed ilmastikutingimused ja üleujutused. Ühe erinevusena võib välja 
tuua, et Eestis hinnati väga kõrgeks küberrünnaku riski, samas kui 
Ühendkuningriigis olid fookuses erinevad kuritegelikud füüsilised 
rünnakud. Viimati mainitud juhtudel võivad hinnangud olla mõju-
tatud hindajate riskitajust, mis teatud määral sõltub lähiminevikus 
reaalselt aset leidnud sündmustest (iii). 
9. Eesti ja Ühendkuningriigi riiklike hädaolukordade riskianalüüside 
avalike väljunddokumentide võrdlus näitas, et kui Eesti väljunddo-
kumendid olid peamiselt hädaolukordade riskianalüüside kokkuvõ-
tete kogumikud, siis Ühendkuningriigi omad täitsid riskikommuni-
katsiooni laialdasemaid eesmärke, sisaldades konkreetseid suuniseid 
era- ja juriidilistele isikutele (i, iii).
10. Uuringud ISO 14001 standardi juurutanud ja sertifitseerida lasknud 
valitud Eesti Vabariigi organisatsioonides näitasid, et enamasti teos-
tatakse võimalike õnnetuste ja hädaolukordade identifitseerimine 
seostatult keskkonnaaspektide kindlaksmääramisega ning seejuures 
arvestatakse ka väliseid tegureid, mis ei ole konkreetse organisatsioo-
ni keskkonnaaspektid (v, vi, vii).
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Although risk assessment in the field of civil protection is a vital element of
emergency and disaster prevention, EU policy directives do not promote a com-
mon methodological approach for evaluating the performance of emergency risk
assessments (EmRAs). Consequently, new member states have based the devel-
opment of their national risk assessment systems on examples from the EU-15
member states and elsewhere. The latest important trend in the EU is the con-
struction of unified guidelines on risk assessment and mapping for disaster man-
agement. This paper explores the developments in and problems of the risk
assessment of emergency situations in post-Soviet Estonia. In the 1990s, the
requirements for EmRA in Estonia were vague; only since 1998 has the Chemi-
cals Act established more concrete requirements for hazardous industrial plants.
Entry into the EU required Estonia to abide by and implement EU regulations.
The primary aim of the current study was to conduct a survey on the develop-
ment of Estonian EmRA since the restitution of Estonia as an independent state
(1991). A secondary aim was to examine the impact of guidelines from other
states and international institutions on the process of developing Estonia’s regu-
lations. Although this study emphasises the success of the key stages in the
developmental process of Estonia’s EmRA system, it also demonstrates the need
for further improvement of the system’s legal and methodological basis, as well
as the practical arrangement of EmRA. The problems and solutions of EmRA in
Estonia have common features with those in other EU member states, and there-
fore more cooperation inside the Union is recommended.
Keywords: assessment; civil protection; crisis management; emergency; hazard;
legislation; risk; standards
Introduction
Hazards and risks, and their consequent emergencies, disasters and catastrophes,
have always accompanied human development. Emergencies have occurred in the
past, occur at present and will occur in the future (Tammepuu, Tammepuu, and
Sepp 2009), and as Flynn and Theodore (2001, 80) argue, accident will happen in
any given hazardous environment. Major hazards and accidents are examples of
destabilising factors, which can cause serious setbacks to a continuous development
process (Tammepuu et al. 2008). Disasters of both natural and human agencies pose
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remarkable challenges to sustainable development in twenty-first century Europe
(EC 2008a).
The unplanned and unforeseen nature of accidents means that they are usually
handled in relation to risk. Institutions in all sectors of society can (and do) conceal
the variables of the risks, hazards and threats of their operations from public atten-
tion until a serious accident occurs; therefore, society should be aware of all three
of these variables (Tammepuu et al. 2008). Risk assessment is thus an essential part
of civil protection (Tammepuu, Sepp, and Uiga 2007), and many European coun-
tries clearly recognise the usefulness of developing risk assessment standards in the
field of civil protection and emergency preparedness (Lonka 1999). Requirements
concerning accident risk identification and assessment for emergency preparedness
currently exist in various international and Estonian national legal documents, as
well as in international standards. For example, ISO 14001 refers to a set of
requirements for emergency preparedness and response, focusing on the identifica-
tion of possible accidents and emergencies (ISO 14001 2004).
Several recent studies concerning risk assessment in civil protection have
focused on concrete accident types, e.g. major chemical accidents, according to the
‘SEVESO II’ Directive (EC 1997; Salvi and Gaston 2004; Salvi and Debray 2006).
Fewer studies, either national or comparative, are available concerning the inte-
grated approach of multi-hazard territorial risk assessment (TRA) and management.
Lonka (1999) conducted a comparative study of risk assessment in the field of civil
protection across several European countries. The European research project
QUARTER focused on the development of a territorial management system for ter-
ritorial risk reduction and environmental quality improvement (Treu, Colucci, and
Lodrini 2004). In the context of this research project, Treu, Colucci, and Sam-
akovlija (2005) developed a methodological framework for territorial vulnerability
analysis and assessment, for which QUARTER’s research group (Baldi, Martelli,
and Treu 2004) proposed the Environmental Risk Management System procedure.
Other research projects in the EU sphere are discussed later in the paper. Unfortu-
nately, an inclusive overview of the risks that the EU faces does not exist. This lack
is due to the diversity of methodological approaches employed in previous studies,
which has reduced the comparability of information and caused difficulties in data
consolidation at the EU level (Commission of the European Communities 2009).
A report from the EUROBALTIC I project, which was conducted in the Baltic
Sea region, has introduced several methodologies for the risk assessment, manage-
ment and mapping that were developed and applied in the countries of that region
(Hedin, Hellenberg, and Pursiainen 2006). In Estonia, Tint et al. (2003) and Paas,
Tint, and Järvis (2009) have discussed the problems of major accident hazards on
the basis of Tallinn’s risk assessments. Tammepuu, Sepp, and Uiga (2007) studied
the aspects of risk assessment in land use planning, based on Tartu’s risk assess-
ment, engaging a number of different types of emergency risk. Tammepuu et al.
(2008) conducted a comparative study on the risk assessment strategies of cities in
Estonia and the UK and Tammepuu, Tammepuu, and Sepp (2009) examined emer-
gency risk assessment (EmRA) in a Port of Tallinn facility. Although risk assess-
ment is currently an essential component of Estonian crisis management, many
gaps, contradictions and ambiguities remain concerning its legal and methodological
requirements, classifications, indicators, etc. Therefore, the current study had three
overarching aims in the context of EmRA: (1) to perform an overview survey on
the development of Estonian EmRA; (2) to research the impact of international and





























national regulations and methodologies on the development of Estonian EmRA; and
(3) to discuss the applicability of EmRA and its outcomes in the context of environ-
mental assessment and management as well as spatial planning and mapping.
Throughout the current study, analogous materials from the UK were chosen for the
purposes of comparison, as the Estonian Ministry of the Interior (2008) has recently
adopted the UK approach for Estonian methodological development of EmRA.
Emergency risk in a context of civil protection
The term ‘risk’ is widely used both in the scientific world and in the everyday
life (Christou 1998). Risk is an integral part of life (Smith 2001) that has
become one of the most powerful concepts in modern society (Leiss and Choc-
iolko 1994), to the extent that today’s world has even been called a ‘risk society’
(Beck 2000). A great many ‘risk’ researchers and practitioners are involved in
research studies, and risk appears to be a crucial component of many important
societal decisions. Wlodarczyk and Tennyson (2003) contend that risk is both the
product of the harmful consequence of an activity or event and the probability of
its occurrence. Safety literature most commonly defines risk as the probability of
an adverse future event multiplied by its magnitude (Adams 2001). Although
contemporary society is greatly concerned with many aspects of risk, the concept
of risk and its assessment and management have not yet been sufficiently devel-
oped to provide a holistic approach (Aven and Kristensen 2005). The EU Civil
Protection Financial Instrument (EC 2007a) defines an emergency as any situation
that has or may have an adverse impact on people, and preparedness is defined
as a state of readiness in which the capacity of human and material means
enables protection against such emergencies (EC 2007a, 2007b, Article 3). The
UN ISDR terminology considers the terms ‘crisis’ and ‘emergency’ as effectively
the same, with both being ‘a threatening condition that requires urgent action’
(UN ISDR 2009, 12). The glossary of the European Environment Agency (EEA
2010) defines collocations containing ‘emergency’, such as ‘emergency law’ and
‘emergency plan’, but unfortunately not the word ‘emergency’ itself. The Esto-
nian Emergency Preparedness Act (Parliament of Estonia 2000), which was valid
until 23 July 2009, designated an emergency as ‘an event or a chain of events,
which endangers national security, the life and health of persons, causes signifi-
cant damages to the environment or extensive economic damage’ (Parliament of
Estonia 2000: Section 2 of General Provisions). Responding to any of these
events requires ‘the co-ordinated action of the Government of the Republic, gov-
ernment agencies and local governments’ (Parliament of Estonia 2000: Section 2
of General Provisions). This definition is comparable to Smith’s definition of
disaster as:
[A]n event, concentrated in time and space, in which a community experiences severe
danger and disruption of its essential functions, accompanied by widespread human,
material, or environmental losses, which often exceed the ability of the community to
cope without external assistance. (Smith 2001, 7)
The new Estonian Emergency Act (Parliament of Estonia 2009) defines an
emergency as:





























… an event or a chain of events, which endangers the life or health of many people
or causes significant proprietary damage or significant environmental damage or severe
and extensive disruptions in the continuous operation of vital services and responding
to which requires the prompt co-ordinated activities of several agencies or the persons
engaged by them. (Parliament of Estonia 2009: Section 2 of General Provisions)
In our opinion, an emergency can be defined as an accident for which external
aid is required to provide an adequate response. We recognise a minimum of four
levels of additional aid: (1) institutions need to call emergency services such as the
fire brigade, ambulance, police, etc.; (2) local community councils ask for help from
the regional level; (3) regions ask for national government help; and (4) the national
government asks for international aid. We consider emergencies as the risk of unde-
sired events in a number of levels of severity, starting from everyday incidents and
proceeding through accidents to disasters and, finally, catastrophes. Simultaneously,
we propose that the majority of emergency risks be classified essentially as specific
‘environmental risks’ on the basis that the EEA Glossary (EEA 2010) defines envi-
ronmental risk as the ‘likelihood, or probability, of injury, disease, or death resulting
from exposure to a potential environmental hazard’.
Estonian background
Estonia is one of the post-2004 ‘new’ members of the EU, each of which has a differ-
ent twentieth century background, in contrast with the ‘old’ EU-15 members. Esto-
nia’s experiences in the previous century have undoubtedly influenced the societal
and scientific development of risk assessment and associated concepts in the country.
Both geographically and geologically, Estonia is a safe environment that is unaffected
by plate tectonic activities (volcanoes, earthquakes and tsunamis) or any major envi-
ronmental hazards except for its low-lying west coast, which is prone to flooding by
the Baltic Sea. The legacy of human activity in northern Estonia during the latter half
of the twentieth century does, however, cause a high degree of concern for the envi-
ronment; the excavation of oil shale in the Kohtla-Järve and Kiviõli area, the storage
of nuclear waste at Saku from the Soviet training reactor at Paldiski and the Soviet
processing of uranium at Sillamäe all provide possible threats to environmental
safety. During the Soviet period 1944–1991, EmRA research into these activities, in
the context of the contemporary definition of ‘risk assessment’, did not occur.
On regaining independence in 1991, Estonia began to develop its regulative
framework, and on admission to the EU, this framework was transformed to adopt
the EU legislation requirements. Consequently, the need to elaborate new regula-
tions drove Estonia’s implementation of risk assessment. Between 1991 and 2004,
Estonia was a society in transition, and in moving from an authoritarian planned
economy under the Soviet sphere of influence to a democratic free market economy
within the EU, the country experienced rapid socio-economic and environmental
changes. The process of change brought about the wider societal perception and
recognition of risk-related issues and the necessity for corresponding research into
those issues. Since regaining its independence, Estonia has gradually transformed
the previous Soviet-based, military-style civil defence system into a comprehensive
civil protection system (Stern et al. 2002). The organisational structure of this sys-
tem is centralised, i.e. coordinated and mostly organised by the central national civil
protection authority (Elomaa and Halonen 2007).





























Development of EmRA legislation and methodologies
General characteristics
As in Finland, Sweden and Norway (Lonka 1999), a nationwide system of risk
assessment exists in Estonia. The development of EmRA has been substantially
dependent on the formation and adoption of pertinent legislation, which was ini-
tially independent of EU legislation.
Period I: Transition from Soviet republic to re-established independent state
Risk assessment in the field of civil protection in Estonia began in 1992, when the
Civil Protection Act (Parliament of Estonia 1992) was adopted; this law initially
defined the meaning and established the goals of civil protection in a national con-
text. The Act neither contains nor defines the word ‘risk’, but it essentially was the
catalyst for conducting EmRAs. The primary aim of civil protection was to identify
all the possible extraordinary situations in particular locations, their causes and the
areas endangered by their consequences. Although this aim, in principle, presumes
an assessment of the risk of those events, concrete requirements and legally
acknowledged methodologies for such assessments were absent at the time. One
important development was the Estonian translation of the UNEP/APELL guide-
book Hazard Identification and Evaluation in a Local Community (UNEP IE/PAC
1992), which was based on the handbook of the Swedish Rescue Services Agency
(1989). The translated text was prepared through the cooperation of the Estonian
and Swedish Rescue Boards, and it led to the adoption of an approach known in
Estonia as the ‘Swedish methodology’. Several courses were held with the partici-
pation of Swedish specialists who introduced the theoretical basis and practical
applications of this particular methodology. Between 1993 and 1999, only occa-
sional pilot risk assessments were conducted using modifications of the Swedish
methodology, most of which concerned chemically hazardous enterprises. A more
intensive programme of practical EmRAs was undertaken when the government
passed the Estonian Chemicals Act (1998) and the corresponding regulations of the
Minister of the Interior (1999) into law. These documents partly adopted the princi-
ples and selected criteria of EU legislation. The risks of chemical emergencies will
be covered in greater detail in a dedicated section of the paper.
Period II: EU acceptance to 2008
The key characteristic of this period was the adoption of a new legal act, the Esto-
nian Emergency Preparedness Act (Parliament of Estonia 2000), which clearly
attempted to conform to the EU legislative framework. This Act established risk
assessment as an important task of crisis management on the basis of which all fol-
lowing measures of crisis management should be planned and implemented. The
Act specified two types of risk assessment, TRA and functional risk assessment
(FRA). The TRA involved the Ministries and their areas of government, whereas
the FRA concerned the counties and the largest cities and communities. Pertinent
risk assessment methodologies were integral to the Act. Both the TRA and the
FRA methodologies are essentially variants of the aforementioned Swedish method-
ology (UNEP/APELL), and they were developed and adjusted to Estonian condi-
tions by work groups with the organisational and/or financial support of the





























Ministry of the Interior. Any risk assessment conducted via these two methodolo-
gies can be characterised as a risk matrix approach, which uses a 5-step ranking for
both the assessment of probability (1–5, with 1 as the lowest and 5 as the highest)
and the assessment of consequences (A–E, with A as the least serious and E as the
most serious).
The methodological basis for TRA was established by special regulation in
‘Methodology of risk assessment of the county, the community and the city’ (Min-
ister of the Interior 2001). The goal of risk assessment in the context of this regula-
tion was to determine and assess certain types of possible accidents in the territory
of counties, communities or cities, as well as the probabilities of their occurrences.
Such a risk assessment would obtain an overview of the potential hazards for state
security, human life and health, the environment and critical infrastructures. The
methodology required the assessment of multi-hazard risks, 16 + n different types
of possible accidents or hazards. The 16 types, in alphabetical order, were as fol-
lows: building collapses, communal systems, communication systems, dangerous
chemicals, drinking water pollution, electricity supply, epidemics, epizootics, explo-
sions, extreme environmental conditions, forest fires, floods, gas, social hazards,
transport and water bodies.
The Emergency Preparedness Act of 2000 included the requirement that the out-
comes of risk assessments had to be established as the basis for composing crisis
management plans and spatial planning (land use) in the contexts of county plans,
comprehensive plans, detailed plans and specific building projects. This was an
important requirement as it expressed the need for further research and the develop-
ment of a more effective link between risk assessment and land use planning.
The methodological basis for FRA was the guidance document ‘The Schedule
and Methodology of Ministerial Risk Assessment’ (Ministry of the Interior 2003),
which conformed to the decisions of the Crisis Commission of the Government of
the Republic of Estonia and was amended until 2007. The primary and secondary
aims of FRA were to assess possible emergencies and their corresponding hazards
in the fields and relevant institutions for which each Government Ministry was
responsible. The methodology of FRA did not require the Ministries to detail these
emergencies, as any risks classified as being highly probable and/or of the most
serious consequence could be analysed at a later date. Work groups of the Minis-
tries were mainly responsible for conducting the FRAs. To date, all Ministries
(except for the Ministry of Defence, which was exempted from the requirement)
have conducted FRAs and the counties and most of the largest cities in Estonia
have conducted TRAs.
Period III: Current development as a member of the EU
The adoption into law of the Emergency Act (Parliament of Estonia 2009) marked
the beginning of Period III. The Emergency Act combined the requirements of the
previous Emergency Preparedness Act of 2000 and the Emergency Situation Act of
1996 (amended in 2002), while simultaneously superseding both Acts. The Emer-
gency Act defines risk assessment as a document that identifies the risk coupled
with a report of the risk assessment outcomes. The risk assessment should contain
all relevant data pertaining to the emergency: a description, hazards causing the
event, the probability and the consequences of the event, related information,





























references to applied models and the sources and other relevant information on
which the risk assessment is based.
The Emergency Act no longer makes a distinction between the FRA and the
TRA of the Emergency Preparedness Act of 2000, but instead makes risk assess-
ment more emergency-based. This key difference means that work groups, consist-
ing of representatives of various National Boards, now assess the risks of concrete
emergencies. These work groups can be amended with additional competent persons
from civil service, research and development institutions, and from the private sec-
tor. Such an approach flexibly and conveniently enables Estonia to follow the con-
temporary principles of risk governance: communication and inclusion, integration
and reflection, as determined by van Asselt and Renn (2011). The Emergency Act
of 2009 required the Government to establish a list of emergencies, which defines
26 types of events, all of which must be assessed for risk at the state level (Govern-
ment of the Republic 2010). The Act also requires the appointment, for each risk
type, of a competent agency, which is responsible for forming a work group to con-
duct the risk assessment. The quantity of emergency risks, which the Act requires
to be assessed at the regional level, is slightly smaller and includes 19 different
types of events.
The Emergency Act of 2009, in a fundamental difference from the previous
Acts, requires risk assessments for the continuous operation and provision of vital
services. The organising of the continuous operation of vital services is delegated to
particular Ministries, the Bank of Estonia and the municipalities, whereas the obli-
gation of preparing the risk assessments of the continuous operation of vital ser-
vices is placed on the direct providers of these services. The guidelines for the risk
assessment of the continuous operation of vital services were established by the reg-
ulation of the Minister of the Interior, which essentially means that a separate meth-
odological approach was employed for this specific sector. The paper further
discusses the topic of continuous operation of vital services in a special dedicated
section.
The most notable change in the methodological development of EmRA is the
re-orientation away from the Swedish methodology (UNEP IE/PAC 1992) in favour
of the methodology developed in the UK and published as a chapter of Emergency
Preparedness Guidance (HM Government 2005), which was in turn based on Aus-
tralian methodology (Emergency Management Australia 2004). The transition was
smooth, as Estonia’s Swedish-based methodology and the UK’s methodology con-
sist of similar steps of action and are consequently comparable (Tammepuu et al.
2008). The reasons for this change of orientation in methodology were mostly prac-
tical, and an explanation is outlined as follows. Firstly, the British methodology
was recently developed and was novel. Secondly, the entire methodological concept
and its particular steps of risk assessment were presented in a systematic and
straightforward manner; they were also widely accepted and proven in solid practi-
cal applications (Ministry of the Interior 2008a). Thirdly, the system enabled the
design of better solutions for several problematic characteristics of the previous
methodology, e.g. risk rating (or ranking) into certain categories on the risk matrix.
Fourthly, as a purely practical advantage, the public version of the British
methodology was easily available via the Internet and was written in English. Prior
to the Minister of the Interior (2010a) enacting the current Estonian EmRA
methodology as a legal document, the Government’s Crisis Management Committee
(Ministry of the Interior 2008a) compiled and made public a guide to the system,





























which was available in both Estonian and English. This guide can be considered as
the generic Estonian modification of the UK’s methodology.
The new aspects adopted from the UK’s methodology were the principle of like-
lihood scoring and the risk rating (or ranking) on the risk matrix. Previously, vari-
able and occasionally paradoxical scales for risk rating had been proposed by risk
assessors, but a unified methodological approach was missing. The likelihood scale
of earlier Estonian risk assessment methodologies (TRA and FRA) employed five
steps, which were defined by the probability of a single event occurring in n years;
for example: probability (3) defined an event occurring at least once in five years.
The current EmRA methodology also presents the likelihood scoring scales in five
steps, as defined periods of five years in percentages, and concurrently in the num-
ber of emergencies per certain background events. For example, one chance in
20,000 that an emergency will take place during 5 years equates to 0.005% per
five-year period. The meaning of the entirety (100%) allows for various interpreta-
tions (Tammepuu et al. 2008) under this system, for example a number of ordinary
events, a number of near misses, etc. The likelihood scoring criteria were not
adopted like-for-like from the UK methodology (see Table 1).
The risk matrix of Estonian methodology (Minister of the Interior 2010a,
2010b) has the scale of likelihood on the vertical axis and the scale of conse-
quences on the horizontal axis, whereas the scales on the British risk matrix (HM
Government 2005) are reversed. The Estonian risk matrix (see Figure 2) displays
the likelihood levels by numbers (1–5) and the consequence levels by letters (A–E),
whereas the UK risk matrix, similar to the Finnish risk matrix (Allinniemi 1994;
Seppälä 1994; Lonka 1999), uses numbers for both scales (see Figure 1).
The British risk matrix displays the five ranked categories of risk rating with
explanatory keys, which the Estonian methodology has adopted on an almost like-
for-like basis. The key difference is that, whereas the Estonian risk matrix defines
the level of likelihood of occurrence of 3B, 4B and 5B as ‘low risk’, the British
risk matrix defines their counterparts, 2–3, 2–4 and 2–5, as ‘medium risk’. The pre-
vious Estonian risk matrix, like the Swedish matrix (Swedish Rescue Services
Agency 1989; UNEP IE/PAC 1992; Davidsson et al. 2003), did not originally con-
tain the risk rating categories; this ambiguity gave rise to the previously mentioned
plural interpretations of the risk rating problem. The risk rating categories, in both
Figures 1 and 2, run from ‘very high’ in the right upper corner through ‘high’ and
‘medium’ to ‘low’ in the left lower corner.
Despite the widespread use of risk matrix method, which belongs to the
European standardised risk assessment techniques (EN 31010 2010) and is also





five years (%) Descriptor
Probability over
five years (%)
1 Very small < 0.005 up to 0.05 Negligible >0.005
2 Small >0.05 up to 0.5 Rare >0.05
3 Average >0.5 up to 5 Unlikely >0.5
4 Large >5 up to 50 Possible >5
5 Very large >50 Probable >50





























recommended by Risk Assessment and Mapping Guidelines for Disaster Manage-
ment (EC 2010a), it is not free of substantial imperfections. For example, Cox
(2008) demonstrates by thorough theoretical analysis that risk matrices have only a
limited ability to reproduce the risk ratings correctly; thus, caution is needed in
using these ratings as risk assessment tools. Levine (2011), taking into account pre-
vious critical studies, suggests that in cases where quantitative methods are not
available or a reasonable choice, the most defensible risk matrices are those
employing logarithmic scales and a logical progression of risk rating categories on
the matrix horizontally, vertically and diagonally. The Swedish, British and Estonian
risk matrices used for EmRA have logarithmic scales in principle. This property is
more clearly expressed in the probability (likelihood) scales and less detectable in
the consequence (impact) scales, as the latter are defined by the combination of
both quantitative and qualitative criteria. The division of risk rating categories in
the British and Estonian matrices is not proportional, inclining more to the direction
of impact (consequence). The British matrix generally has a more graceful succes-
sion of risk rating categories, but contains paradoxical sections from 2–2 to 3–3
and 3–2 to 4–3, in which the risk rating is diagonally ‘jumping’ from ‘low’ to
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Figure 2. Estonian risk matrix.





























contains more paradoxes of this nature, and the risk matrix is additionally divided
into the areas of ‘conventional accidents and operating problems’ and ‘emergency
situations’, depending on consequences. This division refers to the possible example
of Irish EmRA methodology (A Framework for Major Emergency Management
2006), where the division into the previously mentioned two areas and their posi-
tions on the risk matrix, although formulated slightly differently, were identical.
Conducting EmRA
Brief overview
In recent years, regular summary reports of EmRAs at the national (nationwide)
and local levels (counties, the largest cities and selected municipalities) have been
produced. The new regulation (Minister of the Interior 2010a, 2010b) does not spe-
cifically concern local level EmRAs but emphasises the regional level, which con-
sists of four rescue regions: North, South, East and West. The EmRAs of these
regions are still being prepared and are not yet publicly available.
Two years ago, we conducted a comparative study of the EmRAs of four Esto-
nian cities and four cities or conurbations of the UK (Tammepuu et al. 2008). We
selected the administrative centres of each of the four rescue regions: Tallinn
(North), Tartu (South), Narva (East) and Pärnu (West). In the UK, we selected Lon-
don, Greater Manchester, the West Midlands conurbation (Birmingham and its sur-
rounding urban areas) and Belfast. The survey demonstrated several conformities
between the risk assessments of the two countries’ cities, as was expected based on
the similarity of their respective methodological bases. The UK cities’ risk assess-
ments were generally more homogenous as they have a more voluminous and
detailed methodological basis. Estonian cities’ risk assessments demonstrated more
variability in individual comparisons, for example, in the previously mentioned risk
rating categories, which were not determined by the previous methodology.
Subsequently, we examined the Estonian national level risk assessment summa-
ries and compared them with the National Risk Register of the UK. During this sur-
vey, we focused on the definition and typology of emergencies (or emergency risks)
on the basis of publicly available versions (Tammepuu and Sepp 2012).
State level EmRA summaries
The public versions of national risk assessment summaries are available via Internet
for the period 2005–2011 (Ministry of the Interior 2006, 2007a, 2008b, 2009,
2011). The Ministry of the Interior composed the summaries of the annual national
level risk assessments of 2005–2007 using the ‘old’ methodology (Ministry of the
Interior 2003), which was amended until 2007 (Ministry of the Interior 2007b). By
2008, the Ministry of the Interior was using the first version of the current method-
ology (Ministry of the Interior 2008a), which was then amended to become the cur-
rently valid methodology (Minister of the Interior 2010a). The summary of the
EmRAs of 2011 was completely based on the most recent methodology.
The summaries of the national risk assessments demonstrated a lack of continu-
ity during the four-year period of 2005–2008 in the identification, definition and
classification of emergencies. The quantity and the formulations of identified emer-
gencies varied from year to year, which complicated the comparison of assessed
risks over this brief period.





























Baseline differences involved the number of identified emergencies, which ran-
ged from 10 in 2005 to 26 in 2008, the number of Groups of Emergencies, which
ranged from 2 in 2005 to 5 in 2007, and the removal of the time-scale for the prob-
ability aspect from 2007 onwards. The key difference that occurred in 2008 was the
appendage of Roman numeral codes I–XXVI to each of the 26 identified types of
emergencies. This same technique was also applied in the summary of 2011.
The summary of 2005 itemised 10 types of emergencies into two risk groups.
The first consisted of emergencies characterised by a probability of occurrence of
once in one to 10 years and serious or very serious consequences, such as epidem-
ics and pandemics. The second consisted of emergencies characterised by lower
probabilities of occurrence, once in more than 10 years, with very serious or cata-
strophic consequences, such as an emergency caused by radioactive substances.
The summary of 2006 itemised 18 types of risks into four groups and made rec-
ommendations for the management of these risks. The first group included those
events assessed to have a high level of probability (once in 1–10 years) and very
serious or serious consequences, such as pandemics and epidemics. The second
group consisted of moderately probable emergencies (once in 10–25 years; in the
case of radiation accidents, once in 25–50 years) with very serious or catastrophic
consequences, such as an emergency caused by radioactive substances. The third
group contained high or moderate probability emergencies with very serious or seri-
ous environmental and/or economic consequences, which in turn would affect the
function of vital societal spheres and endanger human life and health, such as
extensive marine pollution. The fourth group comprised low or very low probability
events with catastrophic or very serious primarily economic consequences, which in
turn would affect the function of vital societal spheres and endanger human life and
health, such as a long-term breakdown of electronic communication.
The summary of 2007 presented 17 types of emergency risks, which were
divided into the following five groups:
• Emergencies with high probability and very serious consequences (such as
extensive marine pollution, epidemics and murrain).
• Emergencies with high probability and serious consequences (such as emer-
gency caused by a large fire or explosion, massive intoxication and extensive
environmental pollution).
• Emergencies with medium probability and very serious consequences (such as
terrorism or a long-term and massive blackout).
• Emergencies with medium probability and serious consequences (such as a
massive influx of refugees).
• Emergencies with low probability and serious consequences (such as an emer-
gency caused by radioactive substances).
The summary of 2008 handled 26 types of emergencies, as was required by the
current EmRA methodology (Ministry of the Interior 2008a); this system finally
determined certain obligations for assessment emergency types. The emergencies
were coded with Roman numerals from I to XXVI, and the evaluated risks were
marked on the corresponding division of the risk matrix. The list of the emergencies
comprised several definitions, which included quantitative pre-assessment
components, concerning the estimated consequences, such as an aircraft accident or
its dissipation with many victims or extensive marine pollution. We still hold that





























the definition of an emergency should not initially consist of the determined criteria
of its consequences, which are essentially the components evaluated during the risk
assessment. Emergency risks were assigned into four risk rating groups, which are
described below, on the basis of the previously described risk rating principles:
• Very high risk – extensive marine pollution (IV).
• High risk – extensive forest and brush fire (I).
• Medium risk – road accident with many casualties (VIII).
• Low risk – extraordinarily cold (XIV) or hot (XV) weather.
The recently published summary of 2011 followed the same principles in divid-
ing the emergencies (or emergency risks) into 26 types (or more precisely into 25
types, as the risk assessment of one of the new categories, the hostage crisis, was
confidential and not contained in the publicly available summary). At the same
time, the typology and the numbers of the emergencies have changed. This alter-
ation means that in most cases the same Roman numerals have different meanings
in the matrices of 2008 and 2011, which complicates any simple one-to-one com-
parisons. A more detailed comparative analysis demonstrated that most of the
assessed emergency risk types were basically the same or similar; only the formula-
tions of a number of emergency definitions were changed and two new types of
emergencies were included and the same number was removed. This generally led
to better continuity in typology than that observed during the period from 2005 to
2008.
We conducted a parallel study using comparative material from another EU
state, the UK’s National Risk Register (Cabinet Office 2010). The Register delin-
eates 14 high consequence risks (see the matrix on page 5, Cabinet Office 2010)
split into three groups: natural events, major accidents and malicious attacks. Each
of the 14 high consequence risks is placed in the matrix according to the variables
of relative impact and relative likelihood. The matrix does not mention either the
three groups or the risk rating categories. Furthermore, the Register succinctly
explains, in a section titled ‘Risks in Context’, the reason for omitting time as a
variable in rating the likelihood of emergencies occurring:
In setting out the risks, their likelihood, and their impact, the National Risk Register is
not predicting that any particular type of emergency will happen in the next five years
or that, if it were to do so, it would happen on a specific scale. Events have a habit of
confounding predictions; prudent emergency planning is based on consideration of a
wide range of risks rather than on a forecast that any particular risk will occur in a
time-schedule. (Cabinet Office 2010, 5)
On the basis of our comparison, the UK’s National Risk Register of the UK was
definitive, whereas the Estonian EmRA summaries contained condensed information
(Tammepuu and Sepp 2012).
The various approaches employed across nations for identifying, defining and
categorising emergencies (or disasters) make it difficult to ensure the continuity of
comparative data and statistics domestically, inside the EU or worldwide. One rea-
son why we propose this remarkable variability of emergency definitions and classi-
fications is the absence of a globally acceptable paradigm for each type of event; if
such paradigms existed, they would enable states to compile lists of emergencies





























based on a unified foundation. In the context of the EU, a disaster typology
designed to suit all member states, the EU’s Vademecum of Civil Protection (EC
2010b), does exist, but this system is inherently open to criticism and is neither
sufficiently universal nor flexible to serve as an acceptable foundation for risk
assessment. For example, the Vademecum of Civil Protection classifies forest fire as
a natural hazard, despite the most common direct cause of these fires (the ignition
source) being anthropogenic. The developers of the European spatial planning
observation network (ESPON) Hazards project (Philipp Schmidt-Thomé et al. 2006)
developed a typology specifically for spatially relevant hazards, which involved 15
risk categories with corresponding indicators divided between two groupings: natu-
ral hazards (11) and technological hazards (4). We conclude that although a great
deal of work has been done to develop emergency typologies, further development
is still required. The results of a recent study (De Vries, Verhoeven, and Boeckhout
2011) accentuate that the taxonomy (classification or typology) of risks has a num-
ber of problematic aspects, not only from the relatively narrow viewpoint of emer-
gency and disaster risks, but also in the generic context of risk governance in
contemporary society.
Risk assessments of selected types of emergencies – (i) major accidents
involving chemicals and (ii) flooding
The following section investigates the compliance of certain EmRAs in the context
of EU directives and Estonian legislation.
Chemical accident risks (in establishments with fixed sites)
The essential principles and requirements concerning the EU risk assessment of
industrial institutions designated as major accident hazards are formulated in Seveso
II Directive (EC 1997). This is arguably the most significant EU Directive as it sup-
ports the protection of people and the environment from major accidental hazards
(Salvi and Gaston 2004). The requirements for risk assessment are specified in the
accompanying guidance on the preparation of a safety report (see MAHB 2005)
and in land use planning guidelines (see MAHB 2006). These guidance materials
introduce the general methodological principles, approaches and best practices of
risk assessment, explaining important concepts such as the arguments for and
against employing qualitative or quantitative methods and deterministic or probabi-
listic relations, etc. However, the guidelines do not prescribe a concrete default, or
recommended, methodological scheme. The accidental risk assessment methodology
for industries (ARAMIS) developed by the ARAMIS project had as one objective,
the creation of a harmonised EU-wide methodology based on the specific require-
ments of the Seveso II directive, combining the strengths of both deterministic and
probabilistic approaches (Salvi and Debray 2006).
In Estonia, the requirements for the assessment of chemical accident risks in
dangerous enterprises and enterprises liable to be affected by a major accident were
initially enacted by a government document titled ‘The Procedures’ (Minister of the
Interior 2003), but since 17 February 2011 they have been superseded by the
regulations outlined in ‘The Requirements’ (Government of the Republic 2011),
which are based on Estonia’s Chemicals Act of 1998 (Parliament of Estonia 1998).
Estonian legislation determines which enterprises are dangerous and divides them
into three categories, depending on the inherent hazardous characteristics of the





























substances they process and the quantities stored. The threshold quantities of Esto-
nia’s two most stringent categories are outlined in the Seveso II Directive’s Annex
1, by which enterprises (hereafter ‘Seveso enterprises’) are deemed to be liable to
be affected by a major accident. There are 53 Seveso enterprises in Estonia (Esto-
nian Rescue Board 2011). The threshold quantities for the third category, compris-
ing ‘dangerous enterprises’, are substantially lower than those prescribed in the
Seveso criteria. For example, the threshold quantity for petrol (petroleum spirits)
was previously 10 tonnes; consequently, the majority of Estonia’s petrol stations
belonged to this category. Since the 1st of October 2011, however, the threshold
quantities for the ‘dangerous enterprises’ were increased and the threshold for petrol
(petroleum spirits) was raised to 100 tonnes. Therefore, the quantity of designated
‘dangerous enterprises’ dramatically decreased after that date. All the remaining
Estonian category three ‘dangerous enterprises’ are obliged to conduct risk assess-
ments and prepare emergency plans.
Both the 2003 (Minister of the Interior 2003) and the 2011 (Government of the
Republic 2011) regulations provided only generic requirements for risk assessments,
which gave risk assessors broad scope to select their methodologies and approaches.
Risk assessors for Estonia’s three categories of dangerous enterprises consist of
three types: (i) the enterprises themselves acting independently or with expert help
and advice; (ii) private companies specialising, partially or totally, in risk assess-
ments; and (iii) universities and colleges acting on the basis of research contracts
with the ‘dangerous enterprises’. This typology of assessors is quite similar to that
observed in the Nordic countries (Magnusson et al. 1999), but determination of the
precise proportions of the each category requires additional study. We (the authors)
have participated in risk assessments, resulting in risk matrixes analogous to the
previously mentioned TRA; researchers at the Tallinn University of Technology act-
ing as risk assessors (Paas, Tint, and Järvis 2009) have used the risk matrix-based
methodology of the University of Melbourne (2003).
We conducted two mini-studies to evaluate whether the conducted risk assess-
ments complied with the legislation of the time at which they were conducted. First,
we surveyed the 147 category three ‘dangerous enterprises’ of the South Estonian
region, finding that only 66% of the risk assessments complied with the generic
requirements of ‘The Procedures’ regulations (Minister of the Interior 2003). Second,
we examined the publicly available safety documents of five Estonian categories one
and two ‘Seveso enterprises’ (Ministry of the Environment 2010). These enterprises
handled the following dangerous chemicals or groups of chemicals: Enterprise (1)
(oil products); Enterprise (2) (ammonium nitrate); Enterprise (3) (oil shale products);
Enterprise (4) (liquefied petroleum gas); and Enterprise (5) (chlorine).
Enterprises (1), (4) and (5) based their risk assessments on a risk matrix. Enter-
prise (1) used a simple risk matrix with three-step probability and consequence
scales, similar to that used in occupational risk assessment. Enterprises (4) and (5)
used risk matrices with five-step scales, contingently compatible with those used in
TRAs. Enterprises (4) and (5) also used simplified combinations of fault and event
trees (bow ties) for accident scenario identification and layer of protection analysis
(EN 61511-3:2005 2005) in a qualitative form, without the probabilities of the
safety barrier operations. Enterprises (2) and (3) only emphasised the qualitative
description of risk. Enterprises (2) and (5) calculated the consequences, based on
safety distances according to certain criteria, whereas Enterprises (1) and (4) used
generic safety distances.





























According to the current risk assessment methodology (Minister of the Interior
2010a) and the Emergency Act (Parliament of Estonia 2009), major chemical acci-
dents are also the responsibility of regional and national risk assessments.
Although neither the regional nor the national risk assessments have a classifica-
tion for a ‘major chemical accident’, this type of event is linked to other types of
classified emergencies, as indicated by the following selection from the 2008
National Summary of Risk Assessments for Emergencies (Ministry of the Interior
2009):
• extensive and/or complicated fire/explosion in industrial or warehouse build-
ings (production enterprises and warehouses with a risk of major accident,
including explosive depots),
• (oil) spill on coast/shore,
• mass poisoning and
• extensive environmental contamination.
As risk assessments of dangerous enterprises are an important source of data for
regional and national risk assessments, methodological compatibility is presumed
by default. The assessors of dangerous enterprises must therefore consider that their
results should be easily formatted to meet the input requirements of regional and
national risk assessments. Problems arise from the widespread usage of probabilistic
and quantitative methods, in which the probable consequences (fatalities) usually
reflect individual and societal risks in concrete conditions. Although quantitative
methods are undoubtedly more precise and informative, their outcomes are not
directly adoptable as inputs to regional or national risk assessments. A solution to
this issue could be the development of a method that enables the comparison of risk
assessments’ outcomes, with the aim of interpreting and converting their results into
a suitable format. This solution is similar to approaches that are already in use in
the UK, where comparable criteria for risk-based and consequence-based
approaches have been established for the definition of zones around a dangerous
enterprise (Christou, Amendola, and Smeder 1999). The lack of published research
on similar problems in the EU might otherwise suggest that this issue is specific to
Estonia.
Flood risks
The main requirements for the risk assessments of floods are presented in the EU’s
new Flood Directive (EC 2007b), which includes the preparation of flood hazard
maps and flood risk maps. De Moel, van Alphen, and Aerts (2009) suggest that the
Directive refers to the mapping of flood hazards and risks as essential components
of flood risk assessment and are consequently the basis of flood risk management
plans. A flood hazard map presents, where relevant, variables that affect flood prob-
abilities, such as water depth or level and flow velocity, whereas a flood risk map
presents the potential adverse consequences associated with flood scenarios. The cri-
terion that differentiates flood hazard and risk maps is the analysis of the conse-
quences of a flood rather than the probability of a flood.
Flood risk assessments, in the Estonian context, have two crucial and necessarily
complementary aspects. Firstly, the risk assessments must follow and implement the
special requirements of the EU’s Flood Directive, particularly the preparation of





























maps and secondly, the assessment of the flood risks must be conducted by regional
and national assessors.
The Ministry of the Environment commissioned research studies for the specifi-
cation of the application conditions of the Flood Directive. Mugra and Sults (2006)
analysed flood mapping and concluded that the majority of existing maps were haz-
ard maps. De Moel, van Alphen, and Aerts (2009) found that the existing flood
maps, which covered the entire Estonian territory, were produced by the central
government and were inherently historical. Kupits and Osjamets (2010) conducted a
preliminary assessment of flood risks, using a framework in which they detailed the
actual types of floods, their probability of occurrence and potential significant flood
risk areas (PSFRA). Kupits and Osjamets (2010) also observed many long-standing
trends of water flow, which can affect the occurrence of floods.
The last two publicly available national EmRA summaries (Ministry of the Inte-
rior 2009, 2011) analytically discuss flood types as being either coastal or river
floods. The summaries conclude that there is one unified emergency for flooding,
defined as a flood in a high-density population area. Both summaries assess the risk
of this emergency as high, but they do not include either the flood hazard or the
flood risk maps. We assume that both types of maps will accompany future versions
of both the national and the regional EmRA summaries to better conform with the
EU’s Flood Directive. We also express the necessity of maintaining the compatibil-
ity of the risk assessment criteria for use in flood hazard or risk mapping. The Esto-
nian Land Board recently compiled the flood hazard map layer on the digital map
of Estonia for four cities: Tallinn, Pärnu, Haapaslu and Tartu (Estonian Land Board
2012). The mapping principle here was based on the water level rise height criteria.
The Kronstadt zero was taken as initial height for Tallinn, Pärnu and Haapsalu,
which are situated on the coasts of the Baltic Sea and a compromise zero height
was established for Tartu, which is situated inland, on the banks of the River Ema-
jõgi. The contour lines were counted with a range of 0.25m, starting from 0.5m
above the zero levels.
Risk assessment of the continuous operation of vital services
Vrijling et al. (2004) characterise critical infrastructures as complex societal systems
and Pursiainen, Lindblom and Franke (2007) argue that they play an essential role
in the maintenance of vital societal functions such as the supply chain, health,
safety, security and the economic and social well-being of the population. The
requirements for the identification and designation of European critical infrastruc-
tures (ECIs) and the assessment of the need to improve their protection were
enacted in the Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 (EC 2008b).
Although the Directive focuses on ECIs, the disruption or destruction of which
would have a significant impact on at least two Member States, the Directive’s main
principles have broader applicability.
Estonian legislation does not include the definition of a critical infrastructure
but does require the risk assessment of continuous operation of vital services,
which have much in common with critical infrastructures. The Emergency Act
(Parliament of Estonia 2009) defines the continuous operation of vital services as
the capability of the consistent functioning of vital services and the ability to
restore this consistent functioning after a disruption. The Act designates over 40
different types of vital services, the responsibility for the continuous operations of





























which falls to six component Ministries, as well as The Bank of Estonia and local
governments.
During the validation period of the Emergency Preparedness Act of 2000, the
risks of several types of disruptions or disturbances of vital services were analysed
in the context of both TRAs and FRAs, together with other types of emergencies,
on the basis of corresponding (and, in principle, compatible) methodologies (Minis-
ter of the Interior 2001; Ministry of the Interior 2007b).
Since the adoption of the Emergency Act (Parliament of Estonia 2009), dual
approaches are now required for risk assessments. Firstly, there is the special regu-
lation enacting the guidelines for risk assessment of the continuous operation of
vital services (COVS), henceforth COVS, (Minister of the Interior 2010b). Unlike
EmRA compilation under the previous guidelines (Minister of the Interior 2010a),
the Emergency Act and its guidelines for risk assessments of COVS require the pro-
viders of vital services to prepare and submit risk assessments of the continuous
operation of these vital services. The criteria of risk assessment and risk rating on
the COVS matrix differ significantly from those of the EmRA compilation guide-
lines (Minister of the Interior 2010a). Furthermore, the impact of a disruption on
COVS is a component of the EmRA of each emergency type, as outlined by the
Minister of the Interior (2010a). In our opinion, the cooperation between these sepa-
rated approaches is necessary for complex and comprehensive solutions. Neverthe-
less, the methodological differences of the approaches could cause problems.
Practical feedback is not yet available, as these regulations are new and currently in
the implementation phase. Therefore, we emphasise the need for convergence of
these methodological approaches or additional tools to assure their comparability.
Applicability of EmRA outcomes
The EmRAs, their results and outcomes can form both a portion and a basis for a
range of formats (e.g. studies, reports and work documents) concerning various
types of applications (planning, environmental protection measures and management
systems of the organisations). The following section will discuss the aspects of
environmental assessment and management as well as spatial planning and map-
ping.
Environmental Assessment and Management
The term ‘risk’ is not defined in the main texts of the environmental impact assess-
ment (EIA) Directive (EC 1985), the strategic environmental assessment (SEA)
Directive (EC 2001), Estonia’s EIA and Environmental Management System Act
(Parliament of Estonia 2005), ISO 14001 (2004) or the EU’s Eco-Management and
Audit Scheme regulation (EC 2009). Although risk is not defined and is strictly
exteriorised in the above documents, the practical requirement to consider the prob-
ability of its consequences creates an unavoidable necessity for the practical usage
of risk assessment as a tool for explaining environmental aspects and impacts. This
concerns the EIA of projects, the SEA of planned activities and the implementation
of environmental management systems (EMS) in existing organisations.
In Estonian practice, risk assessment has been a part of a number of EIAs and
SEAs where the consideration of the probability of adverse outcomes was impor-
tant, e.g. engineered objects, in which abnormal and emergency situations were





























expected, such as (chemically) dangerous enterprises. Browsing through randomly
selected reports of EIAs and SEAs connected with the planning and projecting of
new sites for ‘Seveso establishments’, we found preliminary evidence that the ele-
ments of qualitative, semi-quantitative and quantitative risk assessment approaches
were used in different combinations. At the same time, the requirements for con-
crete methodological approaches were absent. We conclude that this subject may be
a worthy direction for future studies.
Voluntarily implemented EMS according to ISO 14001 and EMAS require
organisations to prepare measures for emergency preparedness and response. These
requirements include the identification of potential emergency situations as well as
potential accidents, which is equivalent to an assessment of the risks of these acci-
dental events. The risk sources can, at the same time, be significant environmental
aspects. We have previously studied emergency preparedness and response in 44
Estonian enterprises that, according to ISO 14001 requirements, have implemented
an EMS. We subsequently conducted an in-depth investigation of emergency pre-
paredness and response at the Port of Tallinn (Tammepuu, Tammepuu, and Sepp
2009). The key concern at the Port of Tallinn was the identification of environmen-
tal aspects and their impacts. We discovered that some aspects that could be the
causes of accidents and emergencies had been assessed as insignificant, primarily
due to their low probability of occurrence compared with non-accidental events.
Our default recommendation was to apply a unified approach to the problem;
indeed, we generally advise many organisations to improve their tools for identifica-
tion and assessment of environmental aspects, enabling them to consider the
specific features of accidental events.
Spatial planning and mapping
Risk mapping has a key role in planning and preparing for accident scenarios,
enabling institutions to reduce the impacts of hazards (EC 2008a, 66). The conse-
quences of unwanted events are spatially distributed and depend on multiple hazard
and safety factors: the character of the risk source, the pathways of hazard factors,
the vulnerability of specific objects and systems, protective barriers, etc.
(Tammepuu, Sepp, and Uiga 2007). In this context, the ESPON hazards project
1.3.1 has calculated the spatial patterns of natural and technological hazards in Eur-
ope in the form of an overview of all Nomenclature d'Unités Territoriales Statis-
tiques level 3 areas (Schmidt-Thomé et al. 2006). The tools that ESPON developed
enable a comprehensive overview of the hazards at EU level, but they are too gen-
eric for localised needs, i.e. spatial planning at the local level. The EU member
states have developed various initiatives relating to hazard and risk mapping, and
this diversity of methodological approaches has complicated the comparability and
consolidation of appropriate information at the European level (Commission of the
European Communities 2009, 5). For example, Carpignano et al. (2009) recommend
the use of an aggregated risk index for multi-risk mapping at the regional level.
In Estonian legislation, the Planning Act (Parliament of Estonia 2002) requires
the consideration of the results of EmRAs at all determined levels of planning:
national, county, comprehensive and detailed. The appropriate maps were previously
and are currently required as appendices to both regional and national EmRAs.
However, Estonian legislation has yet to determine whether these maps should be
hazard maps or risk maps, and the criteria that should be applied for the





























compilation of the maps also remain uncertain. This ambiguity has caused assessors
to employ a broad variety of approaches. To provide a solution to the problem of
multiple approaches, we established the simple principles necessary for evaluating
and mapping the hazards of local conditions during a risk assessment of Tartu
municipality (Tammepuu, Sepp, and Uiga 2007). Our approach divided the
emergencies, which originated from the character of connectivity of the risk source
or hazard with the surrounding space, into five clusters:
(1) Events that are characterised by the existence of a specific and localised risk
source.
(2) Events with mobile sources of risk and logistics chains.
(3) Events where the risk source does not have a specific localisation but could
be found in a limited area.
(4) Events in which the main problem is not a surplus but a shortage of material
or energy (mainly the coverage areas of certain supply networks).
(5) Events that are ‘hardly localisable’, where the exact or even indirect identifi-
cation of a hazard area during risk assessment and its consideration in spatial
planning procedures at the urban level is almost impossible.
We are convinced that dividing emergencies into these clusters is only a preli-
minary solution; however, it does enable a simple form of coverage for the problem
of multi-hazard mapping for land use planning needs. Therefore, we find that a
good solution at the EU level requires the development of unified risk mapping
tools that are suitable for multi-hazard or multi-risk mapping at the local level. Cur-
rently, the generic or consequence-based hazard zones of most of the ‘Seveso enter-
prises’ and ‘hazardous enterprises’ have been mapped by, and are available from,
the Estonian Land Board (2012).
Conclusions
The development of Estonian EmRA can be divided into three periods.
The first period can be characterised by both the absence of strict requirements
for risk assessment and the endeavours to implement the Swedish risk assessment
methodology. The practical usage of risk assessment methodology began in the
mid-1990s, when the first risk assessments of chemically hazardous enterprises were
performed, and intensified following the adoption of the Chemicals Act in 1998.
The main feature of the second period was the adoption of the Emergency Pre-
paredness Act in 2000, which established risk assessment requirements and method-
ologies for TRA and FRA, respectively, that were largely based on Swedish
methodology. This Act resulted in the systematic risk assessment of the counties,
largest cities and the Ministries, as well as the first versions of Estonian national
risk assessment summaries.
The third period began with the adoption of the Emergency Act in 2009, which
legalised an emergency-based interdisciplinary methodological approach on the
basis of British methodology and a special methodology for the risk assessment of
the continuous operation of vital services. Risk assessments at the national and
regional levels are defined as essential and those at the local level are performed
when necessary.





























The requirements for emergency risk analyses and the legalised methodologi-
cal approaches are based on risk assessment methodologies from Sweden and
the UK. The key impacts of these foreign systems on Estonia’s methodology
were that Sweden’s system enabled the application and distribution of EmRA
and the UK’s system enabled the unification and arrangement of approaches to
risk ranking.
EIA and SEA have used the outcomes of risk assessments as inputs or per-
formed special risk assessments. Organisations implementing EMS employ various
approaches for risk assessment. Spatial planners at all levels must consider these
risk assessment results. Although Estonia’s legislation requires risk maps to be
appendices to risk assessments, there is no legal definition of the concrete require-
ments for these risk maps. Therefore, on the basis of implementing the European
Commission’s proposals concerning ‘A Community approach ons the prevention of
natural and manmade disasters’ (Commission of the European Communities 2009,
5), the present need is to concentrate on formulating multi-hazard and multi-risk
mapping solutions applicable for regional and local level planning purposes.
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Abstract 
The purpose of this work was to analyse the problems connected with the risk 
assessment of emergency situations in Estonia and their relations with land use 
planning. The research was carried out on the basis of a case study: the 
preliminary risk assessment of Tartu, the second largest city of Estonia, 
conducted by the specialists of the Estonian University of Life Sciences. 
The Estonian Emergency Preparedness Act designates risk assessment as an 
important task of crisis management, on the basis of which all of the following 
measures should be planned and implemented. The act specifies two types of risk 
assessment, functional and territorial. The first involves the ministries and their 
areas of government, whereas the second concerns the counties and the largest 
cities and communities. The methodical basis of territorial risk assessment is 
established by special regulation of the Minister of the Interior. The regulation 
requires the determination and risk assessment of 15 (or more) different types of 
possible emergency situations. The outcomes of the risk assessments will serve 
as the basis for composing crisis management plans and spatial (land use) 
planning, concerning county plans, comprehensive plans, detailed plans, and also 
specific building projects.  
At present, the risk assessments of all of the counties and most of the largest 
cities in Estonia have been performed, but the possibilities for the application of 
the outcomes for spatial planning remain uncertain. Our intention was to select 
and group the scenarios of development of emergency situation in relation with 
land use and spatial planning, and to draw up proposals for specific planning 
activities. On the basis of their relations to city area, the 15 types of possible 
emergency hazards were divided into five groups, which were described and 
analysed separately. The conclusions concerned the opportunities for taking into 
consideration the results of risk assessment in planning and design procedures.   
Keywords:  risk assessment, land use planning, public safety. 
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The whole existence of mankind and its activities are entirely concerned with the 
use of land. All human activities, as well as all natural conditions pose hazards 
for human beings and/or the environment, and therefore involve certain elements 
of risk [1].  The consequences of unwanted events are spatially distributed, 
depending on multiple hazard and safety factors: the character of the risk source, 
the pathways of hazard factors, the vulnerability of specific objects and systems, 
protective barriers etc. Population growth has made land scarcer, especially in 
urban areas, which leads to ever more intensive use of available space [2] and an 
increasing likelihood of adverse interactions and impacts. 
Today a wide range of professions and academic subjects use the technique 
of risk assessment [3]. Risk assessment is an essential component of the overall 
management of risks within society, and specifically risks to human health 
and/or the environment [4]. It is the first step in explaining the problems and 
evaluating the significance of risk either quantitatively or qualitatively [5]. 
Although today’s society is greatly concerned with many aspects of risk, the 
concept of risk and its assessment and management have not yet been 
sufficiently developed to meet many challenges [6]. Risk assessment is an 
essential part of civil protection. In many European countries the usefulness of 
the further development of risk assessment in the field of civil protection and 
emergency preparedness is clearly recognized [7]. 
An important landmark in the development of risk assessment and land use 
planning (LUP) in the context of major hazards involving dangerous substances 
is Council Directive 96/82/EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-
accident hazards involving dangerous substances (the “SEVESO II” Directive) 
[8,9]. The consequences of major industrial accidents can cause remarkable 
damage in surrounding areas. Article 12 of the Seveso II-Directive requires that 
the objectives of preventing major accidents and limiting their consequences be 
taken into account by the Member States in their land use policies and/or other 
relevant policies [8–10]. Risk assessments are increasingly used in land use 
planning with the purpose of minimizing the undesirable effects of accidents at 
hazardous installations. An emerging and important aspect of risk-based land use 
planning concerns the aspect of integrated risk assessment and management. 
[11]. For the siting of new establishments, the hazards of accidents and the 
environmental impact from continuous emissions could be considered together in 
order to have an integrated assessment of the environmental compatibility of the 
proposed activity [12].  
At present, after the recent enlargement of the European Community, only a 
limited number of European countries have developed specific criteria for LUP 
with respect to major accident hazards [13]. From the methodological point of 
view, two approaches adopted in support to land use planning decisions can be 
distinguished in the countries of the European Union: the first, called a 
“consequence-based” approach, focuses on the assessment of the consequences 
of a number of conceivable event scenarios, and the second, called a “risk based” 
approach, focuses on the assessment of both the consequences and probabilities 
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of possible event scenarios occurring [9,14]. A third methodological approach 
that could also be considered consists of the determination and use of “generic” 
distances that depend on the type of activity rather than on a detailed analysis of 
the specific site [9,14].  
Although the term land use planning is mostly discussed in the context of 
major hazards in fixed installations, these are not the only hazards for which 
LUP is necessary [12]. For example, the risks arising from the transportation of 
dangerous chemicals are often of the same magnitude as those that are due to 
fixed installations, and thus need to be taken into account with the same attention 
in order to keep them under control and to reduce them [15]. Smith discusses the 
problems of the land use planning of several environmental hazards on the basis 
of the experiences of different countries [5].  
The goals of this study were first to give an analytical description of risk 
assessment in the field of emergency preparedness in Estonia as a whole and in 
the city of Tartu. Second, to develop further the methodology of using risk 
assessment results for land use and spatial planning in the case study of Tartu. 
2 Emergency risk assessment and spatial planning in Estonia  
2.1 Risk assessment 
In Estonian legislation, risk assessment is defined as the systematic 
determination and evaluation of possible accidents and risk sources and the 
planning of measures for their prevention [16]. The requirements for risk 
assessment in the field of emergency preparedness and crisis regulation are 
enacted in the Emergency Preparedness Act [17]. Risk assessment in the field of 
civil protection in Estonia took its first steps in the middle of the last decade. 
One important development was the translation of the UNEP/APELL guidebook: 
Hazard Identification and Evaluation in a Local Community [18] into Estonian in 
cooperation with the Estonian Rescue Board and Swedish Rescue Board. Several 
courses and information seminars were held [19], and thus specialists from all 
over the country were able to receive elementary knowledge in the field of 
contemporary risk assessment. Since the middle of the 90s, basic courses of risk 
assessment were taught at Estonian universities.  
As in Finland, Sweden and Norway [7], a nation-wide system of risk 
assessment is also applied in Estonia. The Estonian Emergency Preparedness Act 
establishes risk assessment as an important task of crisis management, on the 
basis of which all the following measures should be planned and implemented 
[17]. The act specifies two types of risk assessment: functional and territorial. 
The first involves the ministries and their areas of government, whereas the 
second concerns the counties and the largest cities and communities. Both types 
of risk assessments use methods of preliminary assessment. The result of such 
preliminary assessment is the ascertainment of hazards that have the potential to 
develop into emergencies, and the general description of the probabilities and 
consequences of these hazards. 
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The methodological basis for ministries’ risk assessment (the functional 
approach) is the guidance document “The Schedule and Methodology of 
Ministerial Risk Assessment” [20] conformed with the decision of the Crisis 
Commission of the Government of the Republic of Estonia. The goal of the risk 
assessment of ministries is to ascertain possible emergencies in the fields of 
government of ministries. An important task of the risk assessment of ministries 
is risk assessment in the institutions in the field of government of ministries. In 
determining emergency situations, institutions shall proceed from the duties 
enacted in their charter, which means determining the emergencies in its fields of 
government and assessing hazards. These risk assessments are event-based, i.e. 
the probabilities and consequences of events and the hazards causing them are 
analysed. It is not necessary to go into detail. Risks classified as high ones, could 
later be analysed in greater detail.  
The methodological basis for territorial risk assessment is established by 
special regulation of the Minister of the Interior [16]. The goal of risk assessment 
in the context of the regulation is to determine and assess certain types of 
possible accidents in the territory of counties, communities or cities and the 
probabilities of their occurrence, thereby obtaining an overview of the potential 
hazards for state security, human life and health, environment and critical 
infrastructures. Factually, the methodology requires preliminary assessment of 
multi-hazard risks, the primary types of which are prescribed. The outcomes of 
risk assessments are established as the basis for composing crisis management 
plans and spatial (land use) planning, concerning county plans, comprehensive 
plans, detailed plans and also specific building projects. This is an important fact, 
which expresses the need for the further development of a more effective linkage 
between risk assessment and land use planning. 
The risk assessments of hazardous installations are important source data for 
territorial risk assessment. The Chemicals Act establishes the requirements for 
chemically hazardous enterprises [21], in which hazardous installations are 
determined and divided into three categories. The thresholds of the two more 
strict categories are these of the Seveso II Directive, and these are plants with 
major accident hazards. For the third category, so-called (simply) ‘hazardous 
enterprises’, the threshold quantities are remarkably lower than prescribed in the 
Seveso criteria. For example, the threshold quantity for gasoline is 10 tonnes, 
and thus most petrol stations belong to that group. These hazardous installations 
are also obliged to carry out risk assessments and prepare emergency plans.  
At present the risk assessments of all of the ministries (except for the 
Ministry of Defence, which is not required to do so), counties and most of the 
largest cities in Estonia have been performed. The Ministry of the Interior has 
composed a summary of risk assessments of ministries and counties [22]. The 
aim of the summary was to offer a brief introduction to the principles of risk 
assessment applied in the system of emergency preparedness and crisis 
regulation. The summary points out the ten types of risk that have been assessed 
as the highest, and makes recommendations for the management of these risks.  
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2.2 Spatial planning 
The purpose of planning in Estonia is to ensure conditions that take into account 
the needs and interests of the widest possible range of members of society for 
balanced and sustainable spatial development, spatial planning, land use and 
building [23]. Spatial planning is democratic and functional long-term planning 
for spatial development that co-ordinates and integrates the development plans of 
various fields and in a balanced manner takes into account the long-term 
directions in and needs for the development of the economic, social, cultural and 
natural environment.  
The Planning Act defines four levels of planning – national, county, 
comprehensive and detailed. The latter two are relevant in the urban context. A 
comprehensive plan is prepared for the whole territory of a rural municipality or 
city or parts thereof.  
The comprehensive plan defines the main directions and conditions for the 
development of the territory of a town or community, to prepare the basis for 
composing the detailed plan for areas and cases where detailed planning is 
mandatory, and to prepare the basis for adjusting the land use and building 
criteria for areas where detailed planning is not mandatory. Several tasks of 
comprehensive plans should also consider aspects of environmental risk: to 
establish conditions for sustainable and balanced spatial development; determine 
general use and building provisions for land and water areas; define the location 
of roads, streets, railways, ports and airports and the general principles of traffic 
management; define the location of principal utility network routes and technical 
infrastructure, take account of general national defence needs and, where 
necessary, to designate national defence areas and specify the boundaries of 
national defence areas designated by the county plan and address in the plan land 
use provisions and building provisions arising from Acts and other legislation.  
A detailed plan is prepared for a part of the territory of a rural municipality or 
city, and it serves as the basis for building activities and land use in the short 
term. The purpose is to guide the land use and construction criteria in towns and 
small towns and in other areas and cases where detailed planning is mandatory 
[24]. 
3 Materials and methods 
The methodological basis of risk assessment in the city of Tartu was the 
document “Methodology of Risk Assessment of County, City and Community”, 
enacted by regulation of the Minister of the Interior [16]. The risk assessment 
can be characterised as semi-quantitative: a risk matrix approach which uses a 5-
step ranking for the assessment of probability (1-5, where 1 was the lowest and 5 
the highest) and the consequences (A-E, where A was the least serious and E the 
most serious) united into the matrix, based on the principles analogical to the 
APELL/UNEP methodology [18].  
The initial information was collected in cooperation with Tartu City 
Government. The risk sources in the town were identified through the 
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classification of the methodology: local risk sources, moving risk sources, risk 
sources without definite location (for example extreme environmental 
conditions) and risk sources that threaten public safety (disturbance of the supply 
of some essential resource). The following analysis and assessment of risks was 
conducted on the basis of corresponding accident types:  
1) fires 
2) explosions 
3) transport accidents 
4) accidents with dangerous chemicals 
5) drinking water pollution 
6) accidents on water bodies 
7) accidents involving communal systems 
8) breakdowns of electricity supply 
9) breakdowns of communication systems 
10) gas accidents  
11) floods 
12) collapses (buildings) 
13) extreme environmental conditions 
14) epidemics 
15) epizootics. 
The probabilities of the accidents occurring were assessed indirectly, taking 
into account the existing statistics of accidental events and also the possible 
internal and external reasons and initial events that could activate accident 
scenarios. The consequences of each selected accident scenario were first 
assessed separately using the following four tasks: human life and health, 
essential sectors, environment and property, each task in a five-point ranking and 
after that, secondly, a general appraisal was given. The risks were collated by 
magnitude, and the proposals for mitigation measures were developed.  
This embraced our attempt to find and describe characteristic features by 
which the accident types and concrete emergency scenarios could be 
distinguished and analytically described as concerns their relation to the rural 
and urban environment, and to group these events on the basis of the 
characteristic features for further practical application. 
4 Tartu case study  
4.1 Risk assessment in Tartu 
Tartu is Estonia’s second largest city, with 98,313 inhabitants [25]. The area of 
the city is 38.8 km2, which means that the city’s territory is quite densely 
inhabited. The average population density is ca 2600 inhabitants per square 
kilometre. 
The City Government of Tartu has ordered several studies of environmental 
risk. In 2002, for example, the Tallinn University of Technology carried out a 
risk assessment in Tartu [26] which mostly focused on critical infrastructures. In 
2003 Tammepuu, who compiled an expert opinion about the study, stated that 
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the work profoundly treated the selected tasks in depth but only partially 
corresponded to the established requirements [27]. In 2004 the working group on 
spatial planning of the Department of Human Geography of the University of 
Tartu carried out a study concerning the linkage between risk assessment and 
urban space [28], based on the results of the risk assessment of Tallinn 
University of Technology. The authors recognized that present-day city planning 
did not consider hazard zones, and these aspects need to receive more attention 
in future. In 2005 the workgroup of the Department of Human Geography 
performed a study on flood risks in Tartu [29]. In addition to the above-
mentioned studies, the risk assessments of hazardous enterprises were performed 
by several persons, using different methodical approaches. Thus the previous 
risk assessments could be divided into two groups: risk assessments and expert 
opinions ordered by the city government and risk assessments of hazardous 
installations. 
The preliminary risk assessment of Tartu in 2005 was carried out by 
specialists of the Estonian University of Life Sciences [30]. The general 
conclusion of the study was that in Tartu the occurrence of emergencies of 
different types was of low or moderate probability. The preliminary risk 
assessment showed clearly that the situations considered to be probable causes of 
emergencies were the following: accidents with ammonia, LPG and fuel 
containers and carriages, the pollution of water supply and long-lasting 
interruptions of water, electricity and gas supply, comprehensive disturbances in 
communication systems and extreme meteorological conditions.  
The assessed probability of serious accidents was estimated to be higher in 
the parts of the town that contained a greater number of hazardous enterprises, 
and through which the railway passes. An accident with a railway carriage 
containing ammonia was expected to be the worst case of a chemical accident. 
Several important and vulnerable objects remain in the hazard zone, including 
Tartu University Hospital. In addition to the railway transport of ammonia only 
one enterprise, which uses ammonia in refrigeration technology, has remained in 
place of about ten in the last decade, which means that in this sense the situation 
has improved remarkably.  
Liquid fuels transported both by railway and by road are also an important 
component in the context of considerable accidents with chemicals. The most 
serious fires were expected in the occasion of accidents with flammable 
chemicals. Possible accidents with truck carriages of petrol were assessed as 
being most problematic in filling stations, especially for those stations situated in 
densely inhabited areas. The accident with the fuel truck was supposed to be the 
most serious situation in petrol stations which formed the majority of the   
hazardous installations in Tartu. The possibility of explosion was also evaluated 
as being the highest in the case of an accident with chemicals.  
In addition to chemically hazardous plants and the transport of dangerous 
goods, serious fires are possible in enterprises that store large quantities of 
flammable materials. This primarily concerns the timber industries. Another type 
of object where fires were estimated to have serious results were buildings where 
the presence of large number of people was expected (department stores, 
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theatres, concert and sports halls etc.). There are also relatively large areas on the 
city’s territory where wildfires can take place, and districts in which old timber 
houses are situated problematically close to each other, increasing the hazard of 
extensive fires involving a group of buildings.  
Critical infrastructures play an important role in the rise of the emergencies 
from one side and in mitigation and reacting activities from the other. The 
insufficiency of water supply was observed to be the most serious type of 
accident in communal systems and networks, the most expected reason for which 
was the long-term interruption of electricity supply. The hazard of drinking 
water pollution was assessed to be highest at one of the water intakes, which 
covers about 40% of the water supply of Tartu and therefore can independently 
cause an emergency. Extensive and long-lasting interruptions of electricity 
supply are possible due to both external causes (not dependent on installations in 
city areas) and internal causes. Tartu is vulnerable because of the lack of reserve 
electricity generators, a limited number of which can be found at some important 
objects. Large-scale disturbances in the work of communications systems can 
firstly independently cause emergencies or secondly have an impact on various 
kinds of emergencies.  
The influenza and other similar viral infections were considered to be the 
most probable causes for the outbreak of large-scale epidemics.  
4.2 Results of complementary analysis  
The goal of the study was to select, group and analyse the scenarios of the rise of 
emergency situations in relation with land use and spatial planning in Tartu and 
to develop measures to mitigate environmental risk. The 15 types of possible 
emergency hazards were divided into 5 groups that were described and analysed 
separately.  
The first group comprises events that are characterised by the existence of a 
specific and localised risk source. Accidents at hazardous installations could be 
the typical example of that group. There are no enterprises with a major accident 
hazard corresponding to the Seveso II criteria in Tartu, but there are 27 objects 
that the Estonian Chemicals Act treats as hazardous installations; most of these 
are petrol stations. These events can be characterised by definite hazard (or 
safety) distances and/or zones, on the basis of certain criteria. In addition, 
industrial plants using large quantities of flammable materials (not chemicals), 
for example timber, could be classified into this group.  
The second group involves events with moving sources of risk and logistics 
chains. This primarily involves possible accidents on railways and roads/streets 
but also water traffic on the Suur-Emajõgi River and also to a certain extent 
accidents on gas pipelines and high-voltage electricity lines, as the latter can be 
characterised as the carriers of (moving) substance or energy, uncontrollable 
emissions of which could cause adverse outcomes. In the case of the 
transportation of dangerous chemicals, the hazard zone is principally ribbon-
shaped, in the centre of which is the observed route or in other words: the hazard 
(or safety) zone, which is circular for a localised object, moves together with the 
 © 2007 WIT PressWIT Transactions on The Built Environment, Vol 94,
 www.witpress.com, ISSN 1743-3509 (on-line) 
90  Safety and Security Engineering II
111
risk source. It is important to mention that the probabilities of accidents 
occurring are not the same in all places on the routes, and also influenced by 
traffic density, which is time-dependent. 
These two groups can be treated similarly in relation to possible chemical 
accidents. The methods used for risk assessments in the hazardous installations 
of Tartu for the identification of safety distances were mostly “generic” and/or 
“consequence-based” (drawing an analogy with the Seveso II terms). Various 
criteria were used by different experts for the determination of safety distances 
(or identifying hazard or safety zones) during the performance of risk 
assessments of concrete hazardous objects. The data from norms, standards, 
handbooks and practical experiences has been applied in these assessments for 
the determining of “generic” distances. The “consequence-based” approaches 
have used the criteria from different sources, including some of those applied for 
Seveso II enterprises in other European Union countries [31,32]. The main 
solutions for the near future could be the determination and harmonization of 
recognized (and preferably legalized) methodological approaches and criteria for 
modelling and assessing the consequences throughout Estonia. There could be a 
gradually shift towards the use of more detailed and quantitative methods. We 
suggest that the usage of “generic”, “consequence-based” and perhaps “risk-
based” approaches could initially exist simultaneously in Estonian practice. At 
the same time, this requires the preparation of a methodology for the comparison 
and /or combination of the results obtained by different approaches. Another 
important task for risk assessors, managers and planners, real estate developers 
etc. is the specification of the limitations of planning and building in hazard 
zones. 
The third group contains events where the risk source does not have a 
specific localisation, but could be found on a limited area. These areas of 
distributed risk source can be marked on a map. Typical events of this group are, 
for example, wildfires and fires in districts with a high proportion of old timber 
houses, where the level of fire protection is low. The fire protection level should 
be increased via measures proposed in spatial planning and projecting (for 
example the selection of construction materials, the installation of centralised fire 
alarm systems, the reconstruction of the fire-fighting water supply, the 
observance of fire safety distances and the planning of protective barriers etc.). 
Floods were also classified in this group, as the limiting factor is the increase of 
the water level, and the accidentally flooded area is dependent on the height, 
which limits the areas of the flood with observable probability. These areas are 
mapped, and conditions for the land use are established through comprehensive 
or thematic planning.  
The fourth group can be characterised by the keywords ‘networks’ and 
‘deficiency’. This means, that probable emergency situations with certain critical 
infrastructures can be characterised as events in which the main problem is not 
the surplus of matter or energy but the shortage thereof. This concerns electricity, 
water, gas supplies and communication systems. Thus the hazards depend on the 
normal functioning of the chain of supply from the reservoir or generator of the 
required resource to the intermediate distributors and final consumers. The initial 
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event causing the absence or lack of the resource can take place in each part of 
the chain or network. In connection with such events, the mapping and planning 
of networks could be examined from the point of view of reliability and risk. 
Factors that should definitely be considered are: the technological state of the 
network elements and the presence and/or possibility of alternative supply. 
Spatial planning should consider the opportunities for modernizing the specific 
network sectors and the application of alternative sources and channels of 
feeding or supply. 
The fifth group covers events that are ‘hardly localizable’, where the exact or 
even indirect identification of a hazard area during risk assessment and taking it 
into account in spatial planning procedures on the city level is almost impossible. 
This group contains such accidental events as natural disasters: thunder, snow 
and hailstorms, extreme snow conditions, unusually high and low temperatures 
etc. A technological emergency like a nuclear accident in a neighbouring country 
also falls into this category in the context of municipal risk assessment and 
planning. Although this kind of event has a certain localized risk source, the 
impact depends on meteorological conditions. These kinds of possible events do 
not enable one to map the specific risk or hazard or safety zones in the risk 
assessment of the city, but allow one to identify more vulnerable objects and take 
these into account in comprehensive planning, and certainly plan measures in the 
city’s crisis management plan. 
5 Conclusions 
The preliminary risk assessment of the town of Tartu and the opportunities for 
applying risk assessment outcomes in spatial planning were studied in the 
context of multiple hazards and emergency scenarios. Whereas previous studies 
[26,28,29] focused on a limited number of events and proposed specific 
solutions, we tried to explore the risk aspects more broadly, and certain 
characteristics of systematisation and grouping the accident types were identified 
in relation to land use and planning. On the basis of the selected criteria, the 
main accident types were grouped into 5 clusters that could be applied in 
mapping, planning and projecting/management procedures.  
The study shows clearly that the experiences of other EU member states 
(which are in that sense more developed) could only partially be adopted. There 
are remarkable differences between the EU countries in the implementation of 
risk assessment and land use planning. We emphasize the urgent need for further 
improvement of risk assessment and crisis management in Tartu. One important 
task in this area is to consider the risk assessment outcomes in spatial planning, 
which helps to mitigate risk and increase environmental and public safety.  
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Abstract 
This paper presents a comparative study of the national risk assessment 
outcomes of two different countries of the European Union: Estonia, as a so-
called ‘new member’ and the UK as an ‘old member’. The comparative survey 
was carried out on the basis of the National Summary of Emergency Risk 
Assessments of Estonia and the National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies of 
the UK. The features compared were requirements, methodologies, risk 
assessment process and performers, risk types and categories together with risk 
assessment outcomes as well as output documents’ composition. Simultaneously 
parallels were drawn with local level emergency risk assessments. Although the 
risk types were defined diversely in the two countries, an indirect comparison 
was still accomplishable. For instance, the risk of pandemic human disease was 
assessed as one of the highest in both countries. On the grounds of our 
observations, the National Risk Register of the UK was comparatively more, an 
advising, guiding and directing document while the Estonian emergency risk 
assessment summaries were in a greater part of a summarizing character.  
Keywords: emergency preparedness, risk assessment, civil protection.  
1 Introduction 
The existence and survival of mankind and the whole of life in the world has 
been accompanied by the impacts of unexpected and hazardous events. Disasters 
and emergencies are samples of the destabilising factors, which can cause serious 
setbacks and breakdowns in the environment and society [1]. The last decades 
have demonstrated a significant increase of technological and natural disasters 
worldwide and in Europe [2]. The risks of emergencies can be out of the eye of 
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public attention, as disasters are uncertain events, which happen relatively rarely. 
Disasters do not respect borders [3]. Therefore it is important to assess and 
communicate corresponding risks on local and regional as well as national and 
international levels.  
     Today risk assessment has become an essential part of civil protection and 
disaster management [4]. Several studies, and also comparative studies, are 
available concerning the integrated approach of multi-hazard territorial risk 
assessment and management. Lonka has conducted a comparative study of risk 
assessment in the field of civil protection of European countries [5]. The 
European research project QUARTER concentrated on the development of a 
territorial management system for territorial risk reduction and environmental 
quality improvement [6]. The report of the project EUROBALTIC I present 
different examples of methodologies of risk assessment, management and 
mapping in the Baltic Sea Region, developed and applied in the countries of the 
region [7]. The ESPON Hazards Project 1.3.1 has worked out spatial patterns of 
natural and technological hazards in Europe in the shape of an overview on all 
NUTS3 areas [8]. 
     In different EU countries the usefulness of the further development of risk 
assessment in the field of civil protection and emergency preparedness is clearly 
recognized [5]. Risk assessments on a national level are recognized to be a 
determinant for improving disaster prevention and preparedness activities [9]. 
Recently the European Commission issued risk assessment guidelines with the 
main goals being to improve coherence among the national risk assessments and 
to make these risk assessments more comparable between member states [9, 10]. 
Nowadays many countries are undertaking national risk assessments, including 
the UK [10, 11] and Estonia [12].  
     Three years earlier we carried out a comparative study of the local level 
emergency risk assessments of four Estonian cities (Tallinn, Tartu, Narva and 
Pärnu) and four cities or conurbations of the UK (London, Greater Manchester, 
West Midlands conurbation and Belfast) [1]. Our previous positive experience as 
well as the latest developments in the EU brought us to the decision to perform a 
comparative study of the public outcome documents of the national emergency 
risk assessments of the same two EU countries. Whilst Estonia is approximately 
5.4 times smaller by territory and 45 times by population than the UK, the 
countries still have enough similar features, favouring the comparison. This 
comprises their relatively northern positions in Europe, a long coastal line, a low 
proportion of seismic and an absence of volcanic hazards, etc.  
     The main research materials were the latest publicly available output 
documents of the national risk assessments of the two countries, 
correspondingly: the 2008 National Summary of Risk Assessments for 
Emergencies [12] of Estonia and the National Risk Register of Civil 
Emergencies (2010 edition) [11] of the United Kingdom. The essential goal of 
the current study was a comparison of the publicly available outcomes and 
outputs of the national risk assessments of the two EU countries for bringing out 
and discussing the parallels and dissimilarities. The observed and compared 
subjects were requirements, methodologies, output documents’ composition, risk 
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assessment process and performers, risk types and categories as well as risk 
assessment outcomes. The results of the study can serve as useful information in 
moving towards the 2012 overview of the major risks the EU may face in the 
future [9]. 
2 Comparison  
2.1 General remarks 
As much as publicly available sources enable to conclude, both countries: 
Estonia and the UK started to organise and undertake national level risk 
assessments somewhere in the middle of the last decade.  
     In Estonia the public versions of national risk assessment summaries have 
been available since 2005. During that period remarkable changes have taken 
place, concerning the legislative requirements and methodological approaches. 
The currently valid Emergency Act [13] replaced the previous Emergency 
Preparedness Act [14], which was valid until 23 July 2009. While the previous 
methodology, used in the years up to 2007, was essentially based mostly on the 
Swedish or UNEP/APELL methodology [15], then the later methodology, used 
since 2008, was generically built on the example of the British methodological 
approach [16]. Due to this the principles and criteria of risk assessment have also 
remarkably transmuted during the last years. Thus the 2008 National Summary 
of Risk Assessments for Emergencies [12] differs considerably from the 
previous analogical documents. 
     In the UK the Government has carried out a classified assessment of the risks 
facing the country, since 2005 [11]. The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 [17], 
which is currently valid, embarked on a thorough reorganisation of the 
emergency management system, including risk assessment. The Government 
performs the National Risk Assessment (further also NRA), which is secret by 
nature and not directly available for public use [11, 18]. The National Risk 
Register (further also NRR) is a public document on the basis of National Risk 
Assessment and the first NRR was published in August 2008 [11, 18]. The NRR 
2010 Edition, which is at the centre of attention in the current paper, is the 
second, updated, version, based on the 2009 iteration of the NRA [18]. The main 
changes to the 2010 Edition and the original NRR embrace the update of risk 
types and risks on the risk matrix and in the text, as well as expansions of the last 
chapters of advisory and informative character [18].   
2.2 Requirements and methodologies 
The Estonian Emergency Act designates risk assessment as a document which 
describes the following on a national and, if necessary, regional and local 
government level: the emergency; the threats and hazards causing the 
emergency; the probability of the emergency; the consequences of the 
emergency; other important information related to the emergency; references to 
models, source materials and other such information, on the basis of which the 
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risk assessment is prepared. This definition emphasises clearly, that the national 
level approach is recognized as principal in Estonian emergency risk assessment. 
Emanating from the Emergency Act, the Minister of the Interior enacted an 
emergency risk assessment compilation guidance, which contains currently valid 
methodological requirements [19]. Earlier, in 2008, the more voluminous 
methodological guidance, approved by the Government’s Crisis Management 
Committee was compiled (in Estonian and English) and made publicly available 
[20]. The 2008 National Summary of Risk Assessments for Emergencies [12] of 
Estonia was composed on this methodological basis. 
     The British Civil Contingencies Act 2004 as well as the Civil Contingencies 
Act 2004 (Contingency Planning) Regulations 2005 [21] principally set the risk 
assessment duty on Category 1 responders and Local Resilience Forums. The 
Category 1 responders are in brief the following institutions: emergency services, 
local authorities, health bodies and environment agencies [21]. This generically 
refers, that the essential requirements for emergency risk assessment lie on a 
local level. As a matter of fact the methodology of risk assessment for British 
local responders, brought in the emergency preparedness guidance [16] and was 
an essential example for working out the previously mentioned Estonian 
emergency risk assessment methodologies [19, 20]. The British risk assessment 
processes used at regional and national levels are not precisely the same as on the 
local level, but have many features in common and are generally consistent [16]. 
The laconic description of the British national risk assessment process can be 
recognized in the NRR edition 2010. We guess that the methodology of the 
British National Risk Assessment is described more thoroughly in some other 
document, not available for public use, as the NRA-s are mentioned to be secret 
and the NRR-s are only the public outputs of these [18].  
2.3 Risk assessment processes and performers 
The Estonian emergency risk assessment process, described in the 
methodologies [19, 20], generically uniform for national, regional and local 
levels, consists of 6 steps. The steps are almost one-for-one comparable with the 
steps of the British emergency risk assessment methodology for local responders, 
obviously for the previously described reasons and connections [16, 20]. The 
steps of emergency risk assessments in Estonia (national, regional, local) and in 
the UK (local) are presented in a comparative context in Table 1. The British 
national risk assessment process is described as consisting of the three main 
steps in the NRR 2010 edition [11], which are the following: identifying risks, 
assessing risks and comparison of risks. As much as the brief description of the 
risk assessment methodology allows proposing, the first two steps cover more or 
less the greater part of analogical or similar actions of the steps of the risk 
assessment on a local level. The third step is the comparison of risks, where 
priority is given to the risks that are both relatively likely and could have a 
serious impact, taking into account different types of planning assumptions. 
There is no precise analogy in Estonian national risk assessment(s), although 
higher risks certainly gather higher attention in emergency and spatial planning 
practices. 
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Table 1:  The steps of Estonian national [12, 20] and British local [16] 
emergency risk assessments. 
Step Estonia United Kingdom (local) 
1 Conceptualization Contextualisation 
2 
Description of the threats and 
consolidation for the purposes of 
assessing the likelihood of an emergency 
Hazard review and allocation for 
assessment 
3 The assessment of possible accident’s probability Risk analysis 
4 Determining risk category and ranking the risks Risk evaluation 
5 Preventive and alleviatory measures for emergencies Risk treatment 
6 Entering results on risk form, and monitoring and audit of risks Monitoring and reviewing 
 
     The British NRR 2010 edition brings only relative scales for impact and 
likelihood assessment, on account of which these cannot be compared with the 
Estonian 5-point scales (basically similar with British local level).  
    The consequences or impacts are exemplified with four characteristics in the 
national risk assessments outcomes of both countries. The categories were not 
completely one-to-one in conformance, but were postured in a comparative 
context, emanating from the definitions of these characteristics [11, 12, 20] as 
follows in Table 2.  
Table 2:  The consequence (impact) categories [11, 12, 20]. 
Estonia United Kingdom 
Categories of consequences Categories of impact 
Human life and health The number of fatalities 
Human illness or injury 
Vital service Social disruption 
Natural Environment Economic damage 
Assets 
 
     The Estonian national risk assessments of different emergencies were carried 
out in corresponding working groups, each embracing the representatives of 
different bureaus and conducted by a lead ministry as was recently determined in 
the 2008 methodology [20]. Today the same principle is enacted by the 
Government of the Republic [22]. The lead ministries are shown in Table 3. 
Afterwards these separate assessments were collocated into a summary by the 
Ministry of the Interior [12]. According to the NRR 2010 edition, the British 
National Risk Assessment drew on expertise from a wide range of departments 
and agencies of government [11].   
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Table 3:  Estonian national emergency risks [12, 20]. 
Number 
(Code) 
Emergency Lead ministry performing 
assessment 
1 Extensive forest and brush fire Ministry of the Interior 
2 Extensive and/or complicated fire/explosion in 
industrial or warehouse buildings (production 
enterprises and warehouses with a risk of major 
accident, including explosives depots) 
Ministry of the Interior 
3 Extensive and/or complicated fire/explosion as a 
consequence of which very many people are 
injured and must be evacuated 
Ministry of the Interior 
4 Extensive, third-degree (oil) spill at sea Ministry of the Interior 
5 (Oil) spill on coast/shore Ministry of the Environment 
6 Mass unrest Ministry of the Interior 
7 Mass disorder in prison Ministry of Justice 
8 Road accident with many injured Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and Communication 
9 Accident involving passenger trains with many 
injured 
Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and Communication 
10 Accident involving a train carrying hazmats with 
many injured and/or major environmental 
damage 
Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and Communication 
11 Accident involving or sinking of passenger ship 
or ship with many casualties 
Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and Communication 
12 Air accident with many casualties Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and Communication 
13 Emergency situation caused by biological risks 
(including epidemic/pandemic, bioterrorism etc) 
Ministry of Social Affairs 
14 Extraordinarily hot weather Ministry of Social Affairs 
15 Extraordinarily cold weather Ministry of Social Affairs 
16 Storm Ministry of the Interior 
17 Flood in a high-density area (especially 
hazardous storm surge) 
Ministry of the Interior 
18 Mass poisoning Ministry of Social Affairs 
19 Epizootic (infectious animal disease) Ministry of Agriculture 
20 Nuclear accident with cross-border impact Ministry of the Environment 
21 Domestic incident involving source of radiation Ministry of the Environment 
22 Extensive environmental contamination Ministry of the Environment 
23 Massive immigration of refugees into the country Ministry of Social Affairs 
24 Hostage crisis Ministry of the Interior 
25 Extensive financial crisis (non-functioning of 
financial system) 
Ministry of Finance 
26 Extensive cyber attack Ministry of Defence 
2.4 Risk types and assessment outcomes 
The methodology, which was the basis of the 2008 Estonian national risk 
assessment, determined 26 emergency types in a one-step list, which means that 
the emergencies (or emergency risks) were not grouped into broader categories 
by certain characteristics. The types of emergencies are shown together with the 
ministries, responsible for performing the concrete emergency risk assessment in 
Table 3. The serial numbers serve simultaneously as the codes of the 
emergencies. 
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     The EU Vademecum of Civil Protection [23] generically recommends the 
division of the typology of emergencies into two broad categories: natural and 
man-made disasters. In the British NRR 2010 edition, the risks are divided into 
three broad categories, the first of which embraces essentially natural, and the 
last two man-made events. The main structure of 3 broad categories and 11 main 
types are shown in Table 4. The main risk types in turn contained sub-categories, 
which were described in the text of the NRR 2010 edition. The number of non-
divided risk types and subtypes of the divided main types made altogether 23 
events. These main risk types or subtypes, which are further brought out in the 
illustrative risk matrix (Figure 2), are marked with light-grey background.  
Table 4:  British national emergency risks [11]. 
Risk category Risk type 
Natural events Human disease 
 Pandemic human disease 
 Non-pandemic human disease 
 Flooding 
 Coastal flooding 
 Inland flooding 
 Severe weather 
 Animal disease 
Major accidents Major industrial accidents 
 Major transport accidents 
Malicious attacks Attacks on crowded places 
 Attacks on infrastructure 
 Attacks on transport 
 Non-conventional attacks 
 Cyber security 
 Cyber attacks: infrastructure 
 Cyber attacks: data confidentiality 
 
     The public output documents of the national risk assessments of both of the 
observed countries [11, 12] presented the risks on risk matrixes. The Estonian 
risk matrix [12] has the scale of likelihood on the vertical axis and the scale of 
consequences on the horizontal axis. The allocation of the scales on the British 
national risk register matrix [11] is the opposite. The likelihood levels on the 
Estonian risk matrix are marked with numbers (1–5) and the consequence levels 
with letters (A-E). Both scales of the British national risk register matrix reflect 
correspondingly relative likelihood and impact – without distributions. The 
Estonian national risk matrix of 2008 is shown in Figure 1 and the British 
national risk register matrix 2010 in Figure 2. The 26 roman numerals on 
Estonian matrix coincide one-to-one with the Arabic numerals in Table 3, which 
means that the numbers of the emergencies in the list serve simultaneously as the 
codes on the matrix. The British matrix presents 14 high consequence risks, 8 of 
which are shown as main risk types and 6 as sub-types, as displayed in Table 4. 
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Very high 5   VI   
High 4   XVIII IV; V:XIII; XIX; XXVI  
Medium 3  XXIII I; IX; XVI; XVII; XXIV X  
Low 2  XIV; XV III; XII; XXI; XXV II; XI; XXII  
Very low 1   VII VIII; XX  
   A B C D E 
   Insigni-
ficant 




   Consequence 
    Very high risk 
    High risk 
    Medium risk 
    Low risk 
Figure 1: Estonian national risk matrix 2008 [12]. 
 
 
Figure 2: British national risk matrix 2010 [11]. 
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     The indirect comparison of the assessed risks of the observed countries 
demonstrated both: similarities and differences. The following is a set of selected 
examples. The risks of pandemic human disease were indicated in both countries 
as very high. The Estonian approach also deemed the risks of extensive oil spills 
as very high, but the British viewpoint did not handle these as autonomous 
events as these can be taken in principle as the results of industrial or 
transportation accidents. The risks accompanied with severe weather conditions 
were assessed as remarkably high in the both countries. Flood risks were also 
found remarkably high in the two countries, whereby in the UK coastal and 
inland floods were assessed separately but in Estonia the limiting criteria for 
flood risk assessment was localised in high-density areas. Major industrial 
accident risks were assessed as relatively high in the both countries, but the risks 
of major transport accidents were more accentuated in the Estonian approach. 
The assessed relative risk of cyber attacks was also observed higher in Estonia. 
The British NRR 2010 turned serious attention to the risks of several malicious 
attacks, which was even determined as one of the broad categories of risks. In the 
Estonian approach, these events were not handled as separate risk types, but 
simultaneously, for instance with the risk of mass unrest, which could bring 
along malicious attacks, which was assessed as high.  
2.5 Composition of the output documents 
The plain comparison of the output documents [11, 12] demonstrated remarkable 
differences in composition and points of view. 
     The 2008 National Summary of Risk Assessments for Emergencies [12] of 
Estonia consists of 2 generic and 26 specific Chapters and of 9 Appendixes. The 
specific chapters are the outputs of risk assessments of concrete emergency 
types. The content can be briefly displayed as follows: 
 Introduction; 
 Changes in comparison with the 2007 National Summary of Risk 
Assessments; 
 Summaries of risk assessments of certain emergency types (I-XXVI); 
 Appendixes (1-9). 
     Each specific chapter included the following sub-divisions: description of the 
emergency, historical facts and previous (similar) events, overview of the hazards 
causing the emergency, assessment of risks, existing resources and actions for 
emergency prevention and consequences mitigation, required additional resources 
and actions for emergency prevention and consequences mitigation. 
     Appendix 1 was a risk matrix (Figure 1), the remaining 8 appendixes 
contained informational materials in the forms of tables, maps or texts.  
     The British NRR 2010 edition consisted of the following main chapters: 
1. Introduction; 
2. Risks; 
3. Considerations for business and organisations; 
4. Preparing yourself, your family and your community for emergencies; 
5. The risk assessment process. 
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     The Chapter 1 Introduction in the NRR 2010 edition, among other things, was 
partly with a summarizing character, bringing out the national risk register 
matrix. The Chapter 2 Risks contained a discussion of assessed risks according 
to the previously discussed three broad categories. For each category features 
were observed such as risk, background, and planning measures by the 
Government, the Devoted Administrations and the emergency responders. 
Chapters 3 and 4 contained correspondingly the considerations for businesses 
and recommendations for civilians. Chapter 5 was a brief overview of the risk 
assessment process on the national level. Each chapter contained a number of 
apposite Internet references.  
3 Conclusion 
The public outputs of the risk assessments of the two EU countries had both: 
similarities and differences. The Estonian national emergency risk assessment 
was based on a similar methodology as the British local emergency risk 
assessments since the first was worked out greatly on the basis of the second. 
The typologies of emergency risks of the two countries were remarkably 
different, but still the majority of risk types were indirectly comparable. Both 
countries featured risks of emergencies such as pandemic or epidemic human 
disease, flooding, events connected with severe weather conditions and major 
industrial accidents. The Estonian approach unilaterally accentuated more 
comparable risks such as cyber attacks, major transport accidents and 
(infectious) animal disease, the British on the other hand different kinds of 
malicious attacks. Generically the British NRR 2010 edition was a more 
advising, guiding and directing document while the Estonian national risk 
assessment output document of 2008 was in a great part a summary of different 
emergency risk assessments. 
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Abstract 
This paper presents a comparative study of city risk assessment in Estonia, as a 
so-called ‘new member’ and in the UK as an ‘old member’ of the EU. The 
comparison of the outcomes was carried out on the basis of four strategically 
selected risk assessments of Estonian cities and the same number of British 
cities. The selected indicators of comparison were legislative requirements, 
provision and performance, methodologies, types of analysed risks, risk 
assessment outcomes on a wide scale, risk assessment results, usage of risk 
matrixes and also publication and availability.  
     The risk assessments in both countries were required not only on a local 
community level, but on regional and state levels as well. In the UK the legal 
requirements and anchors in methodology were in general more clearly defined, 
which guarantees the similarity and better compatibility of the risk assessments 
of different cities and parishes. For example the division of risk matrix between 
risk rankings is precisely determined in British methodology, however in the 
Estonian, different interpretations are currently allowable. British legislation also 
sets concrete requirements for the publication of the community risk register, but 
in Estonia the availability of similar material depends on the decision and good 
will of the local government.  
     The final conclusion is that the territorial risk assessment methodologies of 
different European countries cannot be overtaken one-for-one or converted. At 
the same time, British risk assessment methodology and organisation can 
undoubtedly serve as one of the examples in the process of the further 
development of territorial risk assessment methodology in Estonia and maybe 
also for other ‘new members’ of the European Union, as was previously 
expected.  
Keywords: risk assessment, civil protection, public safety. 
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Sustainable development of cities and other urban units or urban settlements as 
complex systems depends on a large amount of characteristics and presumes 
relatively stabile conditions. Major accidents and hazards are samples of the 
destabilising factors, which can cause serious setbacks and breakdowns in the 
continuous development process. The risks, hazards and threats can be hidden 
and out of the eye of public attention until something serious happens. Therefore 
it is important for communities to be aware of these risks. For that purpose risk 
assessment is an essential part of civil protection [1]. In many European 
countries the usefulness of the further development of risk assessment in the 
field of civil protection and emergency preparedness is clearly recognized [2]. 
     A lot of studies have been carried out concerning risk assessment in civil 
protection in the urban environment. Most of these concern concrete accident 
types, for example major chemical accidents, according to the “SEVESO II” 
Directive [3]. Fewer studies are available concerning the integrated approach of 
multi-hazard territorial risk assessment and management and also comparative 
studies. Lonka et al have conducted a comparative study of risk assessment in 
the field of civil protection of European countries [2]. The European research 
project QUARTER concentrated on the development of a territorial management 
system for territorial risk reduction and environmental quality improvement [4]. 
In the frames of the previously mentioned research project, a methodological 
framework for territorial vulnerability analysis and assessment was worked out 
[5]. In the context of territorial vulnerability analysis the Environmental Risk 
Management System procedure was proposed by the research group [6]. In 
Estonia Tint et al have discussed the problems of major accident hazards on the 
basis of Tallinn city risk assessments [7]. Tammepuu et al studied the aspects of 
risk assessment in land use planning, based on Tartu’s city risk assessment and 
engaging different emergency risk types [1]. 
     The authors of the current paper have been involved in the risk assessments of 
Estonian cities, communities and counties for several years. During our practical 
and research work we have noticed the remarkable differences between risk 
assessment outputs, based on the same methodology. Therefore we decided to 
study the problem more thoroughly, carrying out a comparative study of the 
largest cities of Estonia’s four rescue regions: Tallinn (North –Estonia), Tartu 
(South-Estonia), Narva (together with Vaivara municipality, East- Estonia) and 
Pärnu (West-Estonia). After beginning the research we found it would be useful 
to compare the risk assessments in turn with the analogical work of another 
country, preferably ‘an old’ member of the EU. 
     After some casting about for a suitable country for comparison our eye 
stopped on the United Kingdom. Although the UK is very different from 
Estonia, being approximately 5.4 times larger by territory and 45 times by 
population, the countries still have enough similar features, favouring the 
comparison. Both countries are situated generically in the northern part of 
Europe, have a long coastal line, a low proportion of seismic and an absence of 
volcanic hazards, etc. In UK the performance of territorial risk assessment is 
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shared between local resilience areas. Therefore, in the context of the study, we 
had to look for cases where the local resilience areas coincided with the 
territories of the cities or conurbations, including also surrounding urban areas. 
The selected areas were: (the boroughs of) London, Greater Manchester, West 
Midlands conurbation (Birmingham with surrounding urban areas), and Belfast. 
The last was chosen as differences exist in the requirements and methodologies 
for Scotland and Northern Ireland.  
     The essential goal of the study was finding out, analysing and discussing the 
parallels and dissimilarities between the different risk assessments and assessed 
risks of the cities of two European countries and to look for new ideas for 
proposals for the improvement and development of Estonian territorial risk 
assessment methodology.  
     The research materials were legislative acts and regulations, guides, risk 
assessment reports of Estonian cities and community risk registers with 
supplementary materials from British cities (incl. the boroughs in London) and 
conurbations. 
2 Legislative requirements for risk assessment 
The requirements for risk assessment in the field of emergency preparedness and 
crisis regulation in Estonia are enacted in the Emergency Preparedness Act. The 
Estonian Emergency Preparedness Act designates risk assessment as an 
important task of crisis management, on the basis of which all of the following 
measures should be planned and implemented [8]. The act places the duty to 
conduct risk assessments of cities and rural municipalities on local governments. 
The rural municipality or city government has to perform risk assessments in 
order to identify the dangers, which may exist in the rural municipality or city, 
respectively. The outcomes of territorial risk assessment will serve as the basis 
for composing crisis management plans and spatial (land use) planning, 
concerning county plans, comprehensive plans, detailed plans, and also specific 
building projects. The act does not enact duties concerning the public availability 
of risk assessment issues in any form nor sets any restrictions. 
     The British Civil Contingencies Act 2004 [9] places a risk assessment duty on 
all Category 1 responders. The Category 1 responders are generically the 
following institutions: emergency services, local authorities, health bodies and 
environment agencies [10]. These Category 1 responders are obliged to assess 
risk from time to time, but as often as is necessary to ensure that they are in a 
reasonable position to maintain and update their emergency plans and to perform 
the civil protection duties under the Act, including the duty to maintain business 
continuity plans. The Category 1 responders also have an obligation to arrange 
for the publication of all or part of (risk) assessments made, simultaneously 
considering the security classification of the information and the restrictions on 
the disclosure of sensitive information. The requirements are detailed in The 
Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning) Regulations 2005 [11]. 
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3 Risk assessment methodologies 
3.1 General overview 
The methodological basis of territorial risk assessment in Estonia is established 
by a regulation of the Minister of the Interior. In the methodology legislation, 
risk assessment is defined as the systematic determination and evaluation of 
possible accidents and risk sources and the planning of measures for their 
prevention [12]. The methodology is largely based on the UNEP/APELL 
guidebook: Hazard Identification and Evaluation in a Local Community [13], of 
which the Estonian translation was organized in cooperation with the Estonian 
Rescue Board and Swedish Rescue Board. 
     The methodologies in the UK are presented in different issues. The 
methodologies for England and Wales can be found from the emergency 
preparedness guidance as a corresponding chapter [14] and the same for Scotland 
[16]. Northern Ireland has its own special (draft) guidance for risk assessment 
[15]. The methodologies have different elements, but in general the main 
principles are the same, partially adopted from the standard used in Australia and 
New Zealand. To facilitate our approach we dwell primarily on the English (and 
Welsh) version.  
     Our preliminary comparison demonstrated the existence of abundant 
similarities between the methodologies of the observed countries. Parallels can 
be drawn between the steps of assessment and the elements of risk evaluation. 
Both countries use five-point scales for likelihood and consequences assessment, 
which are combined into the five-times-five risk matrix. The following 
comparison is based on succeeding characteristics: steps, assessed risk types and 
categories, likelihood assessment, consequence assessment, the outcomes, output 
documents. 
3.2 Steps of risk assessment 
Estonian methodology requires the risk assessment as a 7-step process. British 
methodology consists of 6 defined steps. The first steps in the methodologies are 
expressed differently, but there is much in common between them as the 
Estonian information collecting (and exploitation) function is partially similar to 
British contextualisation – “describing the characteristics of the local area that 
will influence the likelihood and impact of an emergency in the community” 
[14]. The British 3rd step – risk analysis, covers both the 3rd and 4th steps of 
Estonian methodology. The Estonian 5-th and British 4-th, as well as the 
Estonian 6-th and British 5-th step are in conformance with each other. The 7-th 
step of Estonian methodology covers the actions, which are self-evidently 
conducted in the British approach, but not brought out as a step. The same could 
be mentioned about the 6-th step of British methodology from the viewpoint of 
the Estonian treatment. The steps of the risk assessments are brought 
comparatively in table 1.  
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Table 1:  Comparison of the steps of risk assessments in Estonia and UK. 
Step Estonia UK 
1 Collecting information Contextualisation 
2 The clearing up of possible 
accidents 
Hazard review and allocation for 
assessment 
3 The assessment of possible 
accident’s probability 
Risk analysis 
4 The assessment of possible 
accident’s consequences       
Risk evaluation 
5 Risk evaluation Risk treatment 
6 The arrangement of prevention 
methods 
Monitoring and reviewing 
7 Forming of risk assessment 
outcomes and compilation of 
the report 
- 
3.3 Risk types and categories  
The Estonian methodology requires the determination and risk assessment of 
16+n different types of possible accidents (or hazards of those). These are the 
following: fires, explosions, transport accidents, accidents with dangerous 
chemicals, drinking water pollution, accidents on water bodies, accidents 
involving communal systems, breakdowns of electricity supply, breakdowns of 
communication systems, gas accidents, floods, collapses (buildings), extreme 
environmental conditions, epidemics, epizootics, social hazards, and the like, 
which means possible hazards that are actual but not in the main list.  
     The British methodology presumes the characterising of risk types with the 
risk identifier and risk category which responds to a certain numeric code. Risk 
identifiers have the following variants: 
• H - hazards which will require a national as well as local response; 
• HL - hazards which would not ordinarily prompt a national response, and 
would usually be dealt with locally; 
• T - threats, which will require a national as well as local response. 
     The risk categories and codes are not defined in the methodology and its 
annexes (or more precisely in the publicly available version of it, used in our 
study). Browsing of concrete community risk registers brought out 10 main 
categories on which the concrete hazards are based. These are: industrial 
accidents and environmental pollution, transport accidents, severe weather, 
structural, human health, animal health, public protest, industrial action, 
international events and industrial technical failure.  
3.4 Assessing the likelihood 
The methodologies of both countries evaluate the likelihood with 5-level scales 
(Tables 2 and 3).  
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Table 2:  Likelihood assessment criteria in Estonian risk assessment. 
Level Likelihood Frequency 
1 Improbable Less than once during 25 years 
2 Rare At least once during 25 years  
3 Probable  At least once during 5 years 
4 Very probable  At least once a year 
5 Frequent At least once a month 
Table 3:  Likelihood assessment criteria in British risk assessment. 
Level Descriptor Likelihood over 5 years Likelihood over 5 
years 
1 Negligible >0.005% >1 in 20,000 chance 
2 Rare >0.05% >1 in 2,000 chance 
3 Unlikely >0.5% >1 in 200 chance 
4 Possible >5% >1 in 20 chance 
5 Probable >50% >1 in 2 chance 
 
     The Estonian approach uses the frequencies of the occurrence of accidental 
events. At the same time no additional conditions exist, which enables various 
interpretations. The reason being that the area where the possible accident 
(realized hazard) takes place can be chosen randomly: a city, a county, Estonia, 
EU, Europe, North America etc., and the frequency depends largely on the size 
of the surveyed territory. The British approach takes a certain time period of 5 
years and sets the percentage and /or ratio of the accidental event. 
Simultaneously, originating directly from the public version of the methodology, 
the meaning of the entirety (100%) remains unclear, which could be understood 
for example as the number of accidents per some kinds of ordinary events.  
3.5 Assessing the consequences 
The methodologies of both countries under observation use a 5-level assessment 
of the consequences. The evaluation scales are comparatively shown in table 4. 
Table 4:  Consequences assessment criteria in risk assessment 
methodologies. 
Estonia United Kingdom 
Level Descriptor Level Descriptor 
A Missing 1 Insignificant 
B Limited 2 Minor 
C Serious 3 Moderate 
D Hard 4 Significant 
E Very hard 5 Catastrophic 
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     The comparison demonstrated the principal similarity, although the levels are 
defined and the descriptors named differently. The categories of consequences 
are also defined in different manners but a detailed comparison of the meanings 
and contents of the terms exhibited an almost direct conformance between the 
categories as displayed in table 5. 
Table 5:  The consequence (impact) categories. 
Estonia United Kingdom 
Categories of consequences Categories of impact 
Life and health Health 
Vitally important sectors Social 
Environment Environment 
Property Economic 
3.6 Risk assessment outcomes and outputs 
The Estonian methodology requires the compilation of an output document 
(summary or report) with the following statutory elements: area characterisation, 
maps and schemes of the area, accident statistics, environmental impacts, data of 
previously existing risk assessments (of concrete objects), risk assessment of 
accidents and appendixes (risk matrix, risk tables and risk map). The publication 
of the document is not mandatory. 
     The British legislation insists the Category 1 responders’ creation and 
maintenance of a community risk register (CRR). The regulation [Regulation 
2004] does not precisely define what the CRR is. Therefore we understand it 
(after having studied the concrete CRR-s) in two ways: firstly as a database with 
a predetermined structure in the form of table (the narrower sense) and secondly 
a document containing, in addition to the table, textual parts like introduction, 
purpose, context, explanation of assessment criteria etc. and usually the risk 
matrix, filled with risk evaluation outcomes (the broader sense). 
     The methodologies of both of the studied countries anticipate tables with a 
certain structure and risk matrixes for risk assessment and evaluation. The 
Estonian approach assumes the composition of a separate table for each risk, but 
does not require the compilation of a unified complex table like the CRR in the 
UK. At the same time British methodology affords an individual risk assessment 
example for documenting definite assessments and supporting the CRR. This 
example has comparable features with the Estonian risk table (for each assessed 
risk). The risk matrix in Estonian methodology has the scale of likelihood on the 
vertical axis and the scale of consequences on the horizontal axis. The allocation 
of the scales on the British risk matrix is the opposite. The likelihood levels are 
marked with numbers (1-5) and the consequence levels with letters (A-E) on the 
Estonian risk matrix and both scales are marked with numbers (1-5) on the 
British risk matrix. The British risk matrix (Figure 1) displays the four categories 
of risk ranking with explanatory keys. The current Estonian risk matrix does not 
originally contain the risk ranking divisions, which enables a creative approach 
to the problem on the one hand but complicates the comparison of risk 
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assessments on the other. The “pure” risk matrix form of the methodology is 
displayed in Figure 2 using the example of Narva, where risk ranking was not 




Figure 1: British risk matrix [14]. 
5      
4      
3      
2      
1      
 A B C D E 
Figure 2: Risk matrix of Narva. 
5 II III IV V VI 
4 II III IV V VI 
3 I III IV V VI 
2 I I I V VI 
1 I I I I I 
 A B C D E 
Figure 3: Risk matrix of 
Tallinn. 
5      
4      
3      
2      
1      
 A B C D E 
Figure 4: Risk matrix of Tartu. 
5 II V V VII VII 
4 II V V VII VII 
3 II IV IV VI VI 
2 I IV IV VI VI 
1 I I III III III 
 A B C D E 
Figure 5: Risk matrix of Pärnu. 
4 Comparison of city risk assessments 
4.1 General remarks 
The comparison of the risk assessments of the selected study areas: (cities, 
boroughs, conurbations) was performed mostly on the basis of publicly available 
materials via the Internet. The exceptions were the risk assessment outputs of the 
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Definitions of risk ratings
• Very high (VH) risk – these are classed as primary
or critical risks requiring immediate attention. They
may have a high or low likelihood of occurrence,
but their potential consequences are such that they
must be treated as a high priority. This may mean
that strategies should be developed to reduce or
eliminate the risks, but also that mitigation in the
form of (multi-agency) planning, exercising and
training for these hazards should be put in place
and the risk monitored on a regular frequency.
Consideration should be given to planning being
specific to the risk rather than generic.
• High (H) risk – these risks are classed as
significant. They may have a high or low likelihood
of occurrence, but their potential consequences are
sufficiently serious to warrant appropriate
consideration after those risks classed as ‘very high’.
Consideration should be given to the development
of strategies to reduce or eliminate the risks, but
also mitigation in the form of at least (multi-
agency) generic planning, exercising and training


















































Estonian cities Tartu and Narva (together with Vaivara municipality), which 
have no direct open access by web but are still easily accessible for research 
purposes. London has six different local resilience areas, divided by boroughs, of 
which each has its own CRR and so we studied all of these. During the 
comparison, the same characteristics as in the comparison of the methodologies 
were under observation.  
4.2 Steps of risk assessment 
The steps of risk assessments in all the case studies were in conformance with 
those required in the corresponding methodologies of the two countries as much 
as it could be concluded on the basis of available outputs. 
4.3 Risk types and categories 
During the observation of the treatment of accident (hazards) categories 
variations emerged in the risk assessments of Estonian cities. The types of risks 
and categories of hazards in the risk assessments of British cities originated 
directly from the methodologies. In the Estonian approaches, the main structure 
of the accidents list was transformed from the original of the methodologies 
(16+n) for the risk assessments of Tallinn [17,18] and Pärnu [19], and sub-
categories were added to the modified main categories. The risk references 
responding to categories of accidents (hazards) were similarly to the British, 
marked with the combinations of letters and numbers in the risk assessment of 
Tallinn but in another way: the letter showed the accident main type and the 
number the concrete accident (R1, R2; M1, M2, M2.1 etc.). The sub-categories 
of the original main categories were appended in the risk assessments of Tartu 
[20] and Narva [21]. The main accident (hazard) categories and sub-categories 
were marked with numbers in the form of two-step classification (1: 1.1, 1.2; 2: 
2.1, 2.2 etc.). 
4.4 Likelihood assessment 
The criteria for likelihood assessment in the methodologies were directly 
followed by all the studied British risk assessments. The risk assessments of 
Estonian cities again contained more variability or more precisely - Tallinn had 
developed its own modification of the methodology, where the frequency range 
was from: more than once a year up to rarer than once per 100 years. The risk 
assessments of other studied Estonian cities followed the likelihood scale of the 
original methodology.  
4.5 Consequences (impact) assessment 
The certain impact categories, as defined in the methodologies, were followed in 
risk assessments of the British cities. The same could be said about the three 
Estonian cities except Tallinn where modification of the methodology defined 
two additional components to the four, compared beforehand with British 
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analogues. These areas were the (need for) evacuation and (presence of or 
coverage with) rescue resources. 
4.6 Risk assessments performance, availability, outcomes and outputs 
Although the responsibility for the performance of risk assessment of a city or 
community in Estonia lies with the local governments, the real practical 
executors can be different persons, who have reciprocal agreements. For instance 
the risk assessment of Tallinn was carried out mainly by specialists of the crisis 
management service of the (previous) Tallinn Fire and Rescue Department 
(whose functions have been replaced by the crisis management bureau of the 
North-Estonian Rescue Centre). The risk assessment of Tartu was conducted by 
a research team from the Estonian University of Life Sciences with the 
participation of the authors of the current paper. The risk assessment of Pärnu 
was accomplished under the coordination of crisis management specialists of the 
rescue service, but different offices and persons were involved. The risk 
assessment of Narva was carried out mostly by private consultants. All the risk 
assessments of the four British cities or conurbations were performed by Local 
Resilience Forums, formed by Category 1 responders (or more precisely by 
working groups formed by previously mentioned institutions on the basis of 
Category 1 and Category 2 responders) as required by the Act [9]. The risk 
assessments were studied through publicly available community risk registers 
and therefore we had no detailed information about the exact staff of these 
working groups. 
     The risk assessment output documents (reports or summaries) of Tartu, Narva 
and Pärnu follow the formal structure enacted in the methodology. The risk 
assessment report of Tallinn is the most substantial with its two parts, but only 
partially complies with the previously mentioned structure. For instance there is 
no special chapter for emergencies statistics but at the same time there exists a 
special chapter for the (previously referred modification of) methodology. The 
British cities CRRs, in the narrower sense, originate comparatively accurately 
from the settings of the methodology and the examples of its annexes. The CRRs 
in a broader sense have more variations, considering the constitution and 
additional textual parts. For example the CRRs of (the boroughs of) London 
[22—27] include the contextualisation statement chapter, describing the social 
and environmental factors and economic and transport infrastructures. The 
included textual part of the Greater Manchester CRR [28] is on the contrary very 
laconic, but simultaneously there exists additional material: The Great 
Manchester Profile Document [29] which functionally belongs together with the 
CRR. 
     The risk assessment reports of Tallinn and Pärnu are available on the 
homepages these city governments. The risk assessment reports of Tartu and 
Narva are available upon request to the city governments, having currently no 
open access via Internet. The CRRs of the London (boroughs) and Greater 
Manchester can be downloaded from special sites of the homepages of the 
responding fire departments or brigades. The CRRs of West Midlands [30] and 
Belfast [31] can be found from special sites of the local resilience forums. 
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Hereby, it should be mentioned that West Midlands had no complete version of 
CRR, but only preliminary materials, covering partly the essential elements of 
the CRR. We began from these in our research. 
     As the risk matrices are core elements of the risk assessments, the ongoing 
comparative description is mainly based on these. The risk matrix is not only a 
risk evaluation tool, but also an output form, filled with risk evaluation and 
rating results. The risk assessments of Estonian cities in general use uniform risk 
matrices, but diversity is recognised in the approaches to risk ranking. The 
(blank) risk matrix of Narva (Figure 2) represents the original one from the 
methodology – without determined risk ranking zones. The (blank) risk matrix of 
Tallinn (Figure 3) is divided into 6 (I-VI) risk ranking zones. Analogically with 
the British risk matrix, the relative importance of the consequences is 
accentuated, but probably with too high a degree of contrast. For example in the 
case of catastrophic consequences, the events with a small likelihood belong to 
the VI zone (the highest) and the same with very small likelihood to the Ist zone 
(lowest). The (blank) risk matrix of Tartu (Figure 4) uses the 3 risk ranking 
zones on the matrix (originally red, yellow and green), where likelihood and 
consequences have proportional weights. The (blank) risk matrix (Figure 5) of 
Pärnu uses 7(I-VII) risk-ranking zones. In our mind the last has aberrances from 
the general logics of a risk matrix, where the risk increases “diagonally” towards 
the matrix, following the increase of the values of likelihood and consequences 
(or impacts). The risk assessments of the British cities followed the uniform risk 
ranking from the methodology.  
     The assessed risks were observed only cursorily in the current study, 
concentrating on (the comparison of) the highest assessed risks, because the 
results of the risks assessments of the two countries, as well as different regions 
of Estonia, were not comparable one-for-one. The highest risks in risk 
assessments of Estonian cities were in general: fire risks, chemical accidents 
risks in transport and fixed installations, failures of vitally important networks, 
extreme environmental conditions, and epidemics (except Tallinn, where the last 
was not assessed). Typical examples of very high risks in risk assessments of the 
British cities and conurbations, which were brought out in all or most studied 
cases (including the CRRs of London boroughs), were: influenza type disease 
with pandemic course, industrial technical failures of telecommunication 
infrastructure and/or electricity network, major local fluvial flooding.  
5 Conclusions 
The previous study demonstrated that the methodological approaches and the 
risk assessment outcomes and outputs of the two countries were readily 
comparable, as was proposed. The Estonian territorial risk assessment 
methodology was more laconic and less precise which enabled various 
interpretations and, as the cases showed, a creative approach. In general parallels 
can be drawn between the main steps of risk assessment in the methodologies of 
the studied countries. The positive side of the latter- is the generation of new 
ideas and viewpoints for the further development of the methodology. At the 
same time a drawback is the noticeable variability and difficult comparability of 
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the outcomes. The British risk assessment methodology was more voluminous 
and detailed and the work arrangement was firmly enacted. This ensured the 
principally uniform approach amongst the essential components of the risk 
assessments of the cities, as was noticed in the studied cases.  
     In our opinion the current Estonian territorial risk assessment methodology 
needs improvement. We believe that during the development and further 
specification of the Estonian territorial risk assessment methodology more 
attention has to be turned to the following components: the classification of 
hazards (and/or accidents caused by these), risk matrix from the aspects of risk 
ranking, and likelihood assessment. We find that the British methodology is 
suitable for serving as one indirect example for that purpose. 
     The optimal classification of categories of accidents (hazards) should be 2-
step and the possible variants could be the combination of a letter and a number 
(A: A1, A2; B: B1, B2 etc) as in the case of Tallinn and alternatively the 2-step 
numeration (1: 1.1, 1.2; 2: 1.2, 2.2 etc) as in the cases of Tartu and Pärnu. The 
British system of codes and categories seems too complicated and specific to 
adopt directly. 
     The risk ranking as we visualize it, could be 3-level: low, medium, high or 5-
level, involving two intermediate levels. Two variations could be conceivable: 
firstly, where the likelihood and consequences are in “balance” like in the case of 
Tartu (Figure 3) and secondly, where the weight of consequences is expressed 
more, like the British and Tallinn cases (Figures 1 and 3). The latter could be 
considered because of the fact that adequate response to single accident(s) with 
multiple victims is on average more complicated due to the lack of resources for 
simultaneous application rather than multiple accidents with few victims.  
     The likelihood assessment tools could be equipped with supplementary 
limiting criteria in addition to frequency, like commitment with certain territorial 
units (per n km2), etc. The application of similar principles as the British use is 
also conceivable, but this presumes an adjustment of the circumstances 
beforehand.  
     Finally we emphasize, that the accurate determination of work arrangements, 
publication requirements and conditions, as well as information exchange and 
cooperation in the field of civil protection with other EU countries will be 
conducive to the perspectives of Estonian territorial risk assessment. 
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Abstract 
This paper concerns the integration of Safety Management Systems of the 
Estonian Seveso II establishments into ISO-based Integrated Management 
Systems (IMS). Estonia has an obligation to follow the requirements of the EU 
Seveso II Directive since joining the EU in 2004. Today altogether 51 enterprises 
with major accident hazards are in the official register. According to the data 
available at the Estonian Association for Quality, seventeen of these 
establishments have certified quality (ISO 9001), environmental (ISO 14001) 
management integrated systems. Therefore it is useful and politically sound to 
integrate the SMS to the IMS. The essential goal of the current study is to 
explain the application of the unified management system and to find 
characteristic features for further recommendations. The results have 
demonstrated that, in spite of different approaches, a number of common factors 
exist, enabling general recommendations to be worked out.   
Keywords: emergency preparedness, safety management systems, major 
chemical hazard. 
1 Introduction 
The existence of mankind has been filled with disastrous events: both natural and 
anthropogenic. Major accidents and hazards are destabilizing factors for 
continuous and sustainable development [1]. During the last decades there has 
been a significant increase in the number of technological and natural disasters in 
Europe and worldwide [2]. Therefore it is very important to work out different 
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kinds of measures and requirements for keeping the hazards and risks under 
control and avoiding emergencies. Today the requirements concerning safety 
management are available in international and national legal documents and also 
in a variety of international standards. Different requirements cover single 
organisations and also broader social structures on regional, national and 
international levels. 
     Industrial installations using dangerous chemicals in quantities, which can 
cause major accidents, have been under heightened attention in Europe for about 
thirty years. Nowadays the Seveso II Directive [3] sets out basic principles and 
requirements for safety policies and management systems, suitable for the 
prevention, control and mitigation of major accident hazards. This document 
belongs to the most remarkable EU Directives, supporting the protection of 
people and the environment from major accidental hazards [4]. The Seveso II 
Directive also includes the settings for Safety Management Systems for ensuring 
the systematic measures and control mechanisms in the establishments with a 
major accident hazard.  Safety management systems are obligatory for 
establishments with a major accident hazard as failures of the management 
system often cause accidents.  
     Since the 1990s the International Standard Organization (ISO) has worked out 
standards for different management fields in organisations, based on the 
universal management cycle of plan-do-check-act (PDCA). Today several 
organisations over the world have implemented and certified integrated 
management systems (IMS), based on corresponding ISO standards and 
containing quality (ISO 9001) [5], environment (ISO 14001) [6] and often also 
occupational health and safety (OHSAS 18001) [7]. The latter is not based on 
ISO standards, but on a document of the British Standard Institute, which has 
generically adopted the structure of ISO 14001 and has been recognized in many 
countries. The ISO 14001 and OHSAS 18001 both contain requirements 
concerning emergency and safety management. Although the management 
systems, based on ISO standards, are structured differently from the SMS 
presented in the Appendix III of the Seveso II Directive, there are noticeable 
similarities between these systems, providing a basis to an integrated approach. 
     Until now many studies involve both:  the safety management systems and 
the ISO standardized and certified management systems but, simultaneously only 
a few studies have been carried out about the integration of these two categories. 
The situation is discussed more thoroughly in the next section of the paper. 
     Taking into account what was discussed so far, the essential goal of the 
current study is to explain the application of the unified management system and 
to find characteristic features for further recommendations. The particular aims 
and closer research interests concern the following issues: management policies; 
counteractions between ISO-based management systems and the SMS during the 
integrated development; the application of risk assessment and emergency 
planning in the SMS-containing IMS; the applicability and compatibility of such 
components of the IMS as operational control, management of change, 
monitoring performance and also audit and review to fulfil the corresponding 
requirements of the SMS. 
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     The work discussed was carried out within the frames of a research 
workgroup on risk management and civil protection of the Estonian Academy of 
Security Sciences.  
2 Integration of SMS to IMS 
2.1 Safety Management System 
The Seveso II Directive requires the compilation of a “Major Accident 
Prevention Policy” (MAPP) and “Safety Management System” (SMS) from all 
establishments with a major accident hazard [3, 8] on the basis of a summarized 
qualifying quantity by Annex I of the Directive. In accordance with Annex III of 
the Directive the SMS must embrace the following issues [3, 9]: 
 
1. Organisation and personnel 
2. Identification and evaluation of major hazards 
3. Operational control 
4. Management of change 
5. Planning for emergencies 
6. Monitoring performance 
7. Audit and review 
 
     The Safety Management System can be briefly defined as the system for 
implementing safety management [10]. SMS substantially means multiple 
activities, initiatives, programs, etc., consolidated by organisational, human and 
technical aspects [11]. SMS in a formal sense is a framework, holding a large 
package of documents, containing different procedures, manuals, charts, reports, 
records, emergency plans, etc. [12]. The safety management system is considered 
to be a basic component of the organisations’ safety culture [13, 14]. The size 
and orientation of SMS procedures are deeply dependent on identification and 
evaluation of major accident hazards and selection of risk analysis method(s) 
[15]. The integration of the principles of inherent safety and land use planning 
into the plant safety management system permits the reduction of possible 
consequences [16]. The SMS of neighbouring Seveso establishments may be 
organized in clusters, which enables observing common risks and possible 
counteractions as well as knowledge exchange and coordinated planning of pro-
active and re-active measures [17].   
2.2 Integration 
The integration of legally required and standardised management systems is 
possible and recommendable due to the fact that they have several analogous or 
similar system components, although structured in different ways. In principle 
the activities for the prevention of accidents and the mitigation of consequences 
generically follow the PDCA management scheme, on which the ISO standards 
are based [12]. It is important to implement the SMS in consistence with a 
broader management system, like an integrated health, safety and environment 
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(HSE) management system, total quality management (TQM) system, 
etc. which, already exist and cover the entire management of a particular 
organisation [10].  
     Slovenian researchers conducted a study, where they, among other things, 
also observed the integration of SMS and IMS [18]. They brought out that 22 
(71%) of their selected 31 establishments with a major chemical accident hazard 
had introduced the SMS as being related or completely integrated within 
ISO/OHSAS management system(s). 
3 SMS in IMS of Estonian enterprises 
According to the data of the Estonian Rescue Board [19] there are 51 
establishments with a major chemical accident hazard in Estonia (further also 
Seveso II establishments).  Among these, 19 organisations (37%) have 
implemented and been certified by ISO management standards, whereby 17 
(33%, that makes about 1/3 of the total) have an integrated approach, based at 
least on two standards [20]. More precisely: 12 Seveso II establishments have 
integrated quality (ISO 9001) and environmental (ISO 14001) management 
systems, 4 have, in addition to the two mentioned, an occupational health and 
safety management system (OHSAS 18001), in addition 1 also has 
Environmental Management and Audit Scheme  (EMAS) registration.  
Table 1:  Contingent correspondence between SMS and ISO 14001. 
Safety Management System 
(SMS) 
 ISO 14001 










Legal and other requirements 
Objectives, targets and programme(s) 
Resources, roles, responsibility and 
authority 
Competence, training and awareness 
Communication 
Identification and evaluation 








Control of documents 
Operational control 
Management of change 4.3.3 Objectives, targets and programme(s) 
Planning for emergencies 4.4.7 Emergency preparedness and response 
Monitoring performance 4.5.1 
4.5.2 
4.5.3 
Monitoring and measurement 
Evaluation of compliance 
Nonconformity, corrective action and 
preventive action 
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     Recently we carried out a study, concerning the implementation of SMS in 
Estonian Seveso II establishments. During the study we turned our attention to 
the connections between safety management systems and the ISO 9001, ISO 
14001 and OHSAS 18001. Other directions of the study were the evaluation and 
audit of companies safety management systems in Estonian conditions, but these 
are not under observation in the current paper. 
     One important outcome of the study was the guidance, where the previously 
mentioned connections were brought in as correspondence between the 7 main 
components of SMS and the subdivisions of ISO 9001, ISO 14001 and OHSAS 
18001. The excerpt of that work, demonstrating the proposed correspondences of 
SMS with ISO 14001 is presented in Table 1.  
     The guidance was made publicly available and has been introduced and 
recommended to many Estonian Seveso II establishments for practical 
application purposes.  
4 Selected case studies 
4.1 General 
Today, as previously stated, about 1/3 of Seveso II establishments in Estonia 
have implemented the integrated management system. We selected for our case 
studies three of these, belonging to different economic activities. One aim of the 
selection was finding organisations, which were not competitors with each other. 
This allowed for good prerequisites for possible further cooperation between the 
specialists of the organisations in the field of IMS and SMS development. 
     The common characteristics of the organisations were the following: firstly, 
all three belonged to international corporations and secondly, all the 
establishments had implemented and certified at least the ISO 9001 and ISO 
14001 as IMS and thirdly, all three have the additional duty to follow the internal 
standards of their international corporations. One of the three case study 
establishments belongs to the upper tier and the two others to the lower tier, 
according to the quantity of dangerous substances by thresholds, brought out in 
Annex I of the Seveso II Directive [3, 21]. 
     Our study is derived from the previously described guidance, where the 
connections between the SMS and ISO management standards are brought forth. 
The document analysis was carried out, concerning: safety reports or 
descriptions of SMS-s, handbooks of IMS-s, procedures and guides of IMS-s and 
also emergency plans. During the case studies relatively more attention was paid 
to the SMS-specific components: identification and evaluation of major hazards 
(risk assessments) and planning for emergencies. 
4.2 Establishment A: a process industry 
This establishment is a plant, producing chemical products. The major accident 
hazard originates mostly from the use of extremely flammable gases in the 
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processes. The establishment belongs to the lower tier by Annex I of Seveso II 
Directive.  
     The SMS was implemented on the basis of and integrated to the already 
existing ISO 9001 quality management system (QMS). As a matter of fact the 
first step of implementing SMS and integrating it to QMS was the compilation of 
the procedure for emergency preparedness, through which the obligatory 
components of the SMS were integrated. Later, when the environmental 
management system (EMS) on the basis of ISO 14001 was implemented, the 
emergency management part of it was already adopted from the SMS 
subdivision of the initially integrated system of quality and safety management. 
Today the formal part of the management system is generically Intranet-based. It 
is divided into functional modules and the SMS components belong mostly to 
the module of environmental and occupational health and safety management.  
     The establishment had no need to compile special safety politics or MAPP, as 
safety was natural component of the management politics of the international 
company, which the establishment belonged to. The handbook of quality 
(actually the handbook of IMS) serves as a central guidance document, which 
embraces also the key elements and links to the SMS-specific documents. The 
organisational structure scheme and responsibilities of the personnel, initially 
defined by QMS, were revised and amended during the implementation of SMS 
and EMS. 
     Identification and evaluation of major hazards and planning for emergencies 
are both regulated by the emergency preparedness procedure of the IMS, which 
has references to the procedures of environmental aspects assessment and the 
assessment of occupational hazards and risks. Additionally, the internal 
standards of the corporation are considered. The identification of hazards is 
carried out by the well-known HAZOP [22, 23] methodology in combination 
with the risk matrix for the assessment of risks. The risk matrix used is rather 
ordinary: 5*5 – with five-point scales for both, likelihood and consequences. The 
risk assessment outcome documents are in the status of appendixes of the IMS 
emergency preparedness procedure. The environmental aspects and occupational 
risks are assessed separately, but the principles are quite similar to major hazard 
risk assessment.  The Emergency plan of the establishment with its guides is also 
formally standing as the appendix of the same IMS procedure. So the specific 
requirements, emanating from Seveso II Directive and Estonian Chemicals Act 
[24], are completely integrated to the IMS of that establishment. 
     The required elements of SMS such as operational control, management of 
change, monitoring performance, audit and review were covered by ISO 9001 
based QMS procedures and were taken over during the implementation of the 
SMS and ISO 14001 based EMS. The management documentation was amended 
only with some new procedures and guides, concerning mainly the hazardous 
parts of the technological processes. 
4.3 Establishment B: an oil terminal 
The main activity of this establishment is the handling of oil products at a port 
terminal being one of the largest of its kind in Estonia. The establishment 
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belongs to the upper tier by Annex I of the Seveso II Directive. The corporation, 
to which the establishment belongs, has several terminals in Estonia and abroad.  
     The company implemented an integrated quality, environmental and safety 
management system from the very beginning applying the standards ISO 9001 
and ISO 14001 and so the SMS documents were adapted to the IMS framework 
since their compilation. The central guidance document is the handbook of the 
management system, which gives directions to all components of the system. 
The handbook presents, among other things, the structural scheme of the 
personnel and the special duties of the personnel concerning safety are precisely 
set forth in job descriptions    
     The establishment has a uniform management policy, including the essential 
elements of MAPP.  There is no special procedure of emergency preparedness in 
the framework of IMS. Instead of this, the essential elements of SMS such as 
safety report, risk assessment and emergency plan are integrated into IMS to 
cover the provisions of the subdivision 4.4.7 “Emergency preparedness and 
response” of the ISO 14001. Until today the risk identification of major hazards 
was carried out primarily by deterministic approach, relying on the competent 
opinions of specialists, experts and consultants. The risks were assessed by a 5*5 
risk matrix. The establishment is planning the application of HAZOP to improve 
the identification of hazards.  
     Operational control, management of change, monitoring performance, audit 
and review were conceived from the outset of the implementation of ISO-based 
IMS to cover also the safety management issues, taking into consideration the 
specific requirements for SMS as obliged by the Seveso II Directive. 
4.4 Establishment C: a water treatment plant 
The establishment specialises in water treatment. The dangerous chemical – 
chlorine – is only used in one of the many sites, where the company operates: the 
water treatment plant.  Therefore the IMS, covering the entire company, and the 
SMS, being required only in one certain site, were developed quite separately 
until recently. The water treatment plant is a lower tier establishment.  
     The company at first implemented and certified the ISO 9001 and ISO 14001 
management systems and so the application of the SMS in water treatment had 
taken place already within the conditions of the existing IMS. The IMS of 
quality and environmental management involved the procedure of crisis 
management, covering the provisions of 4.4.7 “Emergency preparedness and 
response” of the ISO 14001. The procedure was designed to organise 
preparedness against different types of possible emergencies beyond the whole 
company and one of the guides, emanating from the procedure was addressed to 
a chlorine accident. 
     Simultaneously, to better respond to the SMS requirements, special 
documents such as a chlorine accident risk assessment and emergency plan were 
compiled for the water treatment plant with the help of a consultation company. 
The risks were assessed by a 5*5 risk matrix. Today the emergency plan is 
integrated with the crisis management procedure and the guide for chlorine 
accidents. 
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     Later, during the implementation of OHSAS 18001 and its integration into the 
IMS the whole subject of risk was thoroughly revised and a special procedure of 
risk management was compiled. The procedure is designed to enable a uniform 
approach to different types of risks as well as environmental aspects. In relation 
to the former the company actuated the HAZOP methodology, covering all the 
production units, including the water treatment. The future orientation, 
concerning major accident risk from chlorine, is the revision of the possible 
major accident scenarios on the basis of HAZOP and drawing the risk 
assessment step-by-step together with the methodological process, derived from 
the risk management procedure of the IMS. Today there are good outlooks for 
this as the outputs of generic (of the whole company) and the chlorine 
emergency specific risk assessment result on 5*5 risk matrixes, although the 
scales, levels and other criteria are currently diversely defined.  
     The company had no need to develop special solutions for SMS components 
such as operational control, management of change, monitoring performance, as 
well as, audit and review since the corresponding measures of the standards-
based IMS enabled complete coverage of these requirements. 
5 Conclusion 
The results of the case studies confirmed the expectations about the mutual 
impacts of the ISO-based IMS and SMS, enabling their integration into a unified 
management system. The case study establishments had composed unified 
policies in the framework of IMS, which contained the essential elements of 
quality, environmental and safety management and therefore there was no need 
for the compilation of a special MAPP. 
     The identification and evaluation of major hazards in the case study 
organisations was conducted by risk assessment, as is required by the Estonian 
Chemicals Act [24]. The major chemical accident risk assessment process was 
integrated to the IMS, although to a different degree, depending on the particular 
establishment.  The three case study establishments received orientation to 
introduce the HAZOP methodology, which serves a broader target than only 
major chemical hazard identification, enabling systematic support for the 
improvement of the whole risk management in the frames of IMS. The default 
selection in the three establishments for risk assessment outputs was the risk 
matrix method, being simultaneously used also for other risk types and aspects. 
In spite of the multiple drawbacks of the risk matrix technique [25, 26], we still 
suggest the use of it for establishments, where a quantitative risk assessment 
approach is not the default selection, as it enables the comparison of major 
accident risks with other risk types in the organisation – either directly, if the 
defined scales and criteria are universal enough, or with the help of additional 
assessment tools for comparison and converting, specially worked out for that 
purpose.  
     The emergency planning principles were decreed and described in the 
corresponding IMS procedures. The emergency plans, designed for major 
accidents, were integrated to the IMS frameworks of the organisations. 
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     The IMS based on ISO/OHSAS permitted the direct execution of the 
requirements of the SMS, involving operational control, management of change, 
monitoring performance as well as on audit and review.   
     Finally we recommend, on the strength of the current study experience, more 
cooperation and information exchange between the Seveso II establishments in 
the field of safety management and its integration to the ISO/OHSAS based 
management system.  
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Abstract 
The paper discusses the problem of the integration of emergency preparedness 
and safety management into the ISO-based integrated management system 
(IMS). The international and national legal requirements for ports embrace 
different aspects of safety, but unfortunately do not give an entire conception of 
safety management. The standard ISO 14001 requires procedures for emergency 
preparedness from the organisations which have implemented it, but at the same 
time, emergency is not strictly defined in the standard and the formulation of the 
requirements’ permit various interpretations. Thereof, our goal was to analyse 
the existing situation in the port of Tallinn and develop an updated conceptual 
approach during the improvement process of the integrated management system, 
suitable for the specific port and maybe partly applicable in other similar 
organisations. 
     The problem was observed in the context of a case study of the Port of 
Tallinn, which has implemented the integrated quality and environmental 
management system. The work, presented in this paper, was carried out in the 
frames of the Interreg IIIB programme DaGoB “Safe and Reliable Transport 
Chains of Dangerous Goods in the Baltic Sea Region”. The first step was the 
analysis of the management system, bringing out the gaps and ambiguities, 
concerning emergency preparedness and safety management. The second step 
was working out solutions and proposal; the third step, the compilation of a 
relevant thematic handbook, in addition to a general handbook of the IMS. 
Keywords: emergency preparedness and response, risk assessment, public 
safety. 
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1 Introduction 
During the history of mankind, human beings have always been exposed to 
different hazards. Emergencies have occurred in the past, occur nowadays and 
will occur in the future. Or in other words: accidents will happen again – it is 
only a question of time [1]. Therefore, the approaches for avoiding accidents, 
and creating a safer environment and society, have a long history. Currently the 
requirements concerning emergency preparedness and response can be found in 
several international/national legal  documents and also in various standards. At 
the same time the meaning of emergencies differ remarkably in different issues. 
     The ISO 14001 for Environmental Management Systems is one of the 
standards containing direct requirements for emergency preparedness and 
response. [2] Since 1996 more than 87,000 organizations in 128 countries have 
been certified observing the ISO 14001 Environmental Management System 
standard [3]. Emergency preparedness and response is one of the key elements of 
the standard, which is closely connected with other elements. In  Estonia today, 
there are over 270 enterprises certified observing the ISO 14001 standard [4]. All 
these organisations have taken responsibility for the subject of emergency 
preparedness and response.  
     The Port of Tallinn is one of the Estonian ISO 14001 certified enterprises. 
The Port of Tallinn has implemented an integrated (quality and environmental) 
management system (IMS), responding on both: ISO 9001 and ISO 14001 [5].  
The port has 5 different harbours on different sites, 3 of which are situated in 
Tallinn or in close proximity. Dangerous goods (DG) in large quantities are 
handled in four of the five ports. A number of enterprises with major chemical 
accident hazard are situated directly on the territories of the harbours. These 
enterprises have their own safety management systems. In spite of different 
hazardous activities taking place on the territories and aquatic areas of the 
harbours, the port has only limited legal responsibility, concerning emergency 
preparedness and response. At the same time the organisation is voluntarily 
taking more duties in this field due to the implementation of ISO 14001 
standards (together with ISO 9001). Currently environmental protection in 
companies is increasingly conducted using IMS [6]. 
     The essential goals of our study were first analyse the existing situation in the 
Port of Tallinn, bringing out the gaps and ambiguities, addressing emergency 
preparedness and safety management. Secondly, to develop an updated 
conceptual approach during the improvement process of the integrated 
management system, containing relevant solutions and proposals. The final 
outcome was the compilation of a handbook of emergency preparedness and 
response for the Port of Tallinn on the basis of the study, as an additional manual 
to the handbook of IMS, facilitating both routine activities and continual 
improvement. The research materials used were existing documents, outcomes 
from interviews with key people and results of the observations. The work was 
carried out in the frames of the Interreg IIIB programme DaGoB “Safe and 
Reliable Transport Chains of Dangerous Goods in the Baltic Sea Region” [7]. 
Although the programme was directed mainly to dangerous goods, our study 
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observed a broader circle of risks of the emergencies in the context of IMS of the 
port.  
2 Emergency preparedness in ISO 14001 
The ISO 14001 standard provides a practical and workable framework for 
controlling environmental risk to prevent accidents and environmental regulation 
violations [8]. Emergency preparedness is one of the key elements of ISO 14001 
[2]. The avoidance of environmental risks arising from the activities of the 
organisation and mitigation of the impact deriving from accidents and 
emergencies is one of the goals of implementing the environmental management 
system (EMS) [9]. The organizations voluntarily follow set standards to 
establish, implement and maintain procedures to identify potential emergency 
situations as well as potential accidents and respond to them. These 
organizations are also compelled to respond to actual emergency situations and 
accidents while preventing or mitigating associated adverse environmental 
impacts.  
     At the same time the meanings of emergency or emergency preparedness are 
not defined in the ISO 14001. Certain ambiguities may cause different 
understandings of the standard requirements. The Estonian Emergency 
Preparedness Act [10], for example, designates an emergency as an event or a 
chain of events which endangers national security, the life and health of persons, 
significant damages to the environment, or causes extensive economic damage. 
Responding to any of these requires the co-ordinated action of the Government 
of the Republic, government agencies and local governments. It is obvious that 
this definition, although being the legal one in Estonia, does not fit into the 
context of the ISO 14001, as it is almost equivalent with Smith’s [11] definition 
of disaster. This is the following: an event, concentrated in time and space, in 
which a community experiences severe danger and disruption of its essential 
functions, accompanied by widespread human, material, or environmental losses, 
which often exceed the ability of the community to cope without external 
assistance. 
     The EU Civil Protection Financial Instrument [12] defines emergency as any 
situation which has or may have an adverse impact on people and their 
preparedness as a state of readiness which the capacity of human and material 
means enable them to ensure. This definition permits the observation of almost 
any kind of accident, where human beings suffer (even slightly), as an 
emergency. Martin [13] brings out that emergencies include releases of all types 
to the environment, whereby natural disasters that might lead to releases, and 
process hazards that might become emergencies. In our opinion an emergency, in 
the context of the environmental management system (as well as IMS), can be 
principally defined as an accident where outside aid is additionally required for 
adequate response. For organizations or enterprises of different sizes, 
emergencies are accidents for which rescue, ambulance, police etc. are called for. 
     Although the ISO 14001 does not define or include the word ‘risk’, the 
identification of potential emergency situations and accidents is actually the 
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assessment of the risk of emergency situations and accidents. In spite of the 
absence of the term ‘risk’ in the standard(s), different sources within the ISO 
14001 contemplate risk assessment and management. Besides, risk in the 
different issues of ISO 14001 [14–16] is observed in a broader context than that 
of the merely emergencies and accidents, covering additional uncertain and 
undesirable environmental impacts. 
     Usually an accountable part of hazards the organisation is faced with are on-
site hazards being (or connected with) environmental aspects. The potential 
accidents and emergency situations arising from these have to be observed 
during the assessment of environmental aspects as the impacts of such aspects. 
The ISO 14001 sets [17] that environmental aspects should not be limited only to 
normal operational conditions; abnormal and emergency situations must also be 
considered. This presumes that the selected methodology for environmental 
aspect assessment is obliged to take into account probability (e.g. assess the 
risk). Voorhees and Woellner [16] point out, that for understanding the degree of 
risk, ISO 14001 requires the following environmental concerns need to be 
addressed: the scale of the impact, the severity of the impact, the probability of 
occurrence, and the duration of impact. Organizations, in addition to first-string, 
often engage risk management specialists to assist in the identification of 
potential emergency or accident situations that could lead to human injury, 
environmental damage, or economic loss [18]. 
     The ISO 14001 does not specify that the accidents and emergency situations, 
covered by the procedure(s), descend only from the elements of an organisation’s 
activities, products and services, (e.g. environmental aspects – on-site hazards). 
Conversely, the responding guidance of ISO 14004 [19] mentions that in 
establishing its procedure(s), the organization should include consideration of the 
potential for (an) emergency situation(s) or accident(s) at a nearby facility (e.g. 
plant, road, railway line). Therefore, the organisation has to broaden the circle of 
potential emergency situations. Hence the coordination of additional risk 
assessment(s) or the analyse of the outcomes of out-site risk assessments are 
necessary for the complete identification of the potentially hazardous events. 
     The ISO 14001 only requires the existence of the procedure(s), covering inter 
alia the response to accidents and emergencies. The laconic and unspecified 
formulation in the standard enables various viewpoints and interpretations.  A 
number of authors [9, 16, 20, 21] recommend the compilation of emergency 
plan(s) in addition to or emanating from the procedure(s). Batts [20] points out, 
that large companies usually have such plans already implemented at all sites.  
Voorhees and Woellner [16] make the point that, according to ISO 14004 
recommendations, emergency plans can document emergency organization and 
responsibilities; a list of key personnel; details of emergency services; internal 
and external communication plans; actions taken in the event of different types 
of emergencies; information on hazardous materials, such as material safety 
datasheets; and training plans and testing for effectiveness.  Belmane et al [9] (in 
addition to previous) mention the overview of special resources and equipment 
and guidelines for handling the accident residue. 
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     An important requirement of the ISO 14001 concerns the periodic testing and 
simulation of emergency procedures, but leaves open the ways and frequency of 
such testing, which can lead to disagreements between auditors and clients [20]. 
Belmane et al [9] express that the absence of such periodical testing has appeared 
as a typical mistake in the maintenance of the EMS.  
3 Case study of the Port of Tallinn 
3.1 Brief overview of the port of Tallinn 
The Port of Tallinn is the largest port in Estonia and, as far as both cargo and 
passenger traffic are taken into account, the biggest port on the Baltic Sea [22]. 
The Port of Tallinn is a state-owned company that unites five ports: Muuga 
Harbour, Old City Harbour, Paljassaare Harbour, Paldiski South Harbour, and 
Saaremaa Harbour. The organisation's main activities are ship traffic and port 
infrastructure management. Today, Port of Tallinn operates as a landlord type of 
port with no cargo handling operations of its own. Cargo handling and passenger 
transport are managed by the port operators, who are wholly responsible for the 
safe operation of the ports. 
     Aimed at improving customer satisfaction and effectiveness of environmental 
actions, Port of Tallinn has utilized, since 2003, an integrated quality and 
environmental management system which meets the requirement of the 
international standards ISO 9001:2000 and ISO 14001:2004 [23]. The safety 
management of the Port of Tallinn has been integrated with the quality and 
environmental management system for effective prevention of, and operative 
response to, hazards. All port facilities also have security plans approved by the 
national maritime authority and are compliant with ISPS requirements. 
     Subsequently the five harbours are briefly exemplified. All harbours are 
navigable all the year round and easily approachable with depths of up to 18 
meters enabling them to receive all vessels able to pass the Danish Straits.  
Taking into account that the DaGoB project, in the frames of which this study 
was conducted, had orientation on dangerous goods (DG), additional attention is 
turned to this topic, characterizing the five ports. There are numerous risks 
related to the transportation of dangerous goods, including risk to human health 
and safety, risk to environment, risk to property and other types of risk [24]. 
Large volumes of hazardous cargo, mediated by the operators, are passing 
through the ports. Thus, serious accidents during their handling may endanger 
the employees of the Port of Tallinn and the normal operation of the ports. 
     Muuga Harbour is the biggest cargo harbour in Estonia and specializes in 
handling transit origin goods. It is the main cargo harbour for Port of Tallinn and 
is located approximately 17 km east of Tallinn. The port area covers territories of 
three different municipalities. The cargo volume handled at Muuga accounts for 
around 80% of the total cargo volume of Port of Tallinn and approximately 90% 
of all the transit cargo volume passing through Estonia. Nearly 75% of cargo 
loaded in Muuga Harbour includes crude oil and oil products, but the harbour 
also handles dry bulk (mostly fertilizers, grain and coal) as well as other types of 
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cargo. The three oil and/or chemical terminals and one enterprise which handles 
ammonium nitrate, are enterprises with major chemical accident hazard potential 
according to the Seveso II directive (EU-directive 96/82/EC) [25] criteria 
(hereafter also: ‘Seveso enterprises’). The two other oil terminals in the 
neighbourhood of the port area, also ‘Seveso enterprises’, use the loading 
equipment on the berth, which has pipeline connections with these terminals. 
     The Old City harbour is one of the biggest and busiest passenger harbours in 
the Baltic region. It is also the biggest passenger harbour for both the Port of 
Tallinn and all of Estonia. In 2008, the total number of passengers travelling 
through the Port of Tallinn was 7,247,366. Not only passengers but also trucks 
with dangerous goods move through the harbour. The most hazardous of these is 
chlorine, used by the Tallinn Water Treatment Plant.  
     Paljassaare Harbour is situated on Paljassaare Peninsula in Tallinn. It is a 
cargo port which primarily specialises in handling mixed cargo, coal and oil 
products, as well as timber and perishables. Two of the operators have ‘Seveso 
enterprises’: one handles oil products and another ammonium nitrate.  
     Paldiski South Harbour is located 45 km west of Tallinn. The emphasis is 
placed on ro-ro activity, export of local goods and transit of liquid bulk and 
metals. One terminal, which handles oil, chemicals and LPG and is a ‘Seveso 
enterprise’, is situated in the neighbourhood and has its loading equipment on 
one of the berths, connected by pipelines with the terminal.   
     Saaremaa Harbour is a new passenger harbour on Saaremaa, the largest island 
of Estonia. The harbour has 2 quays available for cruise vessels accompanied by 
a quay for auxiliary vessels and a floating berth for small crafts. The only 
considerable chemicals handling operation is the occasional bunkering of the 
ships.  
3.2 Analysis and improvement of emergency preparedness and response in 
the Port of Tallinn  
3.2.1 Port safety in general 
The analysis of the safety control and management systems was the first step of 
our study and development work. This analysis included an assessment of the 
conformity to Estonian legislation of the management and control systems for 
hazard prevention and response and of the sufficiency of the mentioned systems    
for preventing and responding to hazards. The analysis brought out a number of 
problems that need additional attention and made specific proposals for their 
resolution. 
     The ISO 14001 standard has special subdivision, concerning legal and other 
requirements. The implementation of ISO-based IMS presumes conformance 
with these requirements. Thus our study turned special attention to this matter. 
The ports are, at the same time, dry land and maritime structures. Therefore the 
legislative requirements, concerning port safety exist in several international and 
national legal acts. There are no strict requirements, obliging the ports to create a 
consistent emergency management system (or approach). Thus we observed only 
selected legal acts, which were more directly connected with emergency 
preparedness and response theme. The conformity with the following acts was 
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examined: The Ports Act [26], the Emergency Preparedness Act [10], the Rescue 
Act [27], The Chemicals Act [28] and the Occupational Health and Safety Act 
[29]. 
     The Ports Act enacts a port authority as one who possesses a port and 
organises the activities of the port as a whole. Originating from this definition 
the port authority is not univocal in the landlord-type ports like the Port of 
Tallinn. This can give birth to contradictory interpretations and indeterminable 
responsibilities, e.g. no one answers for the safety in general on port areas and 
water areas on ports, which means there is dispersed responsibility. We consider 
that the best solution here could be for developing cooperation and the 
specification of the duties of the parties. For instance, in the sites where 
previously mentioned isolated oil terminals have loading equipment on the 
berths located on main port area and other places, the liabilities in the case of 
emergency are the most entangled.  
     The Ports Act is also the legal basis of port rules in the Estonian context. The 
Port Rules of the Port of Tallinn insist that companies operating in the port 
ensure tidiness, order and fulfill due diligence of fire precaution, environmental 
and health protection requirements on the territory, at the quays, in the buildings 
and facilities used by them. The rules require the immediate reporting of all 
accidents, either with people and/or equipment, pollution of the port territory, 
damage to vessels, quays and fenders to the Harbour Master’s Office. The rules 
also require that the operators provide the port owner with the requisites of the 
person responsible for the safe handling of dangerous cargo, which seemed to 
function according to expectations. The rules oblige the operators of oil 
terminals to develop organizational and technical measures, which ensure the 
safety of workers, prevention of fire and sea pollution and localization and 
liquidation of their aftereffects, to be developed in the terminal. This is, in part, 
the intersection with the requirements of Seveso II directive, Chemicals Act and 
also ISO-based EMS or IMS for the operators, who have implemented these 
systems.  
3.2.2 Emergency preparedness 
The Emergency Preparedness Act provides the legal basis for the organisation of 
emergency preparedness of, and for, crisis management by the Government of 
the Republic, government agencies and local governments. The act requires the 
preparation of emergency plans of the enterprises pursuant to the Chemicals Act. 
For this reason the port operators, relevant to Seveso II Directive and some 
others are subjects of this obligation. The Emergency Preparedness Act 
simultaneously determines that, on the basis of risk assessments of rural 
municipalities and cities, the rural municipality and city governments shall 
designate the enterprises and agencies, which additionally shall prepare 
emergency plans. Although the municipalities have assessed the risks of 
responding port areas, not one municipality has posed in its risk assessment 
report the requirement to the port(s) to compile the emergency plan(s).  
Therefore the Port of Tallinn has no obligation to follow the provisions of the 
act, concerning the enterprises and thus its systematic approach to emergency 
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preparedness and response is essentially based only on voluntary obligation in 
the framework of IMS, emanating from ISO 14001.  
     The previous version of the emergency preparedness and response procedure 
(hereafter also: ‘procedure’) was in the centre of our attention during the 
analysis. The ‘procedure’ generically conformed to the essential requirements of 
the ISO 14001. The detected problems concerned basically the identification of 
emergencies and the distribution of actions and responsibilities. 
     The identification of emergencies was carried out by groups of competent 
port employees. The lists of emergencies were composed qualitatively, relying 
on experiences and expert decisions – independently of the assessment of 
environmental aspects and other similar procedures. The participants were 
certainly aware of the environmental aspects assessment, as well as of the risk 
assessments of the operators of ‘Seveso enterprises’ on the port areas, the 
municipalities etc., but the outcomes of these were only indirectly taken into 
account. During the detail study of the problem, we discovered several 
paradoxical moments. The assessed (indirect) environmental aspects (of the 
terminals) were fire and releases of hazardous chemicals, but as a matter of fact 
the assessment methodology in use classified these as non-significant. This could 
be an explanation as to why we did not find the relevant environmental 
objectives and targets in the programmes of IMS. The ‘procedure’ enacted the 
duty of coordinating the risk assessments of the operators, handling dangerous 
goods, to the safety personnel of the ports. Actually the safety personnel did not 
even have copies of the risk assessment outcomes or safety reports. Further, it 
became evident that one security company, a partner of the Port of Tallinn, had 
conducted the general emergency risk assessment, but the outcomes were 
somehow forgotten or neglected by the interested parties. Therefore we 
recommended the composition of a systematic overview of the existing 
outcomes of different risk assessments and further application of additional 
assessment methodologies for accident and emergency risks as well as for risk-
related environmental aspects and impacts. The risks of accidents were also 
considered in the occupational risk assessments, which will be discussed further. 
     The actions and responsibilities were determined rather impersonally in the 
‘procedure’. Thus we recommended the further specification of the duties and 
responsibilities during the composition of new versions of the procedure. The 
specification was carried out by the departments and divisions. 
     Emergency plans were existing for all the five ports, deriving from the 
‘procedure’.  As the risk assessment was a weak point in emergency 
preparedness, the information about the emergencies and hazard zones was 
rather cursory. The plans contained the response resources but not the guidance 
as to how to use them. The instructions for action, in several cases, comprised 
only the emergency communication and references to the emergency plans of the 
operators. Therefore we once more recommend giving more attention to the 
opportunities of identification of the potential accidents and emergencies. 
Secondly we proposed the precision of the concrete emergency actions and 
exploitation of relevant resources.  
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     The port rules included a requirement, by which all companies operating on 
port territory shall prepare a plan of activities for the protection of people and 
assets in case of fire, natural disaster, catastrophe, accident, explosion, etc. The 
copy of the plan of activities shall be submitted to the port owner. Operators with 
‘Seveso enterprises’ and some others had submitted such plans, but most of the 
small operators had not. We supposed that every small company with almost no 
hazardous activities had no urgent need for their own separate emergency plan. 
Therefore our recommendation was the elaboration of the circle of operators, 
from whom the existence of the plan was reasoned in the first place.  
     The ‘procedure’ also determined the main principles of counter-pollution. The 
analysis ascertained that the water areas of the ports were well covered with 
responding measures. Each port had its marine counter-pollution plan, which 
realization chances were covered with competence and resources. The marine 
counter-pollution plans were the functional appendices of the emergency plans of 
the ports. Concurrently it was discovered that the counter pollution of the port 
(dry land) areas was set as an objective, but simultaneously without coverage. 
Because of this we proposed the determination of resources, operations and 
responsibilities for the dry land accidental pollution cases and composition of dry 
land counter-pollution plans for each port as appendixes to the ports (general) 
emergency plans.  
3.2.3 Fire safety 
The previously mentioned Rescue Act [27], among other things, enacts the 
organisational and construction fire safety requirements. In accordance with the 
act the port has delegated the performance of the fire safety requirements mainly 
to the operators and tenants who possess a great part of the ports areas and 
buildings. 
     In spite of the formal delegation of the full responsibility for fire safety to the 
operators, the real liabilities were actually distributed between the port and the 
operator(s), but the details were not comprehensibly fixed in the contracts. 
Therefore we recommended the further specification of the roles of the parties. 
We also suggested the improvement of general fire safety guidance and the 
compilation of special guidance manuals for the maintenance of fire safety 
installations and fire fighting water supply systems.  
3.2.4 Occupational safety – accident hazard in working environment 
Occupational safety as a whole was not the subject of our study, as the Port of 
Tallinn had not implemented and integrated to IMS their system of occupational 
health and safety management by OHSAS 18001 [30] or some other standard. 
Regardless, the Estonian Act of Occupational Health and Safety [29] contains 
the requirements for the employers in the case of emergencies and this is the 
only law, which claims carrying out of risk assessments (of working 
environment) in almost every organisation. Therefore it was decided to observe 
this subject in a more specific context.  
     Further review of the occupational risk assessment reports brought out a 
number of contradictions concerning the accident risks. Subsequently some 
examples are presented:  
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1) fire risk was not assessed in certain groups of workers, but the 
preventive measures were described; 
2) chemical accident risks were not identified and assessed for another 
group of port workers, who are regularly in touch with dangerous 
chemicals (of the operators); 
3) fire risk was assessed for the office but not for the groundwood plant. 
     We considered the need for checking over the outcomes of the risk 
assessment of the working environment, concerning serious accidents and in 
principle proposed the further actuation of these as one source in the 
identification framework of the potential accidents and emergencies.  
3.3 Compilation of a handbook 
Combining experiences and observations with advice of different port 
specialists, a dual meaning was attributed to the handbook of emergency 
preparedness and response: the narrower and the broader. The handbook was 
composed in three parts:. The first part being a handbook in the direct sense – a 
guidance manual of emergency preparedness and response for persons, involved 
with the application and continual improvement of IMS. This part (the guidance 
manual) gave an overview of the risk factors occurring in the ports and of the 
possible hazards associated with these. The second part was the directory of 
safety and emergency preparedness documents, concerning specific ports, 
persons and events. This part, which included safety documents, was designed 
primarily for those port employees who were responsible for hazard prevention 
and response. The third part of the handbook contained plans (instructions) 
related to hazard prevention and response. The general starting point was the 
corresponding chapter of the handbook of IMS of the Port of   Tallinn and the 
basic document of the existing procedure of emergency preparedness and 
response.  
     The first part of the handbook contained six chapters. The first and the second 
chapter were respectively the introduction and the scope. The third chapter 
included an overview of four types of hazards, which can develop into 
emergencies. These were: accidents with dangerous substances, pollution of the 
port area with oil products or other dangerous substances, fires, and bomb risks. 
The fourth chapter handled the general principles of safety management and 
guidelines for hazard response. The fifth chapter presented a review of safety 
assurance in the ports. 
4 Conclusion 
The study generally brought out that the integration of emergency preparedness 
and response to the IMS was evidently the optimal consistent solution for 
assuring the continuous development and improvement of that field in the Port of 
Tallinn.  
     The results of the analysis demonstrated a foreseeable need for turning 
attention to the following important moments in the field of emergency 
preparedness and response. Firstly, the improvement of the identification 
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methodology of potential accidents and emergencies, secondly, the specification 
of the responsibilities of the departments, divisions and staff in chief of the Port 
of Tallinn, and thirdly, the better cooperation between the port administration, 
operators and municipalities. 
     The experiences of the study were taken into account for the compilation of 
the new version of the emergency preparedness and response procedure and 
handbook, which practically denoted the renovation and improvement of that 
specific part of the IMS of the Port of Tallinn. Finally we supposed that our 
observations and proposed solutions could serve as comparative examples for 
others, who were engaged with the safety and emergency problems as well as 
with ISO-based management systems.   
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aBstract
This paper discusses emergency preparedness and response in environ-
mental management systems. Emergency preparedness and response is 
one of the key elements of the 14001 standard of the International Or-
ganisation for Standardization (ISO). ISO 14001 requires participating 
organisations to implement procedures for emergency preparedness and 
response, but the standard does not strictly define the word ‘emergency’, 
and consequently, the formulation of the requirements is subject to vari-
ous interpretations. Organisations implementing and certifying environ-
mental management systems are obliged to identify potential emergency 
situations and accidents that can impact the environment and plan an 
appropriate response. The identification of potential emergency situa-
tions and accidents requires risk assessment. However, the standard does 
not define what is meant by ‘emergency situation’, ‘accident’ and ‘risk’. 
The special requirements in ISO 14001 and the guidelines in ISO 14004 
are fairly laconic and imprecise, which allows for many ambiguous in-
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terpretations. In this context, we studied Estonian enterprises to analyse 
the variety of approaches to emergency preparedness and response. The 
main aim of this survey was to examine the identification and assessment 
of, as well as the response to, accidents and emergency situations in a 
selection of Estonian organisations that had implemented the require-
ments of ISO 14001. As a result of this study, we reached a number of 
conclusions that organisations can consider during the implementation 
and later improvement of their environmental or integrated manage-
ment systems.
keywords: environmental, management, hazard, risk, assessment, emer-
gency procedure, preparedness, response
1. introDuction
Throughout history, humans have been exposed to hazards. Emergencies 
have occurred in the past, occur in the present and will occur in the 
future (Tammepuu et al., 2009). In hazardous environments, as argued 
by [Flynn and Theodore, (2001), p. 80], accidents will reoccur; it is only 
a question of time. Risks, hazards and threats can be hidden and kept 
out of the public eye until something serious happens (Tammepuu et 
al., 2008). Therefore, finding approaches to avoid accidents and create 
a safer environment and society has a long history. Major accidents and 
hazards are examples of destabilising factors, which can cause serious 
setbacks and breakdowns in the continuity of a society’s development 
processes. Currently, the requirements concerning emergency prepared-
ness and response in economic enterprises are detailed in international 
and national legal documents and a variety of international standards. 
Nevertheless, the meaning of the word ‘emergency’ differs remarkably in 
these documents and depends on the context.
The International Organization for Standardization’s (ISO) standard 
for Environmental Management Systems (EMS), ISO 14001, is recog-
nised globally and directly details requirements for emergency prepar-
edness and response (ISO 14001, 2004). The global scope of the stand-
ard is reflected in the 129,199 organisations in 140 countries that were 
certified as observing the ISO 14001 EMS standard in 2006 (Balzarova 
and Castka, 2008; ISO/Survey, 2006). Emergency preparedness and re-
sponse is one of the key elements of the standard for which all certified 
organisations have responsibility. 
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In Estonia, the number of organisations certified as observing ISO 
14001 has grown continuously from 50 in 2002 to 419 in 2012. Most 
of these organisations are small- and medium-sized companies (SMEs) 
that have developed integrated quality and environmental management 
systems (IMS); this has led to improvements in their environmental pro-
tection (Belmane et al., 2002). Many of these enterprises have also devel-
oped occupational health and safety management systems in compliance 
with OHSAS 18001 (BSI, 2007). 
A number of studies have been carried out concerning the emergency 
preparedness of ISO 14001 certified enterprises. Some of these studies 
focus on major chemical hazards and their relationships to ISO 14001. 
For example, Rosenthal and Theiler (1998) discuss the ISO 14000 op-
tion of implementing the United States Environmental Protection Agen-
cy’s rule on Risk Management Programs for Chemical Accidental Re-
lease Prevention. Gerbec and Kontic (2009) conducted a survey of the 
implementation of the Seveso II Directive in enterprises in Slovenia, in 
which they found that the majority of the ‘Seveso enterprises’ were com-
bining the Safety Management System required by the directive with 
voluntary management systems, including ISO 14001. Other studies 
that focus on any of a broad range of ISO 14001 topics also include 
emergency preparedness and response. In a survey of the implementa-
tion status of EMS in U.S. colleges and universities, Savely et al. (2007) 
demonstrate that environmental emergency preparedness and response 
procedures were present in 88% of the cases studied. Sambasivan and 
Yun Fei (2008) argue that organisational preparedness for emergency 
situations is a key component of organisational change. Marazza et al. 
(2010) studied the environmental aspects under the control of local au-
thorities and emphasise that the risks of environmental accidents could 
be included. Saengsupavanich et al. (2009), as part of an environmental 
performance evaluation of a Thai port and the adjoining industrial es-
tate, studied emergency preparedness and planning. They identify the 
availability of an emergency plan as one of the indicators of environmen-
tal performance (Saengsupavanich et al., 2009). Tammepuu et al. (2009) 
conducted a case study of emergency preparedness in a landlord port, 
Tallinn, in Estonia. Although emergency preparedness and response is 
an important component of ISO 14001, we could not find any studies 
specifically directed at the meaning of the key phrase of the standard, 
‘emergency preparedness and response’. 
Consequently, we decided to perform a case study of ‘emergency pre-
paredness and response’ solutions for selected organisations in Estonia. 
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The three specific aims were to determine (1) how organisations identified 
and assessed potential accidents and emergencies, (2) how organisations 
organised their emergency preparedness planning and responses and (3) 
how organisations arranged the testing of emergency preparedness and 
any corresponding training. The overall objective was the identification 
of common features in the organisations’ approaches that could then be 
recommended to interested organisations and stakeholders.
2. EMErGEncy PrEParEDnEss in iso 14001
The ISO 14001 standard provides a practical and workable framework 
for controlling environmental risk and thus preventing accidents and 
violations of environmental regulations (Kwon et al., 2002), and emer-
gency preparedness is one of the key ISO 14001 measures. Avoiding 
the environmental risks that arise from an organisation’s activities and 
mitigating the impacts of accidents and emergencies is one of the goals 
of implementing an EMS (Belmane et al., 2002). Organizations vol-
untarily follow a set of standards to establish, implement and maintain 
procedures to identify and respond to potential emergency situations 
and accidents. While organisations voluntarily devise and develop the 
EMS, the ISO 14001 system compels them to respond to actual emer-
gency situations and accidents while preventing or mitigating associated 
adverse environmental impacts. 
Nevertheless, ISO 14001 defines neither ‘emergency’ nor ‘emergency 
preparedness’, and consequently, certain ambiguities may lead to dif-
fering interpretations of the standard’s requirements. For example, the 
Estonian Emergency Preparedness Act of 2000, valid until the 23rd of 
July 2009, defined an emergency as ‘an event or a chain of events, which 
endangers national security, the life and health of persons, causes signifi-
cant damages to the environment or extensive economic damage’ [Parlia-
ment of Estonia, (2000), Section 2 of General Provisions]. Responding 
to an emergency requires ‘the co-ordinated action of the Government of 
the Republic, government agencies and local governments’ [Parliament 
of Estonia, (2000), Section 2 of General Provisions]. Although this is 
the legal definition in Estonia, it does not fit into the context of ISO 
14001 as it is almost the equivalent of Smith’s (2001, p.7) definition of 
disaster as ‘an event, concentrated in time and space, in which a commu-
nity experiences severe danger and disruption of its essential functions, 
accompanied by widespread human, material, or environmental losses, 
which often exceed the ability of the community to cope without ex-
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ternal assistance’. The new Estonian Emergency Act (2009) defines an 
emergency as ’an event or chain of events that threatens the life or health 
of many people or causing great damage to property or large and exten-
sive environmental damage or serious disruption in the maintenance of 
critical services and for the resolution of which is necessary the expedi-
tious co-ordinated action of several institutions or the persons engaged 
by these institutions’ [Parliament of Estonia, (2009), Section 2 of Gen-
eral Provisions]. This definition is more suitable to the legal requirements 
for the implementation of an ISO 14001 based EMS.
The EU Civil Protection Financial Instrument (2007) defines emer-
gency as ‘any situation, which has or may have an adverse impact on 
people and their preparedness as a state of readiness, which the capacity 
of human and material means enable them to ensure’ [EC, (2007), Ar-
ticle 3]. This definition permits the classification of almost any type of 
accident in which humans suffer as an emergency. Martin (1998, p.69) 
emphasises that emergencies ‘include releases to the environment of all 
types, natural disasters that might lead to releases and process hazards 
that might become emergencies’. In our opinion, an emergency, in the 
context of either an EMS or IMS, can be principally defined as an ac-
cident for which external aid is additionally required to provide an ade-
quate response; i.e., organisations need to call emergency services such as 
the fire-brigade, ambulance, police etc.
 
2.1 risk in the context of the standard
Although ISO 14001 does not define or include the word ‘risk’, the iden-
tification of potential emergency situations and accidents is based on the 
assessment of the probability that they will occur. Despite omitting the 
term ‘risk’, sources cited within ISO 14001 do contemplate risk assess-
ment and management. The various requirements of ISO 14001 view 
risk not as just encompassing emergencies and accidents but in a broader 
context that covers additional uncertain and undesirable environmental 
impacts (Jones and Mason, 2002; Martin and Edgley, 1998; Voorhees 
and Woellner, 1998). An organisation’s management applies risk assess-
ment to the process of identifying significant aspects of the environment, 
including those that can cause accidents and emergencies (Põder, 2006). 
Furthermore Zobel et al. (2002) recommend that incident risk be taken 
into account when monitoring abnormal conditions. Clarke and Kouri 
(2009) account for both direct and indirect environmental interactions 
in risk-benefit analysis when choosing appropriate EMS for universities 
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or colleges. In principle, a risk analysis-based approach is possible for the 
implementation of both IMS and EMS (Labodova, 2004). 
2.2 on-site and off-site hazards
Usually, the hazards faced by an organisation are on-site and either di-
rectly or indirectly environmental in aspect. The potential accidents and 
emergency situations that may arise from these hazards have to be ac-
counted for during an environmental assessment. ISO 14001 states that 
environmental aspects of risk assessment should not be limited to nor-
mal operational conditions; abnormal and emergency situations must 
also be considered. This presumes that the selected methodology for 
environmental hazard assessment is sufficient to account for that prob-
ability (e.g., assess the risk). Voorhees and Woellner (1998) note that to 
understand the degree of risk, ISO 14001 requires the following envi-
ronmental concerns to be addressed: the scale of the impact, the severity 
of the impact, the probability of occurrence and the duration of impact. 
Organizations often hire outside risk management specialists to assist 
with the identification of potential emergency situations or accidents 
that could cause human injury, environmental damage or economic loss 
(Schaarsmith, 2005).
ISO 14001 does not specify that the potential accidents and emer-
gency situations covered by the procedure(s) could only result from an 
organisation’s activities, products and services (e.g., environmental as-
pects of on-site hazards). The guidelines of ISO 14004 (2004) state that 
in establishing its procedure(s), an organisation should also consider the 
potential for any emergency situation or accident at a nearby facility 
(e.g., plant, road, railway line). Therefore, the organisation has to broad-
en the scope of potential emergency situations. Hence, the coordination 
of additional risk assessment(s) or the analysis of off-site emergency out-
comes is necessary for the complete identification of potentially hazard-
ous events.
2.3 Emergency response and testing
ISO 14001 only requires the existence of procedures to respond to ac-
cidents and emergencies. The lack of specificity in the standard enables 
multiple interpretations. A number of authors recommend that emer-
gency plans emanating from or in addition to the procedures be com-
piled (Batts 1999; Belmane et al., 2002; Voorhees and Woellner, 1998; 
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Whitelaw 2004). Large companies usually implement the necessary 
plans at all of their sites (Batts, 1999). According to the recommenda-
tions of ISO 14004, plans can document the organisation and related 
responsibilities in case of an emergency including a list of key person-
nel, details of emergency services, internal and external communication 
plans, actions specific to different types of emergencies, information on 
hazardous materials (e.g., material safety datasheets) and training plans 
and tests for effectiveness (ISO 14004, 2004; Voorhees and Woellner 
1998). Belmane et al. (2002) provide an overview of the special resourc-
es, equipment and guidelines for handling accident residue.
An important requirement of ISO 14001 concerns the periodic test-
ing and simulation of emergency procedures, but it leaves the methods 
and frequency of such testing open to interpretation and that can lead to 
disagreements between auditors and clients (Batts, 1999). The absence 
of periodic testing is a typical mistake in the maintenance of EMS (Bel-
mane et al., 2002). 
3. MatErials anD MEtHoDs
This study was conducted by sending a survey to selected Estonian ISO 
14001 certified organisations. The questionnaire consisted of 16 ques-
tions, including 7 open questions, 6 questions with a selection of an-
swers and 3 closed questions, that were designed to elicit information 
about the structure of the enterprises and their compliance, aspirations 
and problems with ISO 14001 certification in the context of emergency 
preparedness and response. The questions embraced the following topics:
•	 Identification of possible emergencies and accidents
•	 Types of identified accidents and emergencies
•	 Emergency preparedness and response procedures and emergency 
plans
•	 Training and testing
•	 Proposals for continuing improvement
•	 Sources of information
Our quantitative analysis was based on either the percentage and/or 
the number of responses. We rounded percentages to the nearest inte-
ger, and if the number of responses fell short of the total (45) due to a 
questionnaire being incomplete, the shortened total was recorded, e.g., 
30% of 43.
Initially, we selected 84 companies with the longest records of hav-
ing certified environmental management systems; therefore, we included 
182
organisations that had certified environmental management systems in 
place before the publication of the new version of the ISO 14001 stand-
ard in 2004.  We sent our questionnaire to these 84 companies. For-
ty-five of these organisations returned completed or partially completed 
questionnaires, and the results are presented in Table 1.  
table 1. Activities of the Estonian ISO 14001 Certified Businesses Surveyed (N=45) 
Frequ- 
ency
Business Activity Category Size of Workforce and 
Chemical Accident Hazard (+)
6 Electronics and electrical equipment 70,110,110,130,490,520
5 Construction 90,220,270,290,330
4 Chemical industry 60+,60+,110+,210+
4 Energy Production and distribution 140,160+,300,990
3 Petroleum products 50+,110+,150+
3 Printing 40,50,180
2 Building materials 80,130
2 Design 70,100 
2 Furniture industry 130,200
2 Metalworking 70,650
2 Waste management 210,350+
1 Animal husbandry 180
1 Aviation Data Not Available
1 Automobile components production 800+
1 Forestry 1300
1 Medical equipment production 90
1 Oil shale production 4600
1 Port services 740
1 Textile industry 150
1 Transport and logistics 60
1 Wood industry 250
The workforce sizes were rounded to ‘tens’ and ranged from 40-4600 
for an average workforce size of 350 and a median of 150 for the 44 
enterprises. Almost 23% (10 of 44) were companies with potential ‘ma-
jor chemical accident hazards’, according to the criteria of the Seveso 
II Directive (1997), or ‘hazardous enterprises’ according to the criteria 
of Estonia’s Chemicals Act of 1998 (Parliament of Estonia, 1998). De-
spite the fact that the prescribed threshold quantities of chemicals in the 
Chemicals Act are significantly lower than in the Seveso II Directive, the 
companies are still obliged by the Chemicals Act to compile an emergen-
cy preparedness plan (Tammepuu et al., 2007).
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In addition to simple descriptive statistics, we used factor analysis in 
SAS software (SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC, USA) to uncover the main 
patterns and structures in emergency preparedness and response.
4. rEsults 
4.1 identification of possible emergencies and accidents
The results indicated that 96% of the enterprises identified possible acci-
dents and emergencies during their assessment of environmental aspects. 
The causes of possible accidents, the non-environmental aspects, were 
considered by 73% of the organisations. Enterprises identified possible 
accidents using an occupational risk assessment in 82% of the cases, 
and 40% of the organisations, mainly those with chemical hazards, con-
ducted additional environmental risk assessments. Other methodolog-
ical approaches for conducting assessments were used by 13% of the 
organisations and were comprised of qualitative assessments based on ex-
pert knowledge, methods originating from object-specific requirements, 
identification during environmental impact assessments and specific 
methods of risk assessment such as for raw materials and products. In 
45% of the 44 cases, enterprise personnel conducted the identification of 
possible accidents and emergencies. External consultants were employed 
in 32%, and a combination of both was used in 23% of the cases.
  
4.2 types of identified accidents and emergencies
The categories of accidents and emergencies that the enterprises identi-
fied covered a broad range from the traditional (fire and vandalism) to 
the modern (bomb threats and IT security). The enterprises, as expected, 
ranked fire (100%) as the most common possible accident. Four-fifths of 
the enterprises (80%) identified accidents with dangerous chemical sub-
stances as a serious potential hazard although only 23% of the enterpris-
es were considered hazardous under the Estonian Chemicals Act or were 
deemed to have a major chemical accident hazard by the Seveso Direc-
tive. The enterprises identified accidental pollution of soil and/or water 
(62%) as more probable than air pollution (31%). A noteworthy hazard 
was explosions (58%), which may be due to the identification of bomb 
threats as a potential cause of explosive events. Other accidents identified 
were vandalism, technical break-downs, occupational accidents, natural 
gas accidents, slips, electrical accidents, animal epidemics, bomb threats, 
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transportation accidents, security and IT risks and off-site events, such as 
major accidents at neighbouring enterprises, extreme natural conditions, 
epidemics, disruptions to the power supply and other networks as well 
as radioactive pollution of the surroundings.
4.3 Emergency preparedness and response procedures  
and emergency plans
All of the enterprises declared the existence of an emergency preparedness 
and response procedure (the ‘main procedure’), which is a precondition 
for implementing an ISO 14001 management system. The majority of 
the organisations (89%) disclosed the existence of supplementary docu-
ments of preventive measures. Only 5 organisations (11%) declared that 
the main procedure was their sole document that described both meas-
ures for prevention and mitigation of adverse environmental impacts. 
Of the 44 enterprises that answered the question, the majority admitted 
to the existence of supplementary documents of preventive measures. 
Almost half of the companies had a fire safety document (48%), close 
to a third had both a chemical safety document (32%) and an occupa-
tional health and safety document (27%) and a fifth had a collection of 
safety guidelines (23%) and an operational control manual (18%). Less 
common were emergency plans (9%) and plans for the maintenance and 
cleaning of equipment, handling of problematic waste, security, evacua-
tion plans, veterinary and sanitary guides (5% or less). 
The 23 enterprises that answered the question claimed to have doc-
uments pertaining to mitigation measures. The most frequently cited 
documents addressed counter-pollution (43%), fire safety (30%) and 
operational control as well as waste and dangerous chemicals handling 
(17%). Emergency plans and procedures were both disclosed twice (9%), 
and documents concerning automatic control and other mitigation spe-
cific issues, such as ignition of machinery, automatic monitoring and 
high-pressure equipment, were mentioned once (4%). 
The survey did, however, demonstrate that a majority of the enterpris-
es (67%) had, in addition to their ‘main procedure’, emergency plans for 
their responses, which are not directly required by ISO 14001. Almost 
half of the enterprises (49%) described the structures of their emergency 
plans. The emergency plans of these 22 enterprises contained a varie-
ty of components including response action guides (86%), names and 
contacts of responsible personnel (68%), information and communica-
tion data (50%), descriptions of possible emergencies and consequences 
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(45%), details of response resources (41%), guidelines for co-operation 
with neighbours (18%), evacuation guides (9%) and systems for energy 
and communication exchange (9%). Other components were less dis-
closed. As expected, the most complete and detailed emergency plans 
were those of the 10 enterprises considered to be hazardous or have the 
risk of a major chemical accident. Because all of these enterprises in-
volve both hazardous chemicals and combustible materials (petroleum 
and oils), they need to abide by the regulations of either or both the 
Seveso II Directive and the Estonian Chemicals Act, which have strict 
requirements for the development of emergency plans. The need to have 
an emergency plan is as important as having regular reviews (ISO 14001 
4.4.7). The importance of regular reviews is reflected by the frequen-
cies of the reviews claimed by the enterprises: every three years (1/45), 
every two years accompanying internal audits (1/45), annually (30/45), 
bi-annually (3/45) and quarterly (1/45). As these responses indicate, the 
timing of the reviews is not necessarily linked to regular time-frames. 
Reviews occur: during ordinary internal audits and more frequently if 
needed, when necessary, when situation or conditions have changed, 
before internal audits or after an emergency and during continuous 
amendments to response plans. The need for the practical application of 
the emergency plan or emergency response procedure(s) was highlighted 
by 33% of the organisations.
4.4 training and testing 
ISO 14001 4.4.2. clearly states that certified enterprises have the re-
sponsibility to identify training requirements and ensure that every staff 
member whose actions may have an impact on the environment receive 
suitable training. The enterprises took one of four routes to deliver a pro-
cedure for identifying training needs and devising and delivering train-
ing courses to the relevant staff: (i) 27% employed foreign consultants 
to manage the entire procedure; (ii) 47% employed foreign consultants 
to support their in-house personnel; (iii) 24% required their in-house 
personnel to manage on their own (24%); (iv) 2% chose thematic ex-
ternal training courses. The long-term advantage of the second option is 
that the companies’ in-house personnel should be competent to manage 
on their own within a few years. In addition, 60% of organisations dis-
patched their selected categories of workers’ to thematic external courses. 
Thirty-four of the 45 enterprises responded to the question about the 
subjects of the training courses and ranked the most important topics 
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covered as follows: 1st general emergency preparedness and response 
(56%), 2nd fire safety (44%), 3rd environmental pollution (24%), 4th 
evacuation (15%), 5th first aid (12%), 6th welding safety (6%), 7th electri-
cal safety (6%) and 8th occupational safety (3%). 
We expected fire safety, occupational safety, and first aid to be the 
most important as legal requirements exist for all three topics. We as-
sume the respondents did not associate the topics of occupational safety 
and first aid with the theme of emergency preparedness and response as 
required by the ISO 14001 standard. 
We have categorised the content of the emergency training courses 
as ‘general’ when aimed at all employees, ‘semi-specific’ for a particular 
group of the workforce, or ‘specific’ for a few specialists. The results of 
the organisations’ responses to this question are presented in Table 2 and 
clearly indicate that Estonian businesses believe a broad range of employ-
ees would benefit from emergency procedure training.
table 2. Degree of Content Specificity in Emergency Training Courses by Estonian 
ISO 14001 Certified Enterprises in (n=37)
target Employees content category choice of Enterprises





First aid providers Specific 14%
Masters Semi-specific 8%
Drivers Specific 5%
Rescue team members Specific 5%
The testing of the emergency preparedness and response procedures 
was performed as follows: 73% of the organisations practised theoret-
ical training with role-playing; 64% also conducted practical training 
with selected employees, and 57% also organised practical exercises for 
most of their employees. Training exercises, as distinct from role-plays, 
enable trainees to apply theoretical knowledge to practical situations. 
Two-thirds of the enterprises involved emergency services (police, fire, 
ambulance) and other local or governmental offices; 23% practiced the 
exercises in cooperation with neighbouring enterprises, and 39% of the 
organisations employed external instructors to supervise the training ex-
ercises. 
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4.5 Proposals for continuing improvement
Proposals for continuing improvement in the field of emergency prepar-
edness and response inside the framework of ISO 14001 were presented 
by 20 of the 45 respondents (44%) and resulted in 13 recommendations: 
urgent need for more practical training (4 of 20 enterprises), compre-
hensive identification of possible accidents and emergencies and imple-
mentation of risk assessments (3), more careful compliance with legal 
acts and other requirements (3), regular training (2), more detailed safety 
instructions (1), compilation of emergency plans (1), creation of rescue 
teams (1), improvements to security systems (1), cooperation with sci-
entific and development organisations (1), improvements in communi-
cation between partners (1), comparative analysis of the experiences and 
emergency preparedness systems of similar organisations (1), continuous 
review of the risk assessment processes (1), and the need for more specific 
information sources (1).
4.6 information sources
One of the open questions referred to the availability of reference mate-
rials and facilities for use in preparing and maintaining emergency pre-
paredness and response procedures and corresponding measures. Twen-
ty-nine organisations answered, and we have identified eight categories 
of sources of information: legal acts and regulations (13), materials from 
consultants and training courses (8), guiding information from rescue 
service(s) (7), ISO standards and guides (6), unspecified sources includ-
ing thematic guides and instructions from the Internet (6), specific guid-
ance for subject fields and concern(s) relevant to the organisation(s) (5), 
experiences and conventions (4), and responses of other enterprises to 
previous accidents (1). One of the 29 organisations complained of the 
lack of pertinent information sources.
4.7 common patterns and structures according to the factor analy-
sis
The results of the factor analysis covering 34 answers to the questions 
about the identification of possible emergencies and accidents, prepar-
edness, training and testing are presented in Figure 1. Only questions 
answered variably by the 44 enterprises were included. This means, for 
instance, that fire was excluded from the factor analysis as it was iden-
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tified by 100% of the respondents, so there was no variability. The first 
two factors account for 23.7% of the total variability. 
The first factor mainly characterises the relationship with the hazard and 
the second factor with safety. The factor analysis enabled the following 
inferences. The specific methods for the identification of possible  emer-
gencies and accidents were used by the organisations with more haz-
figure 1. Results of the factor analysis of selected questions. Abbreviations used in the 
figure: Id – identification of possible emergencies and accidents (Id1: assessment of envi-
ronmental aspects, Id2: assessment of off-site hazards, Id3: occupational risk assessment, 
Id4: additional environmental risk assessments, Id5: other methodological approaches), 
Per – persons identifying possible accidents and emergencies (Per1: enterprises’ own 
personnel, Per2: external consultants), Type – types of identified accidents and emer-
gencies (Type1: explosion, Type2: dangerous chemical substances, Type3: accidental air 
pollution, Type4: accidental pollution of soil and water), P – emergency preparedness 
and response procedures (P1: supplementary documents of preventive measures, P2: 
collection of safety guidelines, P3: fire safety document, P4: operational control manual, 
P5: occupational health and safety document, P6: emergency plans, P7: chemical safety 
document), ERP – general emergency response procedures (ERP1: common plan, 
ERP2: specific procedures not originating from the common plan), Tr – route to deliver 
a training procedure (Tr1: in-house personnel required to manage on their own, Tr2: 
foreign consultants employed to manage the entire procedure, Tr3: foreign consult-
ants employed to support their in-house personnel, Tr4: selected categories of workers 
dispatched to thematic external courses), Test – testing of the emergency preparedness 
and response procedures (Test1: theoretical training with role-playing, Test2: practical 
training with selected employees, Test3: practical exercises for most of the employees, 
Test4: training exercises supervised by external instructors, Test5: practical exercises in 
cooperation with neighbouring enterprises, Test6: practical exercises in cooperation with 
emergency services (police, fire, ambulance) and other local or governmental offices.
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ard(s), and external consultants were used more often in these cases. The 
organisations with low levels of hazard but with well-developed safety 
measures mainly used foreign consultants to manage their entire emer-
gency preparedness and response procedure, including the organisation 
and execution of training. Emergency plans existed in the more hazard-
ous organisations, while the less hazardous ones preferred using sepa-
rate procedures. The enterprises with larger workforces were relatively 
more hazardous. Testing of the emergency procedures through practical 
training was related to the hazard factor, except in the case of practical 
exercises in cooperation with neighbouring enterprises. The regularity of 
training was related to the safety factor.   
5. conclusions
The survey indicated that the Estonian organisations that have imple-
mented certified ISO 14001-based Environmental Management Sys-
tems have, despite the ambiguous requirements in the standard, largely 
taken similar approaches to compiling emergency procedures. Never-
theless, there were also many variations. The majority of the studied 
organisations combined the identification of possible accidents and 
emergencies with the assessment of the significant environmental as-
pects, which is consistent with Põder (2006), and occupational risks. 
Most of the organisations also took into account off-site hazards as rec-
ommended by ISO 14004. The most frequently identified accident was 
fire, a logical outcome, but less expected among the majority of answers 
were potential explosions and chemical accidents. The organisations 
with higher hazard levels preferred to incorporate foreign consultants 
into the identification of emergencies and risk assessment. The majority 
of these enterprises included accident prevention and loss mitigation 
measures in their special emergency response procedures and EMS doc-
uments. About two-thirds of the enterprises declared emergency plans, 
which is in accord with observations from several studies (Batts, 1999; 
Belmane et al., 2002; Voorhees and Woellner, 1998). Emergency plans 
frequently contained subdivisions, such as response action guides for 
concrete emergencies, the names and contacts of selected responsible 
personnel, brief descriptions of consequences, resources for response 
and special information and communications. The responsibility for 
conducting emergency training courses was held by enterprise staff in 
approximately a quarter of the cases, by off-site consultants in another 
quarter and by a combination of both in half of the cases. As expected, 
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the organisations with higher hazard factors employed more practical 
emergency training exercises. According to the survey results, we rec-
ommend a similar approach to the identification and assessment of sig-
nificant environmental aspects and possible accidents and emergencies. 
The outcomes of the current study also led us to suggest the compilation 
of emergency plans to promote more capable and effective systematic 
emergency responses, even though such a compilation is not required 
by the standard. 
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